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1. Introduction   
1.1. Research Puzzle and Research Question  
There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, nor 
more dangerous to manage than the creation of a new order of things 
(Machiavelli 1513, 19). 
  
 
Severe conflicts from the 1980s onward would, along with the repercussions 
of the end of the Cold War, transform the regional security order in Africa. In the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s, the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
challenged ECOWAS’ (legal) peacekeeping capabilities in their member states’ 
territories. Even though it had adopted protocols1 regarding peace and security 
responsibilities, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) lacked 
a clear legal basis for its interventions in these conflicts (Hartmann 2010, 80). 
However, the adopted protocols only referred to interstate wars—whereas the 
ones in Liberia and Sierra Leone constituted a new kind of war, and thus required 
different types of reaction and intervention. As these wars included a range of 
non-state actors who have been less interested in taking over sovereignty in the 
classical sense, opting rather for control over diamond fields, these new identity- 
and resource-based intrastate wars challenged the existing security order in West 
Africa dramatically (Francis 2006, 140).  
Almost simultaneously, the genocide in Rwanda shocked the African continent. 
From April to June 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were murdered and 
another estimated 2 million were displaced in what is today known as one of the 
worst atrocities of modern times (Englebert and Dunn 2013, 79f.). The 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) not only suffered from being unable and 
unwilling to intervene in Rwanda but also, more generally, from hiding behind 
its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. By 
lacking a robust peace and security mandate, the OAU by then was perceived as 
highly ineffective—and thus incapable of dealing with the severe conflicts on the 
                                                           
1 Namely the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 (ECOWAS 1978) and the Protocol on Mutual 
Defence Assistance in 1981 (ECOWAS 1981). 
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continent (Engel and Porto 2010, 1f.). Additionally, the international 
community’s waning interest in Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War’s end, as 
well as changing geopolitical interests among the great powers, have changed the 
continent’s self-perceptions regarding how to deal with questions of peace, 
security, and development (Babarinde 2013; Franke 2006; Tardy and Wyss 
2014).  
Thus, the two most powerful African regional organizations (ROs) at that time 
had two things in common: First, despite having adopted peace and security 
protocols2, both suffered from ineffectiveness and imprecision regarding their 
peacekeeping mandates. Second, ECOWAS and the OAU were challenged in their 
self-perceptions of their very own peace and security responsibilities in light of 
decreasing support from the international community. To sum up, the decade 
after the end of the Cold War emphasized the high functional need for both ROs 
to ensure effective security mechanisms.3 But what options did these two ROs 
have available in designing their new security mechanisms? They could have 
either crafted completely new institutions to deal with the specific demands on 
the African continent or they could have looked around to see what was already 
there in other such organizations.  
By adopting the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” in 1999, ECOWAS 
institutionalized its shift of emphasis toward peace and security (ECOWAS 1999). 
The Mediation and Security Council (MSC) that had been established by the 1999 
protocol represents the main decision-making body in peace and security matters 
of ECOWAS, and is designed after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
Only one year later, the OAU would decide to transform itself into the African 
Union (AU) by adopting the so-called Constitutive Act. Article 4 (h) dismisses its 
former non-interference doctrine by explicitly calling for the “right of the Union 
                                                           
2 The OAU had adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 
1993 (OAU 1993b). 
3 The term “security mechanisms” is used synonymously with that of “security organs,” meaning 
the institutionalized security responsibilities of ROs. By speaking of security mechanisms or 
security organs, this thesis refers for example to the Peace and Security Council of the AU, the 
Panel of the Wise of the AU, or the Mediation and Security Council of ECOWAS.  
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to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect 
of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity” (OAU 2000c). The subsequent “Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union” (PSC 
Protocol) institutionalized the main AU peace and security bodies (AU 2002b).  
What did the AU do, meanwhile? Having the same options available as ECOWAS 
previously, the AU’s decision-makers did not create new institutions either—
being influenced rather by already-established mechanisms. The Peace and 
Security Council (PSC), as the main decision-making organ, shares some striking 
institutional similarities with the MSC, and therefore also with the UNSC. 
Furthermore the AU established a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a 
Peace Fund, a Panel of the Wise, and an African Standby Force (ASF). All of these 
institutions can be found under ECOWAS too, and partly also within other 
African ROs such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development4 (IGAD) 
(Hartmann 2016; Levitt 2003; Murithi and Mwaura 2010).  
The question that still remains open is why. For what reasons has ECOWAS 
established a security organ that is similar to the UN? And why did the AU follow 
suit, not only in establishing a similar main decision-making body like that of the 
UN and of ECOWAS but also indeed an entire overall structure akin to that of 
ECOWAS? These questions are not only interesting in the light of institutional-
design debates. It has been discussed at length why states act through 
organizations (Snidal and Abbott 1998), and why they design them in the ways 
that they do (Koremenos et al. 2001). Conventional approaches explaining the 
specific institutional design of international organizations (IOs) as well as 
regional ones either point toward endogenous factors, such as state interests or 
collective norms (Acharya 2009a; Solingen 2014), or they explain that 
institutional design by exogenous factors, such as hegemonic states (Katzenstein 
2005). These rather vertically driven explanations have recently been 
complemented by the more horizontally driven approaches of diffusion theory, 
which argues that organizations influence each other in their institutional design 
                                                           
4 The third chapter of this thesis deals with the similarities in the institutional design of these 
organs in detail. 
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(Jetschke 2017). By investigating the growing phenomenon of such organizations 
closely resembling each other, this thesis positions itself right at the center of 
these key debates. It enriches the study of diffusion mechanisms in general, but 
also sheds light on the role of knowledge and information in shaping 
international relations. As complexity and uncertainty grow, decision-makers are 
increasingly relying on expertise. As this is often unavailable inside their own 
organizations however, experts and networks of experts represent therefore one 
important source of knowledge for these decision-makers. As they have gained 
importance in general IR debates, as crucial go-to sources for solving 
international cooperation problems (Haas 1992b), those experts also need to 
move to the center of diffusion debates as essential stakeholders—ones that not 
only possess the required knowledge but also share it with other organizations. 
Additionally, the questions raised are also interesting given the aforementioned 
changing relations between the international community and African states and 
organizations after 1990. An increasing interest in finding “African solutions for 
African problems”5 would not only be found in Africa itself, but also on the 
international stage.6 Processes of increasing “African agency” in international 
politics have consequently been part of discussions ever since then (Beswick and 
Hammerstad 2013; Brown 2012; Brown and Harman 2013).  
 
                                                           
5 The statement “African solutions to African problems” is a difficult one. After being (cynically) 
used to describe the withdrawal of the international community from Africa in the 1990s, it was 
reappropriated by the AU and El-Ghassim Wane in the mid-2000s. Since 2014 it has been used 
academically by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, with its launch of a new platform 
in the form of a publication called the Journal of African-Centred Solutions on Peace and 
Security (Abdalla 2016, V). 
6 The rising difficulties that the UNSC faces in dealing with changing peace and security issues 
worldwide have led to increased calls for regional arrangements to play their part too in 
assuming peacekeeping responsibilities (Wilson 2008, 184). It was Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then 
UN secretary general, who first underlined the importance of a stronger involvement of regional 
arrangements in peace and security issues. In his Agenda for Peace, he explicitly refers to 
“regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations 
efforts [that] could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper 
sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs” (Boutros-Ghali 
1992, § 64). 
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1.2. State of the Art and Research Gaps 
Institutional design has been the subject of academic discussion for a long 
time now; two different explanations have been predominant herein (Katzenstein 
et al. 1998; Keohane and Nye 1971; Martin and Simmons 2002). The first mainly 
draws on functional arguments to explain regional cooperation. These 
functionalist approaches posit that regional cooperation is the result of 
independent decision-making in one region or part of the world. Thus, regional 
institutions are the result of specific cooperation problems that need to be 
resolved (Hasenclever et al. 2002; Koremenos et al. 2001; Zürn 1997).7 According 
to this view, regional integration is the outcome of the problems that states face; 
furthermore, it is characterized by independent decision-making. As such, 
functional approaches are able to explain the emergence but not the similarity 
between regional institutional designs.  
A second approach emanates from the assumption of interdependency within 
and between world regions. Following this reasoning, ROs do not exist and/or act 
in isolation—while hence only certain models of regional integration disseminate 
(Jetschke 2010; Jetschke and Lenz 2011; Risse 2016). Research on diffusion—
which can be understood as the process through which ideas, norms, and values 
spread across time and space (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Gilardi 2016; Strang 
1991)—has evolved into a nascent academic field. A growing body of literature is 
thus now concerned with ROs making decisions based on those of peers, “because 
of [the] material, social, and cultural connections” (Duina and Lenz 2016, 1) 
between them. In this vein, many scholars have explained similarities in the 
design of ROs by stressing the latter’s interdependent decision-making 
processes—and thereby offering a rather new perspective in the emerging field of 
comparative regionalism (Börzel and Risse 2012; Gilardi 2013; Jetschke and Lenz 
2011).  
                                                           
7 States can either face endogenous problems, such as economic interdependence, or exogenous 
challenges, such as globalization, and have to respond accordingly (Börzel 2016; Jetschke 2017; 
Risse 2016). The mainstream theories of regional cooperation and integration put a strong focus 
on the state as the main actor involved in and driver behind the related processes (Mansfield 
and Milner 1997). 
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There is currently a debate about whether diffusion is to be seen as an outcome 
or a process. While some researchers stress institutional convergence as an 
indicator of diffusion (Holzinger et al. 2008), others underline the process nature 
of the latter and criticize the concentration on outcomes alone (Risse 2016). As 
research on diffusion becomes more elaborate, the same holds true for research 
on its underlying mechanisms too (Elkins et al. 2006; Holzinger et al. 2008; 
Schimmelfennig 2012). The literature thereby mainly refers to three broad classes 
of diffusion—learning, emulation, and competition—and is rich with different 
examples of related processes (Dobbin et al. 2007; Gilardi 2016; Simmons et al. 
2006). However existing studies on diffusion mechanisms are mainly 
quantitative, and their operationalization and measurement of relevant 
mechanisms often unspecified. The current literature overlooks the evidence for 
social mechanisms, while qualitative studies that not only describe diffusion 
mechanisms but go deeper into them to explain why decision-makers opt for a 
certain institution or policy are absent (Maggetti and Gilardi 2015). This study 
aims, then, to rectify this situation. 
When it comes to the stakeholders involved in diffusion processes, the research 
is not as advanced as it is for the related mechanisms. Jetschke and Lenz (2011, 
457) are among the few scholars who have included actors in their theoretical 
reflections, doing so by differentiating between virtual, formal, and informal 
channels of diffusion.8 Systematic and broader reflections, as well as empirical 
research on stakeholders, are noticeably missing, being currently limited to 
single-case studies such as that of Alter (2008)—she analyzes the role of jurist 
advocacy networks in the establishment of courts of justice. Botto (2009), 
meanwhile, describes the role of academic networks in Mercosur; Saldias (2010) 
shows the influence of transnational jurist networks in the Andean Community 
(AC) in the process of adopting an EU-style court.  
Although diffusion research is mainly characterized by processes of information 
transfer, the crucial question of who its various stakeholders are remains still 
                                                           
8 By virtual channels, Jetschke and Lenz refer to the transfer of information between decision-
makers via communication technologies. Formal channels describe interregional interactions 
between ROs, whereas informal ones denote expert networks as one important such channel for 
information exchange between decision-makers (2011, 457). 
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under-researched at present. It has been discussed that globalization processes 
lead to a more complex world, one in which international-policy coordination 
becomes evermore difficult to achieve. Decision-makers therefore increasingly 
rely on knowledge that is not always available inside their own organizations. As 
the research has shown, and as noted earlier, these decision-makers therefore 
need to increasingly consult experts possessing the relevant knowledge in order 
to be able to understand and hopefully solve global problems. Those experts and 
their networks therefore have a tremendous impact on international-policy 
coordination, as they not only hold the requisite knowledge but also share it with 
decision-makers too (Haas 1992b, 1f.). Until now, there have been only a few 
studies that recognize those expert networks as channels of diffusion—and that 
consequently have combined the researching of epistemic communities with that 
of diffusion processes too. As those stakeholders have the core task of sharing 
their knowledge and information within diffusion processes, their role needs to 
be much more at the center of our interest as well. Questions such as who is 
involved and how still need to be answered, and so this thesis aims at taking the 
first steps toward doing precisely that. 
In sum, diffusion theory is not only able to explain similarities between ROs but 
also to identify the underlying mechanisms leading to institutional similarities. 
Research on diffusion is already well elaborated and documented for numerous 
different organizations (Börzel and Risse 2012; Haastrup 2013) and regions 
(Acharya 2004; Jetschke 2010) by now. But the existing research focuses mainly 
on the European continent alone, and furthermore neglects the crucial role of 
stakeholders. What is still missing, then, is not only more extensive research on 
the Global South, but also on the key influence of those expert networks bringing 
indispensable knowledge into decision-making processes. How they interact with 
decision-makers remains under-researched, as does how they are interconnected 





1.3. Theoretical Argument 
This thesis is based on the assumption that decision-makers in ROs do not 
act in isolation but rather within an interdependent system.9 Following diffusion 
theory, it is argued that decisions made in regional or international organizations 
influence decision-making processes in other organizations too. What follows is 
a conscious process of adopting institutional features from other regional and 
international organizations. This does not lead to the complete adoption of a 
given institutional design, but rather to an intentional process of partly selecting 
certain design features (Duina and Lenz 2016; Elkins and Simmons 2005; 
Jetschke 2010).  
The present thesis is also built upon the conjecture that so-called new wars in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau challenged ECOWAS’ ability to solve 
crises in West Africa. The waning interest of the international community in 
Africa as a whole has additionally forced ECOWAS to renew its existing security 
structures. Having learned not only from those crises but also from the 
experiences of the UNSC—as the organization deemed to have a suitable security 
institution—ECOWAS thus established within its own walls a security council 
similar to the UN one. According to diffusion theory, learning processes could be 
observed herein. 
This thesis is furthermore based on the assumption that the OAU rawly 
experienced its own impotence during the genocide in Rwanda. Having being 
faced with the unwillingness of the international community to intervene itself, 
the OAU also realized the stark need for a new security mandate—as well as more 
suitable security structures. As ECOWAS had already established its own new 
security structures, the OAU/AU learned intimately, then, from the experiences 
of that RO—this due to the close ties between these two organizations. Following 
                                                           
9 This assumption of interdependence is not limited to diffusion scholars only, and long predates 
the influence of game theory and the rational-choice literature. Already in 1944, anthropologists 
would put “stress on diffusion, that is, the process of adopting or borrowing by one culture from 
another various devices, implements, institutions, and beliefs” (Malinowski 1944, iii). Cultural 
transfer scholars would argue along similar lines. By referring to the emerging hybridity of 
cultures, Edward Said stressed that “all cultures are involved in one another […] all are hybrid, 
heterogeneous” (1993, xxv). 
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diffusion theory, social-learning processes have been the predominant ones in the 
establishment phase of the APSA. 
The present thesis follows the argument that these learning processes are 
facilitated through stakeholders sharing their knowledge. Decision-makers in 
ECOWAS have been advised by individual think tanks, but relevant knowledge 
has been generated mainly by personal networks of influential persons within 
ECOWAS, AU, and the UN. The AU—as the organization most closely simulating 
ECOWAS’ design—has been strongly advised by expert networks, ones that have 
acted as knowledge-holders as well as knowledge-sharers. As such networks 
could build their knowledge on the experience of ECOWAS—in the establishment 
of whose security structures they were partly involved—then the AU too could 
subsequently establish similar structures.  
These stakeholders serve as one major explanation for why we can observe 
different kinds of learning mechanisms existing between ECOWAS and AU. 
Whereas ECOWAS in their decision-making process “only” had the UN as a role 
model and organization with a similar decision-making organ for peace and 
security issues to look to, the AU—emerging later in time—could draw much more 
on ECOWAS for inspiration. As argued for social-learning-diffusion mechanisms, 
organizations learn exceptionally well and swiftly from close peers—such as from 
ROs existing on the same continent (Meseguer 2004, 2005, 2009). Facilitated 
hereby are learning processes involving networks of experts who hold and share 
their knowledge both with decision-makers and among themselves (Adler and 
Haas 1992; Haas 1992b; Risse-Kappen 2008).  
 
1.4. Research Design and Case Selection  
This thesis is realized using a qualitative research design. Aiming at 
explaining social processes and their underlying causal mechanisms as fully as 
possible, a qualitative research design is particularly useful for these ends 
(Dresing and Pehl 2013, 5). The thesis thus strives to analyze the interactions of 
actors and mechanisms, in order to explain their complex causal relations 
(Scharpf 2000, 56). A qualitative research design permits the analysis of the 
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raised questions in-depth, and is therefore able to successfully reconstruct the 
observed social processes. 
This research is designed as a comparative study of two cases, ECOWAS and AU, 
asking why the security mechanisms of both share similarities not only with each 
other but also with the UNSC. ECOWAS—as a subregional organization with a 
predominant hegemon and fifteen mainly francophone members within its 
ranks—differs significantly from the continent-wide AU, which encompasses all 
African countries as member states. Whereas ECOWAS started in 1975 with the 
clear goal of ensuring only economic cooperation, the OAU—predecessor of the 
AU—initially aimed at pushing back colonialism and restoring sovereignty to 
African states. This study aims, then, at tracing the processes leading to both of 
their institutional designs, in order to explain which mechanisms underlay them 
and what kind of stakeholders have been influential therein.  
Accordingly, this work is realized using a multimethod approach. The first step of 
this involves undertaking content analysis. Various protocols of meetings and 
other legal documents (policy papers and background material) are analyzed, in 
order to gain more detailed insight into the different meetings and procedures 
leading to the institutional design of the security mechanisms of both ECOWAS 
and AU.10 In the process of procuring official documents of ECOWAS and 
OAU/AU, several difficulties have arisen. First, while both organizations do have 
web pages and electronic archives neither possesses all the relevant documents—
and are thereby not comparable with the electronic archives of the EU or the UN 
for example.  
Second, although an archive, as well as the registry of the Legal Counsel, are to be 
found at the headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa, which between them do 
possess a number of legal documents, they still do not have all the relevant ones 
filed however. Third, both organizations do not produce minutes from meetings 
that are available to researchers. Therefore, it is much more difficult to trace 
                                                           
10 These documents have been partly researched on the web pages of the AU and ECOWAS, but 
were mainly found in the archive of the AU as well as in the registry of its Legal Counsel. The 
author would like to thank all the involved persons in charge, particularly Mr. Sirak Tesfaye 
from the African Union Archive as well as Dr. Papa Mamadou Diop from the Office of the Legal 
Counsel of the AU.  
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processes without being able to look at the records from the relevant meetings. 
To address these difficulties, interviews were conducted to close the knowledge 
gaps arising from not being able to access all the relevant documents. Thus, thirty 
structured expert interviews were undertaken in total.11 Using the data derived 
from content analysis and the interviews, historical process tracing is employed 
in order to “trace causal mechanisms” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 1). Specifically, 
those lying beyond the respective decision-making processes; they are examined 
so as to identify and explain the underlying mechanisms leading to institutional 
similarities in ECOWAS and AU. 
 
1.5. Overview of Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into two parts. Whereas the first part (chapters 2–5) 
aims at conceptualizing diffusion processes between security institutions, the 
second part (chapters 6–9) aims at fully explaining these.  
Following the introduction that forms chapter one, the second chapter then 
gives an overview of current research gaps and elaborates on the state of the art 
regarding the institutional-design literature. It discusses existing theories 
explaining institutional design, with a particular focus on diffusion theory.  
Chapter three consists of an analytical description of the security mechanisms 
of ECOWAS, AU, and the UN. The institutional design, as well as respective legal 
competencies in the peace and security arenas, of these three organizations are 
systematically compared. 
Chapter four presents the theoretical framework of this thesis. It outlines the 
core assumptions of diffusion theory, and derives ones that form the basis for the 
subsequent analysis. 
                                                           
11 Among the interviewees, three distinct groups can be identified. First, academics working on 
this subject matter and observing these processes for years now. Second, current and/or former 
UN, AU, and ECOWAS staff. Third, experts as well as UN, AU, and ECOWAS officials involved 
in these processes, interviewed based on their experience vis-à-vis the policy-making choices 
leading to the specific institutional designs. 
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Chapter five presents the methodological framework and the research design. 
It explains the case-selection criteria, as well as the chosen methods of data 
collection and analysis. Further, the scope as well as limitations of the present 
study are also discussed. 
Chapter six is the first analytical chapter. It illustrates how conflicts in the past 
have shaped the self-perceptions of ECOWAS and AU, and reveals to what extent 
those events can explain the emergence of the witnessed institutional designs of 
the two organizations.  
Chapter seven is concerned with the first case, ECOWAS. By looking at the 
interdependencies between organizations, the ECOWAS-AU-UN triangle, as well 
as Nigeria’s hegemonic influences, it is explained how influential stakeholders 
(namely, Nigerian ones) have shaped the learning processes leading to the 
security institutions now present within ECOWAS. 
Chapter eight illustrates the diffusion process vis-à-vis the AU. By looking 
particularly at the establishment processes of PSC, the CEWS, and the ASF, the 
chapter explains how the AU has learned from ECOWAS’ own experiences—and 
how think tanks and expert networks have brought relevant knowledge into these 
social-learning processes. 
Chapter nine summarizes the findings and concludes the study. It addresses 
the key contributions and implications of the present work, and gives an outlook 














Part I: Conceptualizing 
























2. State of the Art 
 
This thesis aims at explaining why the security mechanisms of AU and 
ECOWAS resemble each other, and furthermore why they share similarities with 
the UNSC. It also examines what role expert networks have played in the 
establishment processes of the security mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS. It is 
argued that severe crises served as triggers for both organizations to rethink their 
existing institutional structures. Based on diffusion theory, this work posits that 
both organizations were, in the process of establishing new organs, influenced by 
(design) decisions that had already been made in other regional and international 
organizations elsewhere around the globe. For ECOWAS, as the first of the two 
ROs to have established security organs, the UNSC was the main role model 
herein. The OAU, meanwhile, heavily relied on the experiences that ECOWAS 
made with its priorly established security organs. In this process of accumulating 
know-how, expert networks played a crucial role not only by holding but also by 
sharing their knowledge—leading to learning processes in organizations. It is 
argued that expert networks have played a particularly important role in the 
social-learning process of the OAU. They not only facilitated the learning process 
with ECOWAS, as an RO that has close connections to the OAU, but have also 
brought knowledge and experience from ECOWAS into the decision-making 
processes of the OAU. 
This diffusion argument is innovative for three reasons: First, it can explain 
institutional change within the security organs of AU and ECOWAS. The 
institutional design of security organs is generally rather stable, and only rarely 
subject to change. As visible in the UNSC, reforms of existing security institutions 
often fail due to great power interests (Gould and Rablen 2014). Although 
security as a policy field has changed tremendously in the past seventy-five to 
eighty years, and furthermore threats have recently come to include a far greater 
number of non-state actors, the security institutions of IOs nevertheless rarely 
adapt to these new challenges (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016).  
Second, diffusion theory describes by definition horizontal decision-making 
processes—ones in which states voluntarily adopt policies based on 
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interdependent decision-making. The African continent has hitherto been mostly 
depicted by applying a rather vertical decision-making scheme. The image of 
Africa as an underdeveloped continent with weak states is still predominant, with 
only the influence of great states often at the front and center of interest 
(Hartmann 2016).  
Third, wide-ranging in the rational-choice literature is the assumption that states 
design organizations to further their own goals, and organizations are thus the 
core preference of states (Koremenos et al. 2001). This thesis will show that 
decision-makers in African ROs learn from the experiences of other African ROs, 
and form their institutions accordingly. In contrast to the rational-design 
literature, the diffusion approach stresses the importance of stakeholder 
interaction—and thereby underlines the ability of organizations to adapt to 
changing circumstances by learning from each other.  
Summarizing the existing literature on institutional design in general and on 
diffusion processes in particular reveals that—although significant research has 
already been conducted—key gaps can nevertheless still be easily identified. First, 
quantitative studies on diffusion mechanisms have had only limited success in 
explaining underlying processes in-depth. Although there have been studies 
regarding specific diffusion mechanisms, more detailed and in-depth research is 
still needed. As part of this qualitative studies are also necessary, so as to answer 
questions such as how and where exactly diffusion takes place. 
Second, diffusion theory does not take into account what root causes can underlie 
decision-making processes. How certain regional and international organizations 
act is often based on what has happened in the past. Therefore, diffusion theory 
should not only research the interdependence between stakeholders, nation-
states, and organizations, but should also stress much more the interconnectivity 
between past and present decisions.  
Third, much more systematic research is needed in order to identify the decisive 
stakeholders in these diffusion processes. As policy-making no longer involves 
only nation-states but increasingly non-state actors too, with uncertainty among 
policy-makers simultaneously also on the rise, then expert knowledge is now 
being widely used to advise those policy-makers on a wide range of issue areas. It 
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is widely accepted that non-state actors—such as transnational networks of 
judges and other epistemic communities—play a crucial role in the various stages 
of decision-making, including in the process of developing the institutional 
design of a given RO. Empirical research on transnational policy networks is well 
elaborated, but is nonetheless still almost entirely non-existent for diffusion 
processes however. As such, it is now necessary to relate research on diffusion 
mechanisms much more closely with the involved stakeholders. 
Fourth, most of the research on institutional design focuses on the Global North. 
There have been numerous studies in the field of Europeanization research 
explaining how the EU has disseminated its influence around the globe. Until now 
there has been very little research on diffusion processes in the Global South 
though, such as between the countries or between the continents that constitute 
it. As a consequence, research on African ROs has been heavily neglected—and 
thus now urgently needs to be expanded. 
This chapter gives an overview of the current research debates in the field. 
Regarding the emergence of institutional design, we can distinguish between 
explanations based on independencies among international stakeholders and 
those based on interdependencies in the international arena. Still-dominant 
integration theories assume that regional cooperation results from independent 
decision-making in certain areas of the world, or within regions. The state of the 
art of this research strand is described in the first part of this chapter (2.1.). 
Theoretical explanations include those based on functional necessity (2.1.1.), 
approaches based on random co-evolution (2.1.2.), and analyses based on 
coercive external pressures (2.1.3.). A further chosen approach emanates from 
the assumption of interdependency between regional and international 
organizations. According to diffusion theory, ROs do not act in isolation—and the 
actions of one affect the decisions of others. Chapter 2.2. therefore describes the 
state of the art of diffusion theory. After elaborating general diffusion theory 
assumptions (2.2.1.), the current literature on diffusion mechanisms is examined 
(2.2.2.)—and that specifically on the role of stakeholders in diffusion processes 




2.1. Institutional Design Research 
2.1.1. Functional Theories 
Functional-institutionalist theories explain the emergence of ROs with the 
collective action problems caused by economic interdependence, to which 
decision-makers respond rationally (Keohane 1984). Rational-institutionalist 
ones answer the question of why institutions emerge with the functions that they 
need to perform. Examples can be found in the description of the US Congress, 
and how its rules support stable legislation (Hall and Taylor 1996, 943). Other 
rationalist approaches in IR see institutions as mechanisms for states to lower 
their transaction costs. It is argued that in an anarchic system with complex 
interdependencies, states demand international cooperation and set up 
international institutions so as to enhance problem-solving (Martin and 
Simmons 1998; Moravcsik 1993; Shepsle 1989). For ROs, this argument is even 
more prominent due to geographic proximity. Globalization and global markets 
are seen as major drivers for regional cooperation, as regional trade and economic 
relations are easier to manage than global ones are (Breslin et al. 2002; Schirm 
2002).  
After having chosen to establish an institution, relevant parties need to also 
decide on its institutional design. Rationalist-functionalist approaches postulate 
that this design is determined by the type of cooperation problem that needs to 
be solved, as well as member states’ preferences. Hence, international as well as 
regional organizations are partly perceived as being “radically different” 
(Koremenos et al. 2001, 761). Other functionalist strands identify key similarities, 
and explain them with higher levels of interdependency. The more 
interdependent states are, the more externalities are created—ones that result in 
higher levels of regional institutionalization (Haftel 2013; Hawkins et al. 2006). 
Problem-structural approaches unfold in line with these arguments. Thus, 
comparable levels of (regional) integration lead to institutional-design 
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similarities as the demands for specific institutions align (Haftel 2007, 2013; 
Krapohl and Fink 2013; Mattli 1999b).12 
To sum up, rationalist-functional approaches conjecture that ROs are the result 
of specific cooperation problems that need to be solved, as (economic) 
interdependency calls for cooperation between states. Results are either radically 
different designs or similar ones, if the cooperation problems faced are also 
analogous. Rationalist-functional theories therefore underline the significance of 
region-specific factors, and largely ignore international or other exogenous ones. 
By doing this, they assume however that ROs act independently from each other. 
 
2.1.2. Random Co-Evolution  
In contrast to functionalist theories, random co-evolution approaches 
emphasize configurations of state preferences. In order to explain institutional 
similarities, they assume that the random co-evolution of institutional design is 
observable if similar interests or ideas exist. This is in line with constructivist 
theories, which also focus on the role of ideas in regional-cooperation processes 
(Duina 2006; Johnston and Acharya 2007). In rationalist approaches, we also 
find similar arguments—that is, stating that international institutions are to be 
seen as the outcome of specific interest constellations. Therefore, states use IOs 
to promote their own objectives and choose the institutional design accordingly 
(Koremenos et al. 2001). Similar to functionalist theories, it is argued herein that 
member states’ preferences, the number of member states, and the respective 
cooperation problems are all decisive factors for institutional design (Böhmelt 
and Pilster 2011). A further important one is the degree of development of the 
states concerned. The design of institutions whose member states are rather 
developed and democratic differs radically from those institutions constituted by 
less developed countries (Milner and Kubota 2005; Solingen 2008, 2012). As 
                                                           
12 It is Ernst Haas (1970, 2004 [1958]) who has—most prominently—argued that cooperation 
problems in the future need to be solved with the help of regional institutions that originally 
aimed at economic cooperation, and only later expanded their mandate to political issues too. 




they vary both within and between regions, similarity of institutional design due 
to random co-evolution is considered a rather rare occurrence. To sum up, 
theories of random co-evolution play only a minor role in explaining 
institutional-design similarities. Similar to functionalist theories, they posit the 
independent decision-making of ROs as being responsible for determining 
factors that are in fact region-specific. 
 
2.1.3. External Pressures  
Another strand of the current literature explaining institutional-design 
similarities underlines the importance of powerful actors or hegemons pressuring 
member states into adopting certain design choices. These realist and 
international political economy (IPE) theories assume that international as well 
as regional organizations are founded by powerful states or hegemons to realize 
their own specific goals (Katzenstein 2005; Krasner 1976). Hegemonic stability 
theory argues that powerful states—whether outside or within the region—even 
help facilitate regional integration, by offering direction and by moderating in 
case of tensions (Gilpin 1987; Grieco 1997; Mattli 1999a).13 There have also been 
recent approaches ascribing the ineffectiveness of ROs to the absence of a 
hegemon or external powerful actor (Fawcett and Gandois 2010; Hemmer and 
Katzenstein 2002). Herein it is argued that powerful states such as China, 
Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, and the US support the emergence of regional 
integration due to their own geopolitical interests, and furthermore have 
enhanced cooperation in numerous policy areas (Börzel 2016, 45).14 
Theories of IPE assume that regionalism is a consequence of, and rational 
response of decision-makers to, changes in the international economy. Recent 
such approaches have argued that increasing integration and interdependence on 
                                                           
13 One example is the US, who acted as external hegemon in the creation of the European 
Community and also supported the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in creating 
a security community (Acharya 2001; Gruber 2000). More recently, scholars have argued that 
the EU supports regional integration efforts worldwide (Schimmelfennig 2012; Telò 2007).  
14 There are also examples where powerful states or hegemons are not willing to act as such in 
order to enhance regional integration. South Africa has greatly supported the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), but is much more hesitant in undermine its leading role in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Lorenz-Carl 2013).  
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the global level is leading to greater institutionalization worldwide. As a result, 
regional cooperation and integration are being strengthened (Mauro et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, regional-integration processes are progressing parallel to rising 
overall integration at the global level. Consequently these approaches expect the 
increasing regional integration of member states who are upwardly integrated in 
global structures, and therefore develop similar regional institutions (Dees et al. 
2007). 
To sum up, IPE and hegemonic theories include exogenous factors in their 
attempts to explain the institutional design of regional and international 
organizations. However these exogenous factors are described as being either 
globalization forces or coercive pressures. In the case of the latter, it is assumed 
that ROs are interdependent—but that interdependence arises from the 
relationship with the (global) hegemon, and not among the ROs themselves. 
Concerning globalization, external factors are seen as decisive—but institutional-
design similarities are explained as independent answers to common pressures. 
IPE and hegemonic theories thus also ultimately overlook the interdependent 
nature of the decisions taken by regional and international organizations. 
 
2.2. Diffusion Theory  
2.2.1. Development of Diffusion Research 
There is a growing literature on diffusion processes between different 
regional and international organizations.15 Originating from sociological 
institutionalism, diffusion theory claims that there are global scripts about 
institutions—ones that are carried around the world (Boli and Thomas 1998; 
Meyer 1987; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). A vast number of works (e.g. Börzel and 
Risse 2012; Gilardi 2013; Solingen 2012) refer to either Strang’s definition of 
diffusion as “any process where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a 
population alters the probability of adoption for remaining nonadopters” (1991, 
325) or alternatively (e.g. Elkins and Simmons 2005; Jetschke and Lenz 2011; 
                                                           
15 The appearance of the term “diffusion” as such in journal titles in Sociology and Political Science 
increased from fifteen to twenty occurrences per decade by the 1950s to thirty-seven per decade 
by the 1990s (Elkins and Simmons 2005, 36). 
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Weyland 2005) to Rogers’ classical definition of diffusion as a “process by which 
an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system” (1983, 5).  
Despite having different research focuses, three assumptions unite the diffusion 
theory literature: First, that diffusion is a consequence of interdependent 
decision-making (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Gilardi 2013; Jahn 2006; Jetschke 
and Lenz 2011, 2013; Solingen 2012). Second, in most of the research, diffusion 
is characterized as a phenomenon that occurs in distinct waves. The literature 
often refers to diffusion waves or clusters by speaking of temporal and geographic 
spreads of innovation (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Walker 1969; Weyland 2005). 
Third, these works refer to the decentralized nature of diffusion—wherein the 
numerous stakeholders take decisions voluntarily, in the absence of a 
coordinating authority (Börzel and Risse 2012; Jetschke and Lenz 2011; Maggetti 
and Gilardi 2015). 
Based on these three conceptualizations, there has been intense academic 
discussion regarding how to best contemplate or understand the various sources, 
processes, and mechanisms of diffusion. First, it has been discussed whether and 
if so to what extent we need to distinguish between single and multiple diffusion 
sources. Generally speaking the EU is considered a single stimulus, whereas 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are seen as multiple different diffusion 
sources (Kim et al. 2016; Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer 2014). Second, the 
academics grapple with how to discern what it is that actually diffuses. What are 
the objects of diffusion? Lenz and Duina (2016) refer to problem definition, 
problem framing, and problem articulation. Risse’s differentiation (2016) 
between three diffusion objects is in a similar vein. He argues that regional 
cooperation and regional integration can be objects of diffusion, as can 
institutional-design features and specific regional-governance practices in 
certain policy areas.  
Third, very recently debate has arisen about whether diffusion needs to be 
conceptualized as an outcome or as a process. Some research strands see 
institutional convergence as the most important indicator of diffusion (Holzinger 
et al. 2008; Jetschke and Lenz 2013; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Other 
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approaches argue, meanwhile, that diffusion is related to a process and so cannot 
be measured only by its outcomes. Accordingly, the different phases of diffusion 
as well as the interactions between involved actors need to be taken into account 
(Duina and Lenz 2016; Jahn 2015; Risse 2016).  
In recent years numerous studies applying diffusion research to different world 
regions or policy areas, as well as to specific institutions, could be found. Research 
regarding the diffusion of institutional design around the globe is vast and very 
insightful. Baccini et al. (2014) show that different trade agreements around the 
globe form institutional-design clusters. Similarly, Duina (2006) describes how 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has played an exemplary 
role in constituting trade agreements elsewhere and subsequently. Alter (2012, 
2014, 2016) convincingly elaborates how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
diffused, resulting in eleven copies of it being discoverable around the globe. The 
increasing similarity of the AU to the EU has been elaborated on by Packer and 
Rukare (2002). As an example from the Middle East shows, meanwhile, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) has also been inspired by the EU with regard to its 
institutional design as well as its founding charter (Fawcett 2013). Lenz (2012) 
and Buzdugan (2013) discuss how European integration models have diffused to 
SADC and its common-market objectives. Anja Jetschke (2010, 2012, 2017) 
elucidates, furthermore, how ASEAN has adopted European-style institutions 
despite its explicit “ASEAN way.” 
However most of the diffusion research is still focused on diffusion processes 
from the Global North to the Global South. Despite some examples from Asian 
ROs, diffusion research within the Global South is still by and large absent (Risse 
2016, 96). Acharya (2009a) and Dash (1996) depict how ASEAN has been a model 
for the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). Diffusion processes from Mercosur to the Pacific Alliance have also 
been described (Tvevad 2014), as have those between Mercosur and SADC 
(Mattheis 2014). A notable exception from the otherwise exclusive scholarly 
concentration on the Global North is the Comparative Regional Organizations 
23 
 
Project (CROP).16 Based on content analysis of the founding and amending 
treaties of eighty regional and international organizations worldwide, CROP 
explains any discovered similarities and diffusion mechanisms. Furthermore, 
based on its extensive codebook, it has become possible to explain diffusion 
processes of RO institutional design as well as norm and policy area diffusion too 
(Jetschke et al. 2018). 
Furthermore, recent literature has been concerned with the diffusion processes 
of single policies and policy areas.17 Hiro Katsumata (2011) shows that ROs 
develop similar policies, based on the example of ASEAN and its establishment 
of new cooperative security agendas that can also be found with the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Kurt Weyland (2005, 2006) 
explains the diffusion of social security reforms based on the Chilean-style 
pension privatization of the 1980s. Furthermore, Brooks and Kurtz demonstrate 
in their analysis of capital-account-liberalization strategies in Latin America from 
1983 to 2007 how the transfer of innovations is “conditioned by the legacy of a 
country’s pre-debt crisis economic development model” (2012, 95). Similarly, 
Elkins et al. (2006) show that the spread of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
is driven by competition over foreign direct investment. The diffusion of 
environmental standards in the US, from California to the federal government, is 
described by Vogel (1995) meanwhile.  
A significant part of diffusion research is concerned with that of norms. Even only 
implicitly, the spread of norms has long been an important aspect of international 
politics. A famous example is Samuel Huntington’s (1991) “third wave of 
democratization,” which can be considered a diffusion process. Explicit diffusion 
studies, meanwhile, describe how democracy moves between neighboring 
countries (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Starr 1991). 
Constructivist approaches also underline the role of ideas and identities in 
diffusion processes. Acharya (2009b) explains differing regional cooperation 
between Europe and Asia by way of the role of identity in the latter region. Other 
                                                           
16 CROP is conducted at the University of Göttingen, Germany, under the guidance of Professor 
Dr. Anja Jetschke. The author was herself previously part of the CROP research team. 
17 For an excellent overview of policy diffusion research in Political Science, see Graham (2013).  
24 
 
scholars have researched the role of legal culture in economic-integration efforts 
(Duina 2006), or the role of identity in the establishment of regional-security 
communities (Kupchan 1997). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) famously describe 
the norm cascade, and how norm dynamics relate to political change. One of the 
few examples of research regarding norm diffusion in the Global South is that of 
Dwarka and Attuquayefio (2014), who argue that norm diffusion in Africa has not 
been unidirectional and that the AU has been heavily influenced by ECOWAS— 
particularly in the peace and security field.  
 
2.2.2. Literature on Diffusion Mechanisms  
A central focal point of the diffusion literature is concerned with the 
mechanisms through which institutions and policies diffuse. In defining what 
mechanisms can be considered relevant herein, the research varies greatly. In 
their conceptualization of diffusion from a horizontal perspective, Jetschke and 
Lenz (2011) exclude vertical mechanisms such as coercion or material incentives. 
Other scholars such as Börzel and Risse (2012), Gilardi (2013), Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier (2005), as well as Simmons et al. (2006) include those direct 
mechanisms in their considerations that denote the specific processes through 
which hegemonic stakeholders exert their influence.  
What unites most diffusion researchers is the underlying decision logic. Being 
located on a continuum, the two ends constitute the logic of consequences and 
the logic of appropriateness respectively (March and Olsen 2006). Figure 1 below 
shows how the various horizontal mechanisms are situated on this continuum.  
Figure 1: Horizontal Mechanisms of Diffusion 
Logic of consequences                   Logic of appropriateness 
 
Rational learning · Bounded learning · Social learning   Emulation · Mimicry 
        
Source: Jetschke and Lenz 2011, 461 
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The mechanism “rational learning” is associated with the logic of consequences, 
as it describes how rationally acting stakeholders try to achieve fixed goals and 
preferences so as to maximize the benefits for themselves (Meseguer and Gilardi 
2009; Sommerer 2011). Moving further to the other side of the continuum, 
Jetschke and Lenz (2011), Meseguer (2004, 2005, 2009), and Hall (1993) still 
categorize mechanisms such as “bounded learning” and “social learning” under 
the logic of consequences, but ascribe them with elements of the logic of 
appropriateness. Many examples of this can be found in the literature. Yeo (2008) 
as well as Jetschke and Murray (2012) show how decision-makers in ASEAN have 
adopted EU-style institutions through learning processes. How the Washington 
Consensus led to a spread of liberal economic policies during the 1980s and 1990s 
through learning processes has been analyzed by Williamson (1990). Related to 
this, Tommasi and Velasco (1996) demonstrate how critical economic situations 
in Latin American countries during the 1980s led to learning processes vis-à-vis 
numerous models in other countries elsewhere. Kurt Weyland (2004) explains, 
meanwhile, how rational learning is the underlying mechanism in the adoption 
of market reforms in a number of Latin American countries.  
Moving a little further along the continuum, the mechanism “emulation” is a well-
debated aspect of diffusion literature, and included in the categorization of 
Jetschke and Lenz (2011) as well as Risse (2016). Emulation is considered to be 
the process in which states adopt policies because of their normative and socially 
constructed characteristics, and not because of their objective features (Tolbert 
and Zucker 1983). Polillo and Guillén (2005) show how states adopt policies to 
increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Similarly, 
Lenz (2012) describes how Mercosur and SADC took on certain institutional 
arrangements from the EU via emulation. Other scholars argue that emulation 
can be also understood as norm diffusion. Examples include the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and its role as a 
“teacher of norms” (Finnemore 1993) or Henri Dunant, founder of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who defined what is permitted 
during times of war and what is not (Gilardi 2013).  
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On the very end of the continuum, the mechanism “mimicry” is assigned to the 
logic of appropriateness. As visible in figure 2, this mechanism is also to be found 
in the categorization of Risse (2016)—which is also built on the same decision 
logic, but contains both so-called horizontal and vertical mechanisms of 
diffusion. 
Figure 2: Horizontal and Vertical Mechanisms of Diffusion 
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Source: Risse 2016, 89  
 
Mimicry as a diffusion mechanism describes the search for legitimacy and 
appreciation. Meyer and Rowan (1977) posit that certain states adopt specific 
policies or institutions to express belonging to a certain community of states. As 
noted, Börzel and Risse (2012), Gilardi (2013), Risse (2016), Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2005), as well as Simmons et al. (2006) all include so-called vertical 
or direct diffusion mechanisms in their theoretical considerations, in contrast to 
Jetschke and Lenz (2011). One of these is the mechanism “coercion,” which is 
allocated to the logic of consequences. Risse (2016) identifies the 1999 Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe on the Western Balkans of the EU as one example 
of forced regional cooperation. Biersteker (1990) claims that the attachment of 
conditions in processes of financial help provision by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank can be considered coercive mechanisms. Similar 
examples can be found within the EU, as it often attaches conditions—such as the 
reform of domestic policies and institutions—to its financial assistance 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Another main diffusion mechanism is 
27 
 
“competition”18, which describes processes in which states adjust their behavior 
in the direction of supposed best practices. Elkins et al. (2006) and Busch et al. 
(2005) outline how states compete over attaining higher employment rates or 
greater economic growth in order to meet certain required criteria. Similarly, 
standard globalization studies operationalize competition as economic and 
financial openness toward other countries (Garrett 1998).  
 
2.2.3. Literature on Diffusion Channels 
Not only have diffusion mechanisms themselves been subject to intense 
academic discussion, but so have (albeit to a much lesser degree) the channels 
through which any relevant information and practices actually spread. As already 
mentioned, Jetschke and Lenz (2011) are among the few scholars to have 
systematically looked at what they call “diffusion channels”. They define these as 
those “through which information and practices diffuse” (ibid., 457). Taking into 
consideration that receiving information about certain practices in other 
organizations is a prerequisite of diffusion processes occurring, they distinguish 
between three types of diffusion channel—virtual, formal, and informal ones. The 
following section will give an overview of current research on the three 
categories.19  
According to these authors, virtual channels are best understood as ones 
facilitating the transfer of information between decision-makers via modern 
communication technologies. In practice, this can be as trivial as decision-makers 
actively looking on the internet or in newspapers for relevant information, as 
Duina (2006) has shown. After having actively searched on the internet for 
strategies used in other world regions, decision-makers then adopt the 
researched approaches. But as it is hard to show causalities between using 
                                                           
18 This review will concentrate on those diffusion mechanisms scrutinized by most scholars in the 
field. Mechanisms such as “positive incentives/negative sanctions” and “norms socialization 
and persuasion” (see figure 2) are rather minor ones that are rarely considered in other 
academic research. What Risse (2016) calls “lesson-drawing” is termed “learning” by other 
scholars. 
19 As the informal channel is the most relevant one for this particular thesis, the author will only 
briefly present current research on the other two channels here. 
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(modern) communication technologies and adopting strategies that have been 
previously researched, there is hardly any existing literature on virtual diffusion 
channels. What can be observed, however, is increasing news coverage of the 
policies and strategies of ROs, and particularly the EU. Until today, it has 
remained unclear to what extent such coverage influences decision-makers in 
their choice of policies.  
The formal diffusion channel describes interregional communication and 
exchange. According to Jetschke and Lenz (2011), interregional relations are the 
single most important channel for ROs. In 1990 the EU had two institutionalized 
interregional fora, and in 2007 already twenty-nine (Smith 2008, 103f.). Yeo 
(2008) has shown that regular exchange between ROs in such interregional fora 
can lead to socialization processes for the involved stakeholders. On a 
quantitative level, Cao (2010, 2012) has worked on networks and their impact on 
diffusion processes vis-à-vis fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policies. Beyond 
that, very little academic attention has hitherto been paid to explaining diffusion 
processes via formal diffusion channels.20  
The third, and for this thesis most important, form hereof is the so-called 
informal channel, which refers to non-institutionalized interactions between 
decision-makers on the one side and non-state actors21 on the other (Jetschke and 
Lenz 2011, 458). Transnational expert networks do not occupy formal state 
positions, but they do possess essential knowledge. Due to increasing complexity 
                                                           
20 Interregional exchange in general has been researched quite extensively by now. A few 
examples are: Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger (2005); Farrell (2007); and Lombaerde and 
Schulz (2009). 
21 The term non-state actors is used here so as to distinguish this research from those approaches 
in international affairs wherein intergovernmental relations are understood as ones in which 
governments are unitarian, and so non-state actors are seen to play no role (Halliday 1991, 197). 
This Weberian notion of the state had exceptional influence on scholars of political realism such 
as Morgenthau and Carr (Biersteker 2013, 247). But not only classical realists transferred this 
concept of the state into their own works; Moravcsik (1993, 1997) also includes it in his 
reformulation of liberalism. Although acknowledging the role of societal actors, Moravcsik 
retains the nation-state as a gatekeeper between national and international policy. Similar 
arguments can be found in Wallerstein’s (2004) world system theory. He heavily relies on 
Weber, by stressing that national sovereignty includes a monopoly over the legitimate means of 
coercion and that nation-states are the only legitimate stakeholders (ibid., 43). The same holds 
true for the constructivist Alexander Wendt (1999) as well, who replicates this concept of 




in international relations, decision-makers rely on knowledge that often is limited 
to specific groups of experts. Transnational networks are one important provider 
hereof, and thereby exert key influence on decision-makers.  
Alter (2008, 2012; Alter et al. 2012) convincingly shows how transnational jurist 
advocacy networks shape different regional courts based on the model of the ECJ. 
With the specific example of the Court of Justice of the AC, Saldías (2010) 
illustrates how transnational jurists have proposed an ECJ-style court to the AC 
based on their prior EU experiences. Similar processes have been observed by 
Dent (2008), outlined in his article about the influential role of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) in regionalism processes in East Asia. Additionally 
there have been studies on epistemic communities in research centers funded by 
the European Commission aiming at transferring regional integration knowledge 
to other world regions (Sanchez-Bajo 1999). These select examples suggest that 
transnational non-state expert groups have significant influence on decision-
makers; more research is needed, however, to be able to make more detailed, 
concrete statements hereon.  
 
2.2.3.1. Transnational Policy Networks 
Horizontal perspectives on policy-making date back to the 1940s, when 
they were first introduced into the academic discussion. By researching the 
interdependency between government, bureaucracy, and organized interests, 
scholars at that time argued that constellations of stakeholders do indeed matter 
(MacIver 1948). A distinct policy-network approach could only be established in 
the 1980s however, when it finally became consensual wisdom that the 
interactions between the numerous stakeholders involved in the policy-making 
process do indeed have an impact on its outcome (Kenis and Schneider 1991). 
This “major shift […] from hierarchical control to horizontal coordination” (ibid., 
36) described a pivotal societal transformation now unfolding, as well as its 
impact on contemporary policy-making. With the geopolitical and world-
economic changes now occurring, interconnections across national borders were 
also on the rise—meaning that horizontal coordination was not only taking place 
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within national boundaries, but to an increasing degree transnationally too 
(Risse-Kappen 2008, 459). As rich as the literature on policy networks certainly 
is, the perspectives therein on the application of this concept are just as diverse. 
Most scholars are still discussing whether there is already in place a sufficiently 
far-reaching theory on the impact of policy networks on public policy-making, or 
whether alternatively it is still a rather loose concept describing only policy-
making in general (Börzel 1998; Lang and Leifeld 2008; Rhodes 2006; Schneider 
2009). In the following a brief overview of policy-network approaches is 
presented, while critiques regarding their actual impact are also discussed. 
Additionally, research describing specific actor groups is introduced.22 
 
2.2.3.2. Policy Networks: A Theory in the Making? 
Given the great variety of policy-network approaches and their 
applications that exist, a number of different overviews of them can be found 
(Börzel 1998; Lang and Leifeld 2008; Rhodes 2006; Schneider 2009). R. A. W. 
Rhodes (2006, 426) categorizes policy networks as attempts to describe 
governments as work, as the reformation of public management, and also as a 
theory for analyzing government policy-making. Those works dealing with policy-
network theory can be distinguished between ones on Great Britain (Rhodes 
1988, 1997), on the rest of the European continent (Börzel 1998; Kickert et al. 
1997), and on the US (O'Toole Jr 1997; Salamon and Elliott 2002). Based on this 
first categorization, Rhodes (2006, 431) distinguishes between two broader 
schools of thought differing in their respective attempts to explain network 
behavior—the power-dependence approach (Rhodes 1988, 1997) and the 
rational-choice approach (Scharpf 1997).  
Tanja Börzel (1998), meanwhile, casts the different understandings of policy 
networks along two dimensions: first, she disaggregates quantitative from 
qualitative network analysis and, second, she differentiates between policy 
networks as a typology of interest intermediation and contrariwise as a specific 
                                                           
22 Policy networks are treated here as the generic term for all specific actor groups made up of   
non-state actors of relevance in given policy processes. 
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form of governance. Treating policy networks as a specific form of governance is 
mostly attributed to scholars of the so-called Max Planck School, such as Renate 
Mayntz, Fritz Scharpf, Patrick Kenis, Volker Schneider, and Edgar Grande. 
According to them, modern societies are “characterized by societal 
differentiation, sectoralization, and policy growth which leads to political 
overload” (Börzel 1998, 259) and “governing under pressure” (Jordan and 
Richardson 1983, 1).  
Based on growing complexities worldwide, functional differentiation is leading to 
actor groups that are specialized in certain key issue areas. This so-called 
informatization trend is closely related to the growing need “for scientific 
expertise in the policy-making process” (Kenis and Schneider 1991, 36). It is 
important to state that, in the academic discussion, policy networks include all of 
the stakeholders involved in drafting and implementing policies in a specific 
domain. Interactions between public and private actors are defined as informal 
and non-hierarchical, interests as interdependent and solution-oriented (Börzel 
1998, 260). In contrast to the dominant government-centric approaches, policy 
networks demonstrate a transforming relationship between state and society—by 
underlining the involvement of a plurality of actors in the policy-making process. 
Scholars therefor argue that policy networks do not merely act as a new analytical 
tool, but also represent a genuine turning point in the structure of polities 
(Mayntz 1993, 5).  
Lang and Leifeld (2008) follow Börzel’s view of policy networks being an in-
between method (they also point here to qualitative as well quantitative network 
analysis) and theory. Regarding policy-network theory, they differentiate 
between five schools: namely, organizational state and political exchange; elites 
and world system; participation and social capital; governance and interest 
procurance; and, issue networks, epistemic communities, and advocacy 
coalitions (which will be described in the next section).  
Although these approaches do certainly have theoretical foundations, Börzel is 
not the only one asking whether policy networks are a “method, model, or theory” 
(1998, 254). The policy-network approach has often been criticized for not being 
able to “take us much further” (Dowding 1995, 136). Detractors castigate the 
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policy-network approach for its inability to generate a far-reaching general theory 
that can enrich existing explanations of the policy process (Dowding 1995, 136). 
Although there is a rich literature about the empirical translation of the policy-
network concept into measurable impacts on the policy process itself (Jansen and 
Schubert 1995; Schneider et al. 2009), the question concerning additional value 
remains a critical one—and further research can thus ultimately only help to 
validate the policy-network approach.  
 
2.2.3.3.  From Epistemic Communities to Advocacy Coalitions  
Another strand of literature points to the specific actor groups who, based 
on shared beliefs, provide specific resources to the policy-making process. In 
contrast to most of the other research emanating from heterogeneous policy 
networks, these scholars proceed on the contrasting assumption of homogenous 
networks existing (Börzel 1998, 258). The most prominent approaches herein 
include epistemic communities (Haas 1992b), advocacy networks (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998), policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984), and issue networks (Heclo 
1978). 
The concept of epistemic communities, prominently featured in a special edition 
of International Organization in 1992, was first introduced by Peter Haas. He 
defines them as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992b, 3). Haas argues that 
based on the growing complexities in world politics, decision-makers now heavily 
rely on knowledge produced by experts. What distinguishes the membership of 
epistemic communities from that of other groups involved in policy-making is the 
authoritative claim to knowledge and shared beliefs as well as principles, in order 
to influence outcomes.  
Haas and others have successfully applied this approach to empirical research, 
especially in the field of environmental policies (Haas 1989, 1992a)—but also in 
the security sector too (Adler 1992). Transnational advocacy networks have been 
postulated by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) meanwhile. What is 
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unique to their network approach is how they are “organized to promote causes, 
principled ideas and norms, and often involve individuals advocating policy 
changes” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 91). In their book Activists beyond Borders 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), these two authors show how activist groups have had 
an impact on such diverse issue areas as opposing slavery, promoting human 
rights, and supporting environmental politics. Another approach vis-à-vis how 
such networks influence policy-making has been presented by Kingdon (1984). 
He defines policy entrepreneurs as political stakeholders who promote ideas 
based on their own interests. The core element of his research thereby lies in the 
process of how policy entrepreneurs manage to initiate policy change by putting 
their ideas concretely on the agenda.  
Empirical research on how exactly policy entrepreneurs spread policy 
innovations has been done by, among others, Michael Mintrom (Mintrom 1997; 
Mintrom and Vergari 1998). The concept of issues networks goes back to Heclo 
(1978), and contains the idea that they will be formed in the policy process based 
on certain ideas and expectations. In contrast to epistemic communities, issue 
networks are dynamic—while members can be very heterogeneous, as they come 
together only based on shared interest and outcome orientations (Leifeld and 

















  If we are to remain free,  
if we are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa’s rich resources,  
we must unite to plan for our total defence and  
the full exploitation of our material and human means,  
in the full interests of all our peoples. 
“To go it alone” will limit our horizons,  
curtail our expectations, and threaten our liberty 
(Nkrumah et al. 1963, xvii). 
 
When African leaders came together in Sirte, Libya, in 1999, they had 
already experienced a decade of ingrained and high-intensity conflicts in Africa 
for which the OAU could not find an appropriate answer. “In dire need of 
solutions to its critical problems” (Adejo 2001, 132), they had to rethink their 
prior approaches in the areas of peace, security, and development. By declaring 
their commitment to transforming the OAU into the AU, deep-rooted reform of 
the former institutions of the OAU was thereby initiated (Adejo 2001; Engel and 
Porto 2010, 2013; Franke 2008).   
This transformation can be understood as a signaling by African leaders of a fresh 
start in the new millennium. Without the influence of the erstwhile great powers 
of the Cold War era, African leaders have instead tried to find “African solutions 
to African problems” (Hartmann 2016, 271)—especially against the backdrop of 
changing security challenges. By transforming the preexisting OAU into the 
newly founded AU, the African heads of state and government emphasized the 
wish for peace, security, and stability on their continent (OAU 2000c, preamble). 
In 2002 they adopted the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace 
and Security Council of the African Union,” whereby they established a series of 
new institutions and elaborated the so-called African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA). The PSC Protocol established the Peace and Security 
Council as the AU’s control center—albeit with it being supported by numerous 
other institutions, such as the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning 
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System, the African Standby Force, and the Special Fund (Engel and Porto 2010; 
Sturman and Hayatou 2010). 
One of APSA’s core characteristics is “its polycentric and multi-level nature” 
(Franke 2013, 73). The AU, as the main, all-embracing organization on the 
continent, relies heavily on other African ROs when it comes to the 
implementation of policies as well as to acquiring local expertise and technical 
capacity. African ROs such as Southern African Development Community, 
ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) have also enhanced 
their peace and security ambitions by strengthening and/or establishing related 
mechanisms.  
Among the aforementioned African ROs, ECOWAS stands out. Originally 
established only to foster economic cooperation in West Africa, ECOWAS 
expanded its focus to security cooperation in the 1990s—and therein developed 
the most advanced security mechanism on the African continent to date (Gandois 
2014; Hartmann 2010; Obi 2009). The revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 together 
with the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” of 1999 paved the way for 
the institutionalization of ECOWAS’ emerging security ambitions. 
A closer look at these mechanisms reveals some interesting observations 
regarding their institutional design. The PSC of the AU and the MSC of ECOWAS 
not only look very similar to each other but also share interesting parallels with 
the UNSC. But why, in fact, do they share these similarities? Until today, a 
systematic comparison of African security organs and their institutional designs 
has been missing. Research dealing with institutional design is still too 
Eurocentric, while non-Western organizations moreover rarely play a role in the 
academic discussion anyway. This dissertation in general and this chapter in 
particular are thus first steps toward systematizing the security organs of AU and 
ECOWAS, by comparing them both to each other and to the UNSC. The definition 
of institutional design utilized here is taken from Acharya and Johnston, who cast 
it as “those formal rules and informal rules and organizational features that 
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constitute the institution and that function as either the constraints on actor 
choice or the bare bones of the social environment within which agents interact, 
or both” (2007, 15). 
The following chapter gives an overview of the emergence, as well as the 
institutional design, of the named security institutions. It is organized as follows: 
It will first give an overview of the security ambitions of the OAU, and of the 
gradual transformation phase into the AU and its APSA. Subsequently, ECOWAS’ 
shift from economic to security cooperation and its related institutionalization is 
elaborated. After clarifying the institutional design and (legal) competencies of 
the security mechanisms of both AU and ECOWAS, the UNSC will then be 
analyzed using the same scheme. 
 
3.1. Organization of African Unity/African Union 
The earliest of the numerous efforts that would be undertaken over the 
years to establish joint African security cooperation date back originally to the 
beginning of the 1920s, intensifying during the decades that followed.23 Calls for 
the uniting of the military forces of African countries so as to fight together 
against the colonial powers became louder as the struggle for liberation slowly 
gathered pace (Franke 2006, 3). It was Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, 
who articulated the idea of an African High Command (AHC) and promoted the 
establishment of an African Legion at the All-African People’s Conference in 
1958. Only a handful of African leaders24 initially supported this—perceived as 
radical—suggestion by Nkrumah, but the underlying idea of a common defense 
                                                           
23 An article in the Communist Review from 1922 claims that “no opportunity should be lost for 
propagandizing the native soldiers in the colonial armies and for organizing secretly a great 
Pan-African army in the same way as the Sinn Fein built up the Irish Army under the very nose 
of England” (Anonymous 1922).  
24 Particularly nationalist leaders, such as Liberia’s President William Tubman, refused to join in 
with the pan-African idea of a common military system, as they feared the eventual political 
unification of the continent (Franke 2006, 4). These profound aspirational differences, in 
combination with conflict over the developments during the Congo crisis and the war in Algeria, 




project had nevertheless now been planted in their minds at least (Touray 2005, 
637).  
The Casablanca group—a collection of states that supported Nkrumah—and the 
opposing Monrovia group—constituted of Liberia, Nigeria, and most of 
francophone Africa, who together were against the political unification of the 
continent—managed to approach each other so as to establish the OAU in 1963 
(Franke 2008, 318). As the ongoing differences between the two groups “allowed 
neither a supranational organization nor a stronger defence structure” (Touray 
2005, 637), the newly established “Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration” was ultimately a rather weak institution. Its main functions included 
the management of interstate conflicts, but not only were very few actually 
referred to it for mediation but also financial shortfalls quickly emerged as 
member states failed to pay their contributions to the organization’s budget. The 
OAU’s Defence Commission—established by Article 20 as a specialized 
commission to be supervised by the Assembly—was instructed to coordinate and 
harmonize the member states’ defense policy. Although the idea for an AHC was 
controversially discussed among member states, meetings regarding 
institutionalized security cooperation took place a number of times under a 
variety of different guises, such as African Defence Organization, African Defence 
Force, or African Peace Force (Franke 2008, 318). 
The OAU, which had come to encompass in the meantime all fifty-three African 
countries,25 started its operations with high hopes for the continent. The founding 
members did not plan anything less than total unity and solidarity among African 
countries as well as their intensified coordination and cooperation to achieve a 
better life for the people of Africa, to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
and independence—alongside the eradication of all forms of colonialism from the 
continent too (OAU 1963, Article 2). One of the most cited and discussed elements 
of the charter is the principle of “non-interference,” as written down in Article 3 
and to which all other ROs and IOs were also adhering at that time. It guaranteed 
                                                           
25 Morocco withdrew in 1984, in protest after the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic 
Republic to the OAU, and would reenter the AU only in 2017. As of 2018, the AU is made up of 
fifty-five member states. 
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all member states that no fellow OAU member would be allowed to intervene in 
their domestic affairs. Often criticized as an excuse for not going into action, 
Article 3 of the charter made the organization incapable of “acting as a credible 
disinterested mediator in the internal conflicts of member states” (Touray 2005, 
638f.). In addition, a lack of financial resources and somewhat unclear legal 
frameworks further complicated the OAU’s work in the areas of peace and 
security.  
The end of the Cold War would mark a lasting milestone in African history. Not 
only the high number of devastating conflicts witnessed on the continent but also 
the waning interest of the international community—and these developments 
being coupled with a now very dynamic political landscape in African countries 
too—led the OAU to eventually rethink its own security and development 
strategies (Franke 2006, 10). During an all-African conference, attended by more 
than 300 delegates, in Uganda in 1991, African leaders consented to the reform 
of the OAU’s approach to African security challenges. They agreed on a unified 
strategy, one combining efforts in areas of security, development, poverty 
reduction, and stability. The final Kampala Document proposed the foundation 
of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa 
(CSSDCA) (Nathan 1992, 212). In the process of establishing the CSSDCA, 
African leaders found their role model for it in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).26 Similar to the CSCE, the CSSDCA is working 
within the framework of four so-called calabashes, or baskets—namely, security, 
stability, development, and cooperation. As a follow-up the Kampala Document 
was presented in the meetings of ROs such as ECOWAS and the Frontline States, 
                                                           
26 The CSCE—also known as the Helsinki Process—was a platform via which the US, the Soviet 
Union, and thirty-three other West and East European countries worked together toward 
improving interstate relations, based on three fields—namely, security, economic cooperation, 
and human rights (Nathan 1992, 212). 
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and at OAU summits in Abuja in 1991, in Dakar in 1992, and in Cairo in 1993—
but was never actually adopted.27  
Almost concomitantly the OAU secretary general, in his report “Proposals for an 
OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution” of 1992, 
called urgently for reform aimed at institutionalizing the organization’s efforts to 
better cope with outbreaks of violent conflict. Given responsibility for 
conceptualizing this mechanism, African leaders presented their revised version 
of the proposal during the OAU summit in Cairo in 1993—and ratified it too. By 
adopting this declaration, OAU member states hoped for the better anticipation, 
prevention, and resolution of the continent’s multiple violent conflicts. Civilian 
as well as military missions for conflict-afflicted areas were provided for. Besides 
this, a specific organ—comprised of members of the Bureau of the Assembly, 
which had to be elected annually, and also of the chairpersons of the Assembly—
was established to coordinate the various activities under the umbrella of the new 
mechanism. To avoid any repeat of the previous financial problems, a special 
fund—made up of allocations from the OAU’s regular budget as well as of 
donations from both the continent and abroad—was created (Touray 2005, 639). 
The newly founded mechanism brought fresh stimulus to the OAU and its 
conflict-prevention approaches. In the following years, the OAU sent several 
military-observer missions to a number of different African countries—such as 
Rwanda (1991–1993), Burundi (1993–1996), and the Comoros (1998–2002). 
At the same time, the OAU would be increasingly criticized as an elite club of 
dictators—a common refrain heard during the 1990s. Far away from the daily 
reality of African people, overloaded with bureaucracy, incapable of solving 
problems caused by severe conflict and extreme poverty—these are only some of 
the negative attributions to the OAU during its last years of existence. The oft-
cited and heavily discussed principle of non-interference in member states’ 
                                                           
27 The Kampala Document could not be adopted at the mentioned summit due to the absence of 
political will and lack of input from member states. As the Kampala Document proposed radical 
change in Africa, numerous heads of state feared a loss of sovereignty (Nathan 1992, 216). 
However, during the OAU summit in Algiers in July 1999, Nigeria’s President Obasanjo called 
for the reconsideration of the Kampala Document, and proposed that the year 2000 should be 
declared the “Year of Peace, Security and Solidarity in Africa” (OAU 1999). 
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internal affairs left the OAU with the stigma of a perceived inability to manage 
the new African landscape that had emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War’s 
end (Adejo 2001; Engel and Porto 2010, 2013).  
A fourteen-member committee, which had been set up to review the current OAU 
charter, submitted a report to the OAU summit aimed at bringing together the 
interests of all member states. Needless to say compromises were difficult to 
reach, especially against the backdrop of the so-called Libyan Initiative.28 Despite 
these difficulties, and based on great efforts being made, African leaders met in 
Sirte in September 1999 for an extraordinary OAU summit—where they declared 
their will to transform the OAU into a newly established African Union (Adejo 
2001, 133). On July 11, 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was 
adopted, and the legal and institutional foundations for this new organization 
were thereby built. Numerous observers certified that were was substantial will 
to genuinely transform the OAU, and not to just create another toothless tiger. By 
giving itself a new vision and a clear mandate, the OAU enlarged its influence on 
the continent (Engel and Porto 2010, 2).  
Additionally, an Assembly of Heads of State and Government, an Executive 
Council, a Pan-African Parliament, an Economic, Social, and Cultural Council, 
and a Court of Justice were all created too. The Commission’s clout was upgraded 
considerably as well, by now giving it a clear political mandate. The stipulated 
objectives, as set out in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act, are inter alia: sovereignty; 
the territorial integrity and independence of AU member states; the political and 
socioeconomic integration of the continent; the promotion of democratic 
principles and institutions; popular participation and good governance; and, the 
successful coordination of policies between both existing and future Regional 
Economic Communities (OAU 2000c). Newly adopted principles on which the 
work of the AU are based are inter alia: the respect for the rule of law; the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and, the upholding of the 
                                                           
28 This idea, authored mainly by Muammar Gaddafi, envisioned a federation of African states. 
Many of Libya’s African peers did not support it, but also did not directly criticize it either. It is 
to be presumed that the North African member states of the OAU intended with this proposal 
to improve their foreign relations (Adejo 2001, 133). In 2009 the AU Assembly adopted a plan 
to implement the United States of Africa by 2017. 
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sanctity of human life. According to Article 4 (h), it is “the right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of 
grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.”29 
As the achievement of peace and security on the continent is at the heart of the 
Constitutive Act, the necessary institutional framework for achieving this was 
soon to be established. On July 9, 2002, the “Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council” of the AU was adopted in 
Durban, South Africa—entering into force on December 26, 2003. Article 2 of the 
protocol defines the PSC as a “standing decision-making organ for the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall be 
a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and 
efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (AU 2002b). To these 
ends, it is supported by the already-founded Commission and the newly 
established Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, African 
Standby Force, and the Special Fund. Its goals encompass, inter alia, the 
promotion of peace, security, and stability, the anticipation and prevention of 
conflicts, as well as the development of a common defense policy among AU 
member states (ibid., Art. 3).  
The PSC consists of fifteen members, of whom ten are elected for two years and 
five are elected for three years—based on the “principle of equitable regional 
representation and rotation” (ibid., Art. 5) of the Executive Council.30 With its 
regional membership and shorter terms of office, as well as the non-existence of 
a veto, the PSC is therefore more the equal of the MSC of ECOWAS. As will be 
                                                           
29 In 2003 the AU amended the Constitutive Act and extended the right to intervene to “a serious 
threat to a legitimate order, to restore peace and stability to the member state of the Union upon 
the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council” (Engel and Porto 2010, 3). 
30 Interestingly, the “big five”—South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt—wanted to ensure 
five permanent seats for those member states with the biggest economic and military capacities 
on the continent. All the other member states refused to accept this proposition however, 
dismissing it by referring to the principle of equality as set out in the Constitutive Act (Sturman 
and Hayatou 2010, 62). 
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shown in chapter 8, for the PSC the UNSC has thereby acted as an example of 
core lessons to be learned—mainly due to the latter’s own problematic structures.  
The PSC is responsible for the promotion of peace, security, and stability in 
Africa, for early warning provision and preventive diplomacy, as well as for peace-
making and peace-support operations and intervention. Additionally, peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction both also fall under the auspices of the 
PSC, as do humanitarian action and disaster management too (AU 2002b, Art. 
6). In collaboration with the chairperson of the Commission, the PSC is 
responsible for the anticipation and prevention of disputes and conflicts, the 
undertaking of peace-making and peace-building functions, the authorization of 
the deployment of peace-support missions, as well as the recommendation of 
intervention in a member state’s territory to the Assembly—along with the 
implementation of a common defense policy among AU member states (ibid., Art. 
7).  
A pivotal role is held by the chairperson of the Commission: they are responsible 
not only for brings matters to the attention of the PSC or the CEWS but also for 
ensuring that the decisions taken by the PSC are actually implemented (ibid.). To 
support the PSC, as noted a Panel of the Wise was established. Comprised of five 
highly respected African public figures, it is mainly responsible for supporting 
conflict prevention (ibid., Art. 11). For both the anticipation and prevention of 
conflict, CEWS was established and furthermore equipped with observation and 
monitoring centers and units (ibid., Art. 12). In order to realize peace missions, 
the ASF was founded—to “be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, 
with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for 
rapid deployment at appropriate notice” (ibid., Art. 13). Its work is supported by 
a Special Representative and a Force Commander, as well as by a Military Staff 
Committee. The latter advises the PSC in all matters related to military needs. 
The newly established Peace Fund is, meanwhile, responsible for the provision of 
necessary financial resources (ibid., Art. 21). Figure 3 provides an overview of the 











Source: Author’s own compilation (based on AU 2002b). 
 
3.2. Economic Community of West African States 
ECOWAS was established on May 28, 1975, as a subregional economic 
organization comprising fifteen member states.31 Its predecessor, the Customs 
Union of West African States, dated back to 1959, and was exclusively created for 
the reallocation of the custom duties that had been levied by the West African 
coastal states (UDEAO 1966). In 1975, with the Treaty of Lagos, the organization 
was renamed, and member states now had to adhere to the exclusive economic 
direction of the new body. Taking European economic cooperation as its role 
model, Nigeria took over the leading role in ECOWAS (Gandois 2014, 43). Soon 
after the latter’s foundation, member states identified political insecurity as one 
of the main barriers to further economic development and the improved well-
being of their people (Elowson and MacDermott 2010, 17).  
Recurring challenges like conflicts and natural disasters over the years have led 
to ECOWAS constantly searching for appropriate response mechanisms by which 
to address these problems. This is why ECOWAS adopted as early as 1978 the 
                                                           
31 At the time of its establishment, ECOWAS saw itself as the first West African RO bridging the 
francophone-anglophone gap. In fact, many (especially) francophone states perceived ECOWAS 
as a Nigerian-led instrument to strengthen its own hegemonic status (Söderbaum and Hettne 
2010, 24). 
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“Protocol on Non-Aggression” and in 1981 the “Protocol Relating to Mutual 
Assistance of Defence” (Birikorang 2013, 89), and thereby went along with the 
emerging wish of African leaders to act in a more self-determined way in the area 
of security cooperation. Decreasing engagement by international security actors 
in African conflicts was preceded here as well, while the wish to find “African 
solutions to African problems” became stronger than ever. In the 1978 protocol 
member states enshrined not attacking or even engaging in aggression with each 
other, committing to solving problems peacefully instead. The 1981 protocol, 
which was signed in Freetown, Sierra Leone, provided for a non-standing military 
force to counter possible threats by external aggressors. As both protocols 
referred only to interstate conflicts, the non-consideration of civil wars soon 
became problematic (Hartmann 2010, 78). However neither protocol was ever 
actually implemented until the 1990s.  
Established originally as an RO having the exclusive aim of facilitating economic 
integration, ECOWAS took over a radical new mandate in the 1990s. Due to the 
increasing number of devastating conflicts in West Africa, ECOWAS had to 
rethink its current conflict approaches and initiate new response mechanisms. 
Particularly, intrastate conflicts such as in Liberia (from 1989) and in Sierra 
Leone (from 1991), alongside the fear of a spillover to the whole region, forced 
ECOWAS into action. In addition, the international community’s diminishing 
tendency to engage with the African continent resulted in ECOWAS needing to 
act in a more self-determined way in the areas of conflict prevention, 
management, and resolution (Birikorang 2013; Gandois 2014). 
Having intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone, member states changed the RO’s 
conceptualization from rather short-term emergency approaches to long-term 
capacity-building. Until then, the possibility of sending peacekeeping forces into 
a member state’s territory had not been provided for in the founding treaty. It was 
particularly the Liberian crisis that caused ECOWAS to starkly notice the non-
existence within its ranks of institutions and provisions to effectively cope with 
this kind of conflict (Gandois 2014; Hartmann 2010). By adopting a revised treaty 
on July 24, 1993, in Cotonou, ECOWAS not only changed institutional-wise but 
also now established for itself a clear security and democracy-protection mandate 
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too. Article 58 of the new treaty, which came into force in 1995, foresaw the 
creation of “appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of 
intra-state and inter-state conflicts” (ECOWAS 1993, Art. 58)—such as a regional 
peace and security observation system and peacekeeping forces.32 Another major 
change in the revised treaty was the introduction of the supranational principle. 
By the “partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the Community 
within the context of a collective political will” (ibid., preamble), ECOWAS took a 
step away from the previously conventional ad-hoc decisions made by member 
states.  
With the earlier “Protocol on Non-Aggression” and “Protocol Relating to Mutual 
Assistance of Defence” never actually being implemented, ECOWAS needed to 
formulate innovative security protocols so as to specify its newly established 
concepts. The “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security”—adopted in 1999, and 
perceived as one of the core protocols in the area of peace and security—outlined 
the goals and criteria for future collaboration among member states. ECOWAS 
had, for many observers, herewith adopted the most comprehensive and 
ambitious protocol regarding peace and security in the West African region to 
date. It not only captured areas of collaboration and the respective organs in 
charge of peace and security operations, but gave also security directives for 
conflict situations—as well as providing for both a civilian and a military force 
(Elowson and MacDermott 2010, 24).33 In Article 25, there is a clearly distancing 
from the earlier principle of non-intervention.34 A serious threat to peace and 
security in the region, significant and massive violations of human rights as well 
as the rule of law, and the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically 
                                                           
32 Interestingly, the treaty’s provisions for peacekeeping forces were only made after ECOWAS’ 
deployment of them to Liberia—making clear how ill-prepared it was to even carry out such 
operations (Birikorang 2013, 90). 
33 After the protocol came into force, ECOWAS intervened in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and then 
played a very active role in peacekeeping there in the decade that followed (Gandois 2014, 43). 
34 According to its 1975 founding Treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS was bound by principles of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention (Iyi 2016, 5). 
46 
 
elected government are, inter alia, circumstances wherein ECOWAS now had the 
right to intervene (ECOWAS 1999).35  
Article 4 of the protocol refers to the involved institutions, namely the already-
established Authority and the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS alongside the 
newly founded MSC. The Authority—the highest decision-making body not only 
regarding the mechanisms but also of ECOWAS itself—is inter alia responsible 
for matters of conflict prevention, management, and resolution, peacekeeping, 
security, and humanitarian support (ibid., Arts. 5 and 6). The Secretariat of 
ECOWAS, meanwhile, has the right to initiate fact-finding, mediation, 
facilitation, negotiation, and reconciliation activities as well as to implement the 
decisions made by the MSC. It serves both the MSC and the Defence and Security 
Commission (ibid., Art. 15).  
The MSC is constituted by nine out of the fifteen member states, with those 
representatives being elected for two years and having the possibility of 
reelection. By acting on behalf of the Authority, it decides on and implements all 
policies for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, peacekeeping and 
security, as well as authorizes all forms of intervention and the deployment of any 
political and military missions. With meetings at the ambassadorial and 
ministerial levels, as well as that of heads of state and government too, the MSC 
thus operates on three governmental levels (ECOWAS 1999, Arts. 8–14).  
Organs assisting the MSC are the Defence and Security Commission (DSC), the 
Council of Elders, and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). 
The DSC consists inter alia of chiefs of defense, officers responsible for internal 
affairs and security, as well as experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It 
gives technical, logistical, and administrative advice regarding peacekeeping 
missions (ibid., Arts. 18 and 19). The Council of Elders, consisting of eminent 
individuals with experience in the peace and security area, is expected to play a 
role in mediation and reconciliation (ibid., 20). Article 21 defines ECOMOG as 
                                                           
35 Interestingly, this protocol was created not only in the aftermath of the ECOWAS interventions 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but also as a reaction to the highly controversial intervention by 
NATO in Kosovo (Abass 2000, 211).  
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“stand-by, multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of 
origin and ready for immediate deployment,” for monitoring, peacekeeping and 
the restoration of peace, humanitarian intervention, as well as peace-building, 
disarmament, and demobilization and policing activities (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 
22). For many observers, the institutional design of the MSC is a nod to that of 
the UNSC (Hartmann 2013, 2016). Figure 4 gives an overview of ECOWAS’ peace 
and security structure. 








Source: Author’s own compilation (based on ECOWAS 1999).  
For ECOWAS and its security mechanisms, the events of the first decade of the 
new millennium were there for them to undergo a practical test. The crisis in Côte 
d’Ivoire in July 2002 was a first milestone, as the MSC—as foreseen in the 
protocol—approved the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to that country. 
The ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) was soon to be followed by 
one in Liberia (ECOMIL) too. Although both of these missions did certainly face 
operational challenges, it was soon obvious that ECOWAS had indeed learned its 
lessons from ECOMOG I and II in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. 
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3.3. United Nations  
The League of Nations had been created in 1920 as a result of World War 
I; the United Nations was established in 1945 as a direct consequence of World 
War II meanwhile, with its aim being the safeguarding of peace for subsequent 
generations. Since then, the UN has become more institutionalized and its areas 
of responsibility increasingly differentiated—while its membership has expanded 
from fifty to 193 states.36 Adopting the UN Charter in 1945 could be understood 
as an answer to the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II, and 
yet this was only a compromise. The great powers harbored fundamentally 
different opinions on the design of the UN, and could only agree on a kind of 
collective security system that would set rules for the international community—
ones to which the great powers themselves would not adhere, though. The charter 
is also criticized for not being as precise as it needs to be when it comes to non-
compliance with rules, to priorities, or to the exact competencies of the UN organs 
(Falk 1971; Gareis and Varwick 2014; Grewe 1984). But the UN Charter can still 
be understood as a “constitution of the international community” (Fassbender 
1998, 531), one that not only managed to survive the twentieth century but that 
also furthermore gave the international community a universally accepted legal 
framework to work within. 
The UN itself consist of several—partly independent—organizations, agencies, 
and programs. As established in Article 7 of the charter, the UN consists of six 
main organs: General Assembly, Security Council, the Economic and Social 
Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the 
Secretariat. If the UN is the most essential international body for the maintenance 
of peace and security, the UNSC is its most powerful organ when it comes to such 
issues. It comprises fifteen member states, of which five—China, France, Russia, 
UK, and the US—have permanent seats and the veto right for any non-procedural 
matter. The ten remaining seats are elected non-permanent member states that 
serve for a two-year term. These ten seats are divided between five regional 
                                                           
36 The UN Charter was signed by fifty founding member states. Poland, who could not be there 
for the inaugural conference, would join the UN later as its fifty-first founding member state 
(Gareis and Varwick 2014, 19). 
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caucusing groups: one country from Eastern Europe, two from each of the 
Western European and Others Group, the Latin America and Caribbean Group, 
and Asia, as well as three countries from Africa (Gould and Rablen 2014, 1f.).37 
The Security Council is able to perform its duties at anytime, and the president38 
calls for meetings if he deems them necessary or if a UNSC member, the General 
Assembly, a UN member state, or the secretary general alternatively does.39 Each 
member state has one vote, but distinctions are made between the respective 
decisions. Whereas those on procedural matters need an affirmative vote of nine 
members, decisions on all other matters need an affirmative vote of nine 
members but also the concurring votes of the five permanent members as well 
(UN 1945, Art. 27). Article 29 of the UN Charter determines the establishment of 
subsidiary organs. At present, there are three different categories hereof: 
committees, peace missions, and international criminal tribunals (Gareis and 
Varwick 2014, 48).  
Article 34 of the UN Charter prescribes, meanwhile, “the right to investigate any 
dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to 
a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or 
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security.” The UNSC is thereby not only the most powerful organ within the UN, 
but also—and foremost—it is unique in global politics. It has the responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security, and is equipped with extensive powers 
to this end. Not only can it investigate any dispute as per Article 34, but can also 
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment at any point in 
time (UN 1945, Art. 36).  
                                                           
37 This is among the biggest sources of criticism regarding the UNSC. The main one is a lack of 
efficiency regarding, or even the blockading of, important decisions—that based on permanent 
member states’ own individual preferences. The second such criticism relates to the non-
existent (geographical) allocation of political power within the UNSC (Gould and Rablen 2014, 
2).  
38 The presidency of the UNSC rotates on a monthly basis, based on the alphabetical order of 
member states’ names (Gareis and Varwick 2014, 48). 
39 The Rules of Procedure of the UNSC determine that no more than fourteen days are allowed to 
elapse between sessions. In practice, the UNSC meets on a daily basis—even several times a day 
in fact (Gareis and Varwick 2014, 48). 
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Whereas its tasks under Chapter VI (Arts. 33–38) remain rather moderate, 
Chapter VII rules specifically on the use of force. After having determined the 
existence of any kind of threat to peace (Art. 39), the UNSC can subsequently 
either apply economic sanctions (Art. 41) or, if these are insufficient, order a 
military intervention (Art. 42) instead. In accordance with Chapter VIII, the 
UNSC can “utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action 
under its authority” (Art. 53). Its prominent position within the UN matrix is also 
reflected in the fact that its decisions are binding for member states, while the 
General Assembly is obliged to honor UNSC decisions when it comes to the 
acceptance of new member states and the election of the secretary general as well 
as judges for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Gareis and Varwick 2014, 
48). For a schematic overview of the peace and security structure of the UN, see 
figure 5. 







Source: Author’s own compilation (based on UN 1945). 
 
 
3.4. Systemizing Security Mechanisms 
After having examined each of the three security mechanisms separately, 
this section will now compare them so as to demonstrate the similarities in their 
institutional design. Close observation of the two African ROs reveals some 
interesting insights. First, it becomes obvious that for both—AU and ECOWAS—
economic and/or political integration were the initial reasons for cooperation. As 
the continent has been and still is particularly affected by violent conflict, extreme 
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poverty and a lack of development thus pose major obstacles for the economic 
prosperity of African countries. Realizing that political stability is a sine qua non 
for economic growth, both African ROs have hence added mechanisms aimed at 
preventing, managing, and solving violent conflicts.  
Second, interesting similarities on the international and continental levels can be 
observed. The PSC of the AU and the ECOWAS’ own MSC seem to follow the 
model of the UNSC, particularly regarding questions of membership and the right 
of intervention. Furthermore the whole structure of the APSA—with its PSC, 
Panel of the Wise, CEWS, ASF, and its Peace Fund—seem to follow the ECOWAS 
structure. In the latter, we can also find the MSC, a Council of Elders, an Early 
Warning System (ECOWARN), a Standby Force, and a Peace Fund (see table 1). 
Table 1: Security Structures of AU and ECOWAS 
 African Union Economic 




Peace and Security 
Council 
Mediation and Security 
Council 
Mediation Body Panel of the Wise Council of Elders 







Funding Mechanism  Peace Fund Peace Fund 
Source: Author’s own compilation (based on AU 2002b; ECOWAS 1999). 
Why is this observation of close similarity relevant? Research on the institutional 
design of peace and security mechanisms is particularly interesting given the fact 
that the institutionalization of these is responsible for every single organization 
achieving its goals (or not). By designing a given mechanism in a certain way, 
regional and international organizations ensure the correct translation of their 
principles and ambitions, as formulated in their constitutions, into concrete 
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policies and actions (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016, 315). This argument 
can be also found in the Rational Design of International Institutions (RDII) 
project by Koremenos, Snidal, and Lipson. Their research is based on the 
assumption that “institutions matter” (Koremenos et al. 2001, 762), this thesis 
follows this argument. 
As systematic approaches to the institutional design of African security 
mechanisms are still absent, it is the first part of this dissertation. The already-
described mechanisms of AU, ECOWAS, and the UN are compared based on 
criteria elaborated out of the findings of the institutional-design literature. The 
first is membership, and denotes the number of actors participating—thus 
revealing how exclusive or inclusive a particular mechanism is (Johnston and 
Acharya 2007, 21f.). The differentiation between permanent and non-permanent 
members is additionally added in.  
The second criterion is also one used by Johnston and Acharya (ibid., 22), and 
refers to the scope of issues that are attributed to an institution. In the present 
case, the mechanisms are thus compared regarding whether they deal with the 
whole spectrum of conflict management or only parts of it (e.g. only with conflict 
prevention). By comparing formal rules, a third criterion is added from the prior 
work of Johnston and Acharya. Ranging from consensus to supermajority, it 
describes how institutions come to their decisions; their voting procedures are 
thus characterized in detail. Whether a mechanism is intergovernmental or 
supranational is a fourth criterion, and represents the degree to which member 
states monopolize capacities within ROs. If member states have a significant 
influence on the decision-making and implementation process, researchers speak 
of intergovernmentalism. Supranationalism, meanwhile, can be found where 
member states do not monopolize these aspects of policy-making (Marks and 
Lenz 2016, 514). Additionally, the fifth and sixth criteria of possibility of a veto 
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As the comparison in table 2 shows, the peace and security organs of the AU, 
ECOWAS, and the UN demonstrate similarities across three different aspects. 
First, only some member states—and that also only for a certain period of time—
are represented in the mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS, as is also the case in the 
UNSC. As with the UNSC, the AU’s own PSC has fifteen member states. Although 
it does not have permanent members like the UNSC does, the PSC still shares a 
similar mechanism by having five members for a three-year period and ten 
members for a two-year one—that also based on regional representation too. In 
the MSC of ECOWAS, meanwhile, similarly nine member states only are 
represented. Alongside the current and immediately preceding chairmen, who 
both enjoy automatic membership in the MSC, seven additional member states 
are elected.  
Second, voting procedures are also comparable. Security mechanisms of both AU 
and ECOWAS decide on relevant matters with a two-thirds majority (for 
procedural matters, the AU sees a simple majority as being sufficient); the 
affirmative vote procedure for the UNSC is comparable to this (the UN also 
distinguishes in their voting rules between procedural matters and all other 
ones). Finally, the right of intervention in member states’ territory applies to all 
three of the UNSC, PSC, and ECOWAS.  
Why are these observations important to study? First, systematic reflections on 
African security mechanisms and their institutional design are still absent to date. 
Research on institutional design is still mainly focused on the European 
continent, and expanding only slowly to non-Western institutions. Similarly, 
what research does exist mainly covers a given IO only either as a whole entity or 
in an economic sense. These observations are also of crucial importance because 
explanations regarding any similarity of institutional design in security organs 
can further enrich the discussion about the role of institutional design in general. 
Taking functionalist approaches into consideration here, while the emergence of 
institutional designs can be explained their similarities cannot. 
Second, and related to the first point, the question of in what sense some African 
security mechanisms have been modeled after the UNSC has not been answered 
yet. Also, why some of the institutional features of the UN have been adopted but 
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others neglected remains opens—best illustrated by the membership question. To 
address these research puzzles, a closer look at the processes leading to final 
decisions (on institutional design) is necessary. There is broad consensus in 
public-policy research that the formulation of new policies involves numerous 
different actors. By having a strong impact not only on the agenda-setting process 
but also that of policy formulation too, expert networks are seen as being 
particularly important stakeholders. Pioneering related research mainly focused 
on domestic policy, but has since also captured foreign policy analysis—especially 
its role across different policy areas. Until now research has been missing 
regarding the role of expert networks, as well as their provision of information, in 
the process of designing IOs and ROs. This is particularly interesting given the 
fact that international policy advisors have played, and indeed still play, a 
considerable role in African security policy.  
Third, and also related to the second point, research on expert networks is mostly 
focused on only one single subgroup. Work has by now already been done on 
epistemic communities, policy entrepreneurs, or advocacy coalitions. The present 
dissertation strives, however, to give a systematic overview of all involved actor 
groups, such as consultants, think tanks, and seconded staff—further to the 
aforementioned subgroups too. By mapping out which expert network groups 
exactly have been involved in the process of establishing (similar) security 
mechanisms in Africa, existing research on their differing impacts on decision-

















4. Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework that forms the basis for 
the empirical analysis that then follows. It sets the theoretical grounds for the 
thesis, and helps to categorize the findings that will be presented in part II of this 
thesis. This chapter is structured as follows: As diffusion theory is the main school 
of thought out of which this work is built, the basic ideas informing that theory 
will be discussed initially. This commences specifically with the basic assumption 
of interdependence (4.1.1.). As the diffusion mechanism “(social) learning” is at 
the center of interest here, this is what will be scrutinized in section 4.1.2. The 
following section 4.1.3 then examines the role of expert networks in diffusion 
processes. The chapter concludes with a summary of the theoretical principles 
introduced, and with the derivation of assumptions that will form the basis for 
the subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
 
4.1. Diffusion Theory 
4.1.1.  Assumptions of Interdependence 
At the heart of diffusion research lies the assumption of interdependence 
between regional and international organizations. It is thus argued that diffusion 
processes are “characterized by interdependent, but uncoordinated, decision 
making” (Elkins and Simmons 2005, 35). This means that actors do make their 
own decisions—that is, without being coerced by great powers or important donor 
countries—after having considered the choices of other stakeholders too. 
Organizational models, rules, and norms that have been established in one setting 
influence other such ones elsewhere too. It is suggested that the development of 
organizations cannot be understood without taking other organizational peers 
into consideration. In this way, material, social, and cultural connections between 
organizations lead to interdependent decision-making processes too (Duina and 
Lenz 2016, 1).  
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Thus, diffusion theory conjectures that the phenomenon can be observed when 
“government policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned 
by prior policy choices made in other countries” (Simmons et al. 2006, 787). 
Additionally, it is argued that the adoption of a particular policy is voluntary by 
nature (Holzinger and Knill 2005; Jetschke and Lenz 2013; Simmons and Elkins 
2004). Having said that, diffusion can also be seen as the consequence of 
interdependence within and between nation-states and/or at the international 
level too (Gilardi 2013, 454).  
In regionalism research, diffusion is applied in answering the question of why 
similar institutional designs emerge in different locations around the globe. 
Diffusion theory argues that “there are global scripts of what constitute legitimate 
institutions and that these scripts are emulated across the globe” (Risse 2016, 87). 
Following this reasoning, diffusion theory stipulates that there is a difference 
between whether there is only one single source of diffusion (such as with the 
UNSC being the only security institution for ECOWAS) or, rather, a number of 
stimuli (such as with the UNSC and ECOWAS’ MSC for the OAU) present 
(Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer 2014). Furthermore, current diffusion research 
stresses that diffusion refers to processes and not outcomes. According to Duina 
and Lenz (2016, 6), diffusion is not necessarily measurable by institutional 
convergence alone. Thus it is argued that diffusion is also to be found in the 
processes leading to institutional design, discoverable by focusing on the 
connections and interactions of stakeholders (Jahn 2015).  
 
4.1.2. Mechanisms of Diffusion 
4.1.2.1. Learning 
In learning mechanisms, organizations or states that are faced with a 
problem requiring institutional change look around for suitable solutions. As the 
consequences of policy change are not certain, they are searching for policies, 
rules, and institutions that have effectively solved similar organizational issues in 
an effective way—and thus attempt to import them to their own unique setting 
(Dolowitz and March 2000; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Risse 2016). Accordingly, it 
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is argued that institutional design originates in more successful contexts, with 
states and organizations learning lessons from the examples of other—often more 
robust—peers. Thereby, learning as such refers to a process in which previously 
held beliefs change due to new evidence (Haas 1990; Meseguer 2009; Sommerer 
2011).  
The learning mechanism in diffusion theory stipulates that decision-makers or 
other individuals inside or associated with an organization closely observe the 
policies or institutions of other ones, doing so in order to be able to evaluate the 
latter’s effectiveness in solving particular cooperation problems (Jetschke 2017, 
178). They may rely on reports of experts or other policy evaluation papers, or 
alternatively on the assessments of other countries possessing insight. Thus 
decision-makers compare the outcomes of organizations that have already 
introduced a new policy or institutions with those that have not experienced such 
change, in order to assess the likelihood of these measures succeeding in their 
own setting. Such learning processes can be rational if the decision-makers apply 
the law of statistics. But they can also be bounded, should decision-makers mainly 
rely on “cognitive shortcuts that may introduce errors in the process” (Gilardi 
2013, 464).  
As is very apparent, learning processes are complex. It is argued that decision-
makers do not necessarily all rely on the same information in the same way, as 
the processing of information is a selective and individual process (Gilardi 2010). 
Furthermore, in learning processes, decision-makers may neglect information 
that does not match their preferences, as their ideological position may be in 
opposition to that which the available information itself puts forward (Volden et 
al. 2008).  
Thus, decision-makers make use of the experiences of other countries or 
organizations in order to be able to better estimate the likely consequences of the 
introduction of new policies (Gilardi 2013, 463f.). Sometimes also referred to as 
“Bayesian updating,” learning is considered a rational process in which actors—
who have already-existing beliefs regarding the consequences of a given policy—
update their prior assumptions as a consequence of the information coming from 
other stakeholders.  
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4.1.2.2. Social Learning 
One such type of learning is social learning. Herein, decision-makers do 
not necessarily learn from more successful organizations but from those with 
which they have a close connection. The latter denotes any kind of interaction 
that underlines how far organizations are aware of the policies and institutions of 
peers. The means by which these close connections are sustained are geographical 
proximity, language, culture, and/or a shared colonial history (Jetschke 2017, 
178). This special form of learning is promoted by sociological theories. According 
to these, stakeholders learn more easily from close peers or from states and 
organizations with whom they share an intimate relationship. Therefore 
information and ideas are communicated between them much more easily and 
significantly faster, as communication channels and networks already exist and 
meetings happen on a much more frequent basis anyway (Hall 1993). This 
“learning from cultural reference groups” (Simmons and Elkins 2004, 175) is 
based on the assumption that shared beliefs and values can shape diffusion 
channels. Accordingly, organizations that share a similar cultural background are 
more likely to adopt the same policies or institutions—as they perceive “common 
values as a useful guide to their own [appropriate] behavior” (ibid., 176). However 
these social-learning processes entail risks for the policy adopter, as decision-
makers may only learn selectively and not screen all available information—only 
that emanating from their close peers (Jetschke 2017, 178f.). 
As Rogers (1983) notes, diffusion is a special form of communication. For him, 
the latter “is a process in which participants create and share information with 
one another” (ibid., 6). Haas (1980), meanwhile, underlines the point that 
information is knowledge that is generated for decision-makers. According to 
him, knowledge is 
  
the sum of technical information […] which commands sufficient consensus 
at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy 




Accordingly knowledge—being often of a technical nature—is diffused among 
elites, and spreads as a kind of policy innovation among decision-makers aiming 
at finding effective solutions to presenting problems. Following this reasoning, 
social-learning processes are channeled based on shared norms and beliefs. 
Epistemic communities are one major stakeholder in the evolution of this kind of 
knowledge, and are therefore not only essential for the policy-making process in 
general but also for social-learning mechanisms in particular (Haas 1992b). Thus, 
the exchange of information among specific actor networks is the core of the 
diffusion approach and an integral part of all diffusion mechanisms. How specific 
networks play a role in the learning mechanism will be described in the following 
subchapter. 
 
4.1.3. Stakeholders of Diffusion 
4.1.3.1. Channels of Diffusion 
As already outlined, the “exchange of information among connected actors 
is the presumed motor behind diffusion” (Simmons and Elkins 2004, 175). 
Consequently, those actors among whom ideas are interchanged are also at the 
center of interest here. In diffusion theory, it is argued that information is 
“channeled” along specific kinds of actor network. The present thesis follows 
these arguments, and furthermore posits that ideas and information are 
particularly intensely exchanged among actors who share close relationships with 
one another.  
As already indicated in the description of the mechanism “learning”, networks 
play a fundamental role specifically in social-learning processes (Jetschke 2014, 
8). Actors who are well-connected with each other are not only able to exchange 
information more effectively, but also to learn faster from their close peers. 
Frequent and direct meetings between organizations can thereby count as “well-
established channels of communication” (Simmons and Elkins 2004, 175). These 
frequent meetings, and the accompanying well-established flow of information, 
leads to knowledge about what works in a given setting and what does not. As 
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already shown by Haas (2004 [1958]), regular negotiations and the maintenance 
of organizational relations can lead, therefore, to crucial learning opportunities.  
 
4.1.3.2. Non-State Actors in Diffusion Processes 
While speaking of policy processes in general and diffusion ones in 
particular, most research refers to state actors as being the key stakeholders 
herein. Classical theories claim the nation-state has a monopoly over legitimate 
political action in both domestic as well as foreign policy (Nölke 2004, 15). But it 
is now widely acknowledge that non-state actors play a fundamental role in 
today’s policy realms too. The growing uncertainty arising out of increasingly 
complex problems being faced in international politics has made coordination 
“not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult” (Haas 1992b, 1). 
As argued by Haas, knowledge and information are important dimensions of 
power. Thus knowledgeable experts are one possible provider of a key resource 
to help state actors to identify problems, and also for the proposition of specific 
policies to address them (ibid., 2f.).  
As uncertainties rise and the demand for information and knowledge constantly 
increases, expert or specialist networks emerge and strengthen. These networks 
become important actors on the national as well as international levels, as 
decision-makers rely on experts’ knowledge and hand over responsibility to them 
(ibid., 4). Thus such transnational networks “seem to have a major impact on the 
global diffusion of values, norms, and ideas” (Risse-Kappen 2008, 459). Jetschke 
and Lenz (2011, 458) include those expert networks that (at least partly) consist 
of non-state actors in their categorization of earlier discussed informal diffusion 
channels. By doing this, they identify these informal channels as transnational 
networks characterized by direct but non-institutionalized interactions between 
state and non-state actors—and thus as crucial in diffusion processes. In the 
present thesis, it is argued specifically that the AU consulted expert networks in 
the establishment process of its security structures. These expert networks were 
particularly valuable in bringing in knowledge of already-existing institutions, 
particularly from ECOWAS—as one organization having close ties with the AU.  
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4.2. Summary of Assumptions 
Having presented the theoretical foundations, the following part will now 
summarize briefly the assumptions underlying the present thesis—these are then 
examined in detail later, in chapters 6 to 8. 
The research here is based on the assumption that decisions in ECOWAS and the 
AU have been made dependent on those already taken in other regional and 
international organizations elsewhere. As neither organization acts in isolation, 
their decisions regarding the new institutional design for their security structures 
have been taken in relation to choices made previously by other similar 
organizations.   
The present thesis is also built on the position that the so-called new wars in 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone challenged ECOWAS’ ability to solve 
crises in West Africa. The decreasing interest of the international community in 
getting involved additionally forced ECOWAS to revise its security structures. 
Having learned not only from those crises but also from the experiences of the 
UNSC—as the organization itself already possessing a suitable security 
institution—then ECOWAS would establish a Security Council similar to the UN 
one. 
This thesis is furthermore based on the assumption that the OAU experienced 
firsthand its own powerlessness during the genocide in Rwanda. Having had to 
also face the unwillingness of the international community to intervene, the OAU 
soon realized its urgent need for a new security mandate as well as more suitable 
security structures. As ECOWAS had itself already established new such security 
structures, the OAU/AU consequently intensively learned from the experiences 
of that RO—specifically on the basis of the close ties existing between the two 
organizations. 
The argument that these learning processes are facilitated through stakeholders 
sharing their knowledge is one that the research presented here also adheres to. 
Decision-makers in ECOWAS were certainly advised by individual think tanks, 
but in fact relevant knowledge was mainly generated by personal networks of 
influential (Nigerian) stakeholders within ECOWAS, AU, and UN. The AU, as the 
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organization following ECOWAS in time, was itself also strongly advised by 
expert networks, ones acting as both knowledge-holders and knowledge-sharers. 
As these networks could build their knowledge out of the prior experiences of 
ECOWAS—in the establishment of whose security structures they were partly 
























5. Research Design   
 
The following chapter gives an overview of the methodological basis and 
research design of the present work. It elucidates the reasons for case selection, 
and outlines the qualitative research design of the thesis alongside discussing its 
both limitations and applications. Furthermore, it describes the data-collection 
process. As part of this, it divulges the selection process regarding experts chosen 
for the interviews as well as the exact guidelines for the latter. It reveals how the 
interviews were conducted, and critically reflects on their realization. The data 
that formed the basis for the additional document analysis is also presented and 
discussed. The chapter concludes with the presentation of the chosen methods of 
data interpretation. 
Although the data generation and interpretation process has in principle been led 
by theoretical and methodological reflections, sometimes these considerations 
could not be fully realized during the research process. As a result, it is not only 
important to shed light on the theoretical groundwork but also on the practical 
dimensions of the research process itself. The chapter therefore also considers 
these pitfalls, and discusses how any such discrepancies have been handled in the 
present study. 
 
5.1. Research Design 
5.1.1. Case Selection 
The present thesis is a comparative case study. It looks at the institutional 
design of the AU and ECOWAS, and asks why their security mechanisms both 
share similarities with the UNSC—as well as how those commonalities have 
evolved over time. Following Yin, this question falls under the categorization of 
an explanatory case study as it “deal[s] with operational links needing to be traced 
over time” (1994, 6). Hall (2006, 24f.) argues in a similar vein when he states that 
systematic process analysis with a historical focus is particularly useful to 
demonstrate causal linkages vis-à-vis research questions. A growing interest in 
explaining complex causal relations in the social sciences has been identified by 
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Bennett and George (2004, 9f.), who also argue that case studies are particularly 
valuable herein. 
Why have the present cases, of the AU and ECOWAS, been selected, and why does 
this research focus on these two and not on other African ROs or on cases across 
continents?40 As this research represents a diffusion study that argues for 
interdependencies between cases, independent case selection—as typically 
applied in conventional case studies—is by definition not applicable here. After 
having examined the institutional design of other African ROs, it became obvious 
that AU and ECOWAS are the ones that share the most similar institutional-
design features (as already elaborated on in chapter 3). Other African ROs such 
as SADC, COMESA, or ECCAS do all have security organs, but are either not as 
institutionalized or not as similar to each other as AU and ECOWAS are. The same 
points also hold true when considering ROs on other continents too, as no other 
RO in Asia, the Americas, or Europe has similar security mechanisms to these 
two cases—namely, a Security Council (except for the UN, as addressed 
previously) as well as analogous security structures.  
Based on the assumptions of diffusion theory, institutional-design similarities 
are explained. That is why only those ROs having similar institutional designs 
have been selected for the present thesis. The AU and ECOWAS are not only 
compared to each other (cross-case comparison); also conducted is a within-case 
comparison, to investigate why certain design features within these two ROs take 
the forms that they do. This is realized in the subsequent analysis chapter, 
specifically by taking an in-depth look at single security mechanisms such as the 
Early Warning System, the PSCs, the Panel/Council of the Wise/Elders, the 
Standby Forces, and the Peace Funds of these two ROs. It will thus be examined 
why certain mechanisms have the actual institutional designs that they do, and 
further whether in certain sub-institutions specific mechanisms can be observed 
or not.  
                                                           
40 The logics of a most similar system design or a most different system design (Mill 1875) are 
not applicable here, as both strategies posit independent case selection. As diffusion studies 




A closer look at the two cases reveals certain interesting characteristics. The AU 
and ECOWAS vary on numerous aspects with regard to the so-called independent 
variable. Whereas the AU is the only continent-wide RO comprising all African 
countries, ECOWAS is a subregional organization covering only a limited part of 
the African continent. As the countries in Western Africa were in the main French 
colonies previously, ECOWAS is predominantly made up of francophone nations. 
The AU contrariwise includes both francophone as well as anglophone countries. 
A leading stakeholder in ECOWAS meanwhile is Nigeria, a clear hegemon striving 
to enforce its own goals. The AU, on the other hand, has in its ranks strong and 
influential states such as Nigeria and South Africa but no such one dominant 
hegemon. Whereas the OAU, as the predecessor of the AU, was established 
mainly to fight colonialism and nurture a common African spirit, ECOWAS was 
very clearly founded as an alliance aiming originally at economic cooperation 
alone. Both organizations widened their mandates to security cooperation only at 
later stages. Concerning the so-called dependent variable,41 the institutional 
design of their security mechanisms, both ROs share significant similarities. 
Table 3 gives an overview of the abovementioned characteristics. 
Table 3: Overview of the Characteristics of Selected Cases 

















Type of RO Continent-wide  Geographically 









Hegemon No clear hegemon Nigeria as clear 
hegemon 
Original Purpose of 
RO 
Fight colonialism Economic 
cooperation 
                                                           
41 The author will not hereafter use the labels independent and dependent variables, as these apply 
much more to quantitative research. However, for the introduction of case-selection techniques, 




















Design of Security 
Mechanisms 
Peace and Security 
Council 















Source: Author’s own compilation (based on AU 2002b; ECOWAS 1999).  
The aim of the present thesis is not to identify or isolate those characteristics or 
aspects that cause a certain outcome. These considerations are particularly useful 
if the research at hand aims at asking what leads to a certain outcome. The 
present study, however, is interested instead in the question of why a particular 
outcome has occurred. This research aims thus at tracing the processes that led 
to the actually witnessed institutional designs of AU and ECOWAS, and at 
identifying the underlying mechanisms thereof.  
 
5.1.2. Qualitative Research Design 
The present thesis is based upon a qualitative research design. It aims at 
explaining social processes and their underlying causalities as comprehensively 
as possible. By looking at the causal mechanisms lying between conditions and 
results, qualitative research designs focus on single or small-N studies (Gläser 
and Laudel 2004, 24). Qualitative research designs are also particularly useful to 
reconstruct complex social processes and for dissections of meaning (Dresing and 
Pehl 2013, 5). As most of the cases lie in the past, qualitative research needs to 
analyze the interaction of actors and mechanisms to explain these complex causal 
relations (Scharpf 2000, 56). The present thesis aims at doing exactly this: 
illustrating as comprehensively as possible the processes of the past that have led 
to the institutional design of the security mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS, with 
particular focus on stakeholders and mechanisms. This research objective reveals 
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that a quantitative research design would not be adequately able to answer the 
raised questions. Not only that, the author also does not have as her aim finding 
statistically significant correlations or realizing a larger case study so as to 
generalize the findings (Brüsemeister 2008, 19ff.; Gläser and Laudel 2004, 23f.). 
Therefore, by using a qualitative research design, the author is able instead to 
analyze the introduced research questions in-depth, and to draw concrete 
conclusions based on the reconstruction of the observed social processes. 
 
5.1.3. Limits and Applications 
Deciding for a certain research design comes with many advantages and 
disadvantages. As already elaborated, a qualitative research design allows the 
researcher to go into cases in extensive detail. It is possible herewith to trace 
causal mechanisms, and to identify important factors leading to certain outcomes 
too. But qualitative designs also have their disadvantages, ones that will now be 
discussed. 
The research topic here is too detailed to include more cases, something that 
would allow for a generalization of the results. Not being able to generalize 
findings is a major critique that qualitative research is exposed to. Thus, the 
conclusions of the present thesis cannot be extended to other ROs and IOs. 
However this subject does permit an in-depth study, which would not be possible 
with quantitative research. Critiques have also been made of qualitative 
research’s intransparent operationalization of the respective variables, making 
their verifiability impossible. In the present thesis, such problems are minimized 
as the operationalization is made very clear and outlined in detail. A further 
critique is the interpretation of the data. In comparison to quantitative research 
with its statistical analyses, qualitative data analysis is solely based on the 
personal interpretations of the individual researcher. The author has also tried to 
minimize this issue by presenting the interpretation of her research to other 




5.2. Data Collection 
The data that forms the basis for the present thesis originates from two 
different sources. On the one hand, thirty expert interviews were realized; on the 
other, document analysis of treaties and protocols as well as press releases was 
also conducted. Using different sources—also referred to as data triangulation—
has the advantage of enhancing the credibility and quality of the data set (Patton 
1999, 1189).  
If data triangulation is undertaken, questions concerning the relevance of single 
sources are to be asked. Are, for example, both sources utilized equally in the 
interpretation of data (Miller and Fredericks 1994, 27f.)? In the present case, this 
question is not as relevant as in other ones. The different data sources used here 
have a rather complementarily nature. They have been chosen with the aim of 
giving the whole picture vis-à-vis the processes scrutinized within both AU and 
ECOWAS. The expert interviews were conducted so as to attain the personal 
views and impressions of involved stakeholders meanwhile. They revealed 
different perspectives on the processes, based on respective roles and 
responsibilities therein. These different points of view have been additionally 
complemented with findings from the document analysis. This results in a 
comprehensive and detailed picture of the processes in question. In the next 
section, both data sources—expert interviews and document analysis—will be 
scrutinized. 
 
5.2.1. Expert Interviews  
5.2.1.1. Selection of Experts 
To approach the research subject and to gain a broader impression of the 
relevant processes, expert interviews were chosen as the main method of data 
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collection.42 But what exactly is an expert, and indeed an expert interview?43 
Following the definition of Gläser and Laudel, “experts are persons that have 
obtained particular knowledge about social circumstances, and expert interviews 
are a method to acquire this knowledge” (2004, 10; author’s own translation).  
Two characteristics are crucial in these observations. First, experts themselves 
are not the object of research but are of interest as witnesses to the relevant 
processes. Second, these experts have a special and sometimes even exclusive 
position in the respective social structures (ibid.). This confirms where and to 
what end expert interviews should be applied so as to generate insights and 
ultimately explanations: the reconstruction of social situations or processes. The 
expert interviews thus make this key information available to the interviewer or 
researcher (ibid., 11). 
To realize the expert interviews, it was first necessary to identify those persons 
who even possess the information required to be able to reconstruct the described 
processes. In order to pick out such experts, it is necessary to ask the following 
questions: Who has the relevant information? Who is able to give precise 
information? Who is willing to even give out information? Who is available for 
interview (Gordon 1975, 196f.)?  
Who has the relevant information and who is available for interview? In the 
present case, it turned out that two groups of individuals have the relevant 
information as they were present during the processes in question. First, heads 
of states and prime ministers of those countries that have been members of the 
AU and ECOWAS. Due to their high-ranking positions, it was not possible to 
interview them however. The second such group consists of relevant stakeholders 
at the operational level, both for the AU and ECOWAS. Among these individuals, 
some have also taken up high-ranking positions in the UN and thus were difficult 
                                                           
42 Other methods such as experiments or observations are not suitable for the present study (Bortz 
and Döring 2006, 321ff.). As the processes in question have already taken place, their 
observation is no longer possible. Due to the complexity of the relevant processes, experiments 
are neither possible nor expedient meanwhile. 
43 The author is aware of the risk of selection bias regarding chosen experts. Path dependencies 
and snowball effects may be the consequences of interdependencies between experts, so that it 
is only those experts it was recommended to speak to by their peers who are in a certain group. 
The author sought to avoid that risk by very careful research on the involved experts, being 
double-checked by decision-makers as well as other experts. 
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to even reach. But in the main they were both contactable and available for 
interview.  
In order to identify the relevant persons, a multilevel procedure was applied. The 
starting point was a list of names given to the interviewer by an involved person. 
Based on this list, emails were written to the persons named on that list and 
interviews subsequently arranged. One part of every single interview was to 
identify other individuals relevant to the process in question. In this, multiple 
overlaps could be observed and the interviewer was thus able to obtain a detailed 
picture of both who was involved and who has the relevant information. Research 
on experts identified in relevant documents and scholarly articles was 
additionally undertaken. The search for new experts to serve as interviewees was 
continued until that point in time where further interviews would not yield any 
new findings vis-à-vis the processes, and thus empirical saturation might occur 
(Krüger 2000, 333; Krüger and Wensierski 1995, 196). 
Who is willing to give out information? This question is an extremely relevant 
one, based on two observations. First, security policy in general is a very sensitive 
subject and information is often classified and thus not intended for the general 
public’s consumption. Some of the contacted experts would not be available for 
an interview being put forth in a scientific publication. For those that were 
conducted, the interviewer assured the interviewees of anonymity in the handling 
of their statements. 
Who is available? This might seem a trivial question at first, but in fact it is an 
essential one in the data-collection process. It proved to be useful to begin with 
persons lower down in organizational hierarchies. Most often, these individuals 
are more easily accessible for interview, and also have more detailed knowledge 
on the operational level (Gordon 1975, 203). In the present case, this question 
concerning availability was crucial due to two aspects. First, it was problematic to 
find experts—as the relevant processes took place around twenty years ago, and 
so some of those individuals have since either retired or passed away. Second, 
some of the persons that were crucial to the relevant processes in the AU and 
ECOWAS in the 1990s and 2000s are now in very high-level positions. As they 
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are or have been African heads of state or high-ranking UN officials, they were 
not available for interview.  
To obtain as much information as possible, it is often necessary to consult various 
different people. This is important for two reasons: first, different people have 
different information about the various aspects of the relevant processes. Second, 
talking to different people about the same processes enables the verification of 
prior statements (Gläser and Laudel 2004, 113). In sum, talking to different 
people allows the interviewer to attain a more complete impression of the 
phenomenon in question.  
 
5.2.1.2. Guideline 
The most important classification of interviews is regarding their degree of 
standardization. If an interview is completely standardized, the actions of both 
interviewer and interviewee are standardized. In half-standardized interviews, 
only the actions of the interviewer are however; in non-standardized interviews 
none of the stakeholder’s action are standardized (Gläser and Laudel 2004, 39). 
Whereas standardized interviews are mostly found in quantitative research, non-
standardized ones are mainly conducted as part of qualitative studies. Among the 
latter, there is an important distinction between guided, open, and narrative 
interviews. Narrative ones are used to reveal the longer stories of the interviewee, 
often after a first complex question. Open interviews do have a given subject 
matter, but not a guideline forming the basis for the conversation. Guided 
interviews, meanwhile, contain both a defined subject matter and a guideline for 
questions. It should be noted that neither the order nor the formulation of 
questions is binding, and any ad-hoc queries that are absolutely necessary to 
obtain the whole picture do not have to be present in the original guideline (ibid., 
39f.). The author decided to work here with guided interviews, as a certain 
guideline for questions was needed for all experts—but some flexibility in the 
conducting of the conversations was also absolutely necessary too.  
The guideline of the interview was divided into three parts. The first aimed at 
welcoming the interviewee, and included a short summary of the research 
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question. The current position of the interviewee as well as their relationship to 
the process in question were asked. The second part formed the main one of the 
interview. Questions such as to what extent the relevant person was personally 
involved in the investigated process and their specific tasks therein were posed. 
Furthermore, the interviewees were asked to outline the process leading to 
certain institutional design choices, and also to assess the influence of certain 
decision-makers herein too. The third and final part concerned the personal 
network of the interviewee. They were asked to name persons who they had 
worked with in the scrutinized process, or ones whom they know were involved 
in or important to it.44 
The guideline performed a pretest. Based on three interviews conducted in that 
pretest and on the respective feedback, the guideline was improved and 
sharpened. Thereby, the order and especially the formulation of individual 
questions was eventually modified (Kuckartz et al. 2008, 20).  
 
5.2.1.3. Performance of Interviews and Critical Reflection 
To establish contact initially, potential interviewees and experts were first 
contacted by email. This communication contained a brief summary of the 
present research project and the procedure constituting the interview. What 
sounds mundane is in fact an important step, as it deals with the selection of 
interview partners and the preparation of the interview (Seidman 1991, 41). After 
receiving replies, appointments were arranged and the guideline sent to the 
interviewees. In preparation for the interviews themselves, the interviewer 
researched information regarding each interviewee’s person and position to avoid 
unnecessary questions and the disturbance of the conversation’s flow (Helfferich 
2011, 182).   
Twenty-nine of the thirty interviews were realized as individual interviews by the 
same interviewer. Only in one case did the original interview partner ask to invite 
two more interviewees to the conversation. As group interviews can influence the 
course of conversation, individual interviews are preferred in qualitative research 
                                                           
44 The guideline is attached in the appendix to this thesis. 
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designs (Myers 2009, 125). Twenty-eight of the thirty interviews were recorded. 
As two of the interviewees did not agree to being recorded, the interviewer 
transcribed their words verbatim from memory. It proved to be of enormous 
benefit to record the conversations, as “listening, writing, and thinking all at the 
same time” (Thomas 1995, 16) is extremely difficult. 
Of the thirty interviews, twenty-two were conducted personally across three 
countries. In Germany, interviews were held at the Federal Foreign Office, the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Federal 
Ministry of Defence. In the US, experts were met with at the International Studies 
Associations’ Conference in Baltimore, as well as in New York City at different 
research institutes. Most interviews were conducted at the headquarters of the 
AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and with think tanks situated there too. In contrast 
to the twenty-two interviews wherein the respective parties spoke face-to-face, 
eight were conducted via Skype or over the telephone. This was necessary as some 
of the experts live in locations only accessible for the interviewer by means of 
inefficient and unsustainable overseas travel. Interviews via Skype and telephone 
were thus realized with experts living in Belgium, Canada, Norway, South Africa, 
the UK, and the US. Six interviews were conducted in German, the other twenty-
four in English. 
After completing the expert interviews, all of the recorded ones were transcribed 
using MAXQDA Software (Kuckartz et al. 2008, 29).45 This transcription 
represents an inevitable and extremely important basis for the future 
interpretation of these interviews (King 1994, 25). In the transcripts, non-verbal 
expressions were excluded and dialects polished—as well as interruptions and 
any incomprehensible passages noted (Gläser and Laudel 2004, 188f.). Any 
information that might lead to the identification of the interviewee was deleted 
so as to guarantee their anonymity.  
By conducting a pretest of the guideline and careful multistep selection of 
interviewees, the author has sought to minimize concerns regarding the reliability 
of her research. However, some aspects related to the data-collection method 
                                                           
45 Most of the interviews were transcribed by the author herself. Some were transcribed on 
commission due to time constraints. 
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“expert interview” now need to be discussed and critically reflected on. As already 
noted, the selection of interview partners was a mindful and drawn-out process. 
Nevertheless it is clear that the thirty experts were not an exhaustive selection of 
relevant parties, but merely a representation of the knowledge available to the 
interviewer. Due to the unavailability for one reason or another of certain relevant 
experts, not all persons involved in the establishment of the security mechanisms 
of AU and ECOWAS could be consulted.  
A second point is the nature of the research subject. As security policy is a rather 
sensitive issue, it remains unclear to what extent relevant information was not 
shared with the author due to obligations of confidentiality on the part of the 
experts. A third point is the intercultural differences between the interviewer and 
the interviewee in some cases. It is unclear to what extent certain interviewees 
might have been wary of being criticized for having helped establish ineffective 
security mechanisms in Africa by a young, Western, and female scholar. While 
never intentional, the interviewer did still experience some—albeit only very 
few—such moments, and with them a refusal to answer yet again to another 
Western scholar seen to be patronizing African stakeholders. This was ultimately 
only rather an impression and cannot be definitely proved, but does needs to be 
acknowledged as a possibility in the interpretation of the data. 
 
5.2.2. Document Analysis 
It is important to note that document analysis is used to complement the 
data extracted from the expert interviews. The latter are the primary data source 
here, with document analysis being only utilized to extract information not 
otherwise available from these interviews. 
In the course of the document analysis, official legal documents from the AU as 
well as ECOWAS were examined. These included treaties, protocols, strategy 
papers, communiqués, minutes of meetings, and press releases from the 
respective organizations. Researching official documents proved to be difficult. 
Whereas the main legal documents could be accessed on the web pages of the 
respective ROs, other legal ones such as minutes of meetings or protocols needed 
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to be researched in the AU archive itself and in the office of the AU Legal Counsel. 
The problem with this was twofold. First, certain documents have not been 
archived or alternatively could not be found by the staff working in the archive 
and for the Legal Counsel. Second, a considerable number of documents proved 
to be classified and thus not available to academic researchers. An overview of all 
of the documents that are included in the document analysis can be found in the 
bibliography. 
 
5.3. Data Interpretation and Research Method 
As noted, the data for the present thesis has been generated from two 
different kinds of collection method: expert interviews and document analysis. It 
is once more important to stress that the data from the expert interviews 
functions as the main data source, and that obtained from the document analysis 
is only complementary to this. 
All data has been processed in MAXQDA. This software tool for computer-based 
qualitative text analysis has the advantage that a comprehensive amount of data 
material can be handled. Also, transparency of the data-interpretation process is 
high as all steps taken along the way can be retraced. Additionally, MAXQDA is 
easy to handle as the data only needs to be digitalized for it to be processed 
(Kuckartz 1999, 32ff.). 
All data is subject to qualitative content analysis. This procedure extracts 
information from text, in order to process the relevant data separately from the 
original source material. Therefore, the extracted information is reconstituted 
and edited based on an analysis matrix that is theoretically consolidated (Gläser 
and Laudel 2006, 191ff.). Mayring (2002, 114ff.) differentiates between three 
kinds of qualitative content analysis: content-analytical summary; explication; 
and, structuration. For the present thesis content-analytical summary seemed to 
be the most useful tool, as the data is arranged according to specified criteria. 
These categorizations are based on theoretical considerations, and single-text 
passages are thus assigned to individual categories within this system.  
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In sum, content-analytical summary proceeds as follows: First, the category 
system is elaborated based on theoretical considerations. Second, individual 
categories are defined very clearly. Third, individual text passages are assigned to 
those single categories.   
As the aim of the present thesis is to discover causal mechanisms46 and related 
processes, process tracing is applied here. According to Blatter et al. (2007, 135), 
process tracing is the most suitable method for identifying and validating causal 
mechanisms within complex processes. Further, as George and Bennett point out,  
 
in process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, 
interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process 
a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence 
and values of the intervening variables in that case (2004, 6). 
 
As this statement makes clear, process tracing is, then, the methodology best 
suited to the purposes of the present thesis. In particular systematic process 
analysis—as developed by Hall (2006, 27)—is utilized, as a special form of process 
tracing. The following four steps form the basis of systematic process analysis: 
The first, theory formation, consists of introducing and elaborating on the 
theoretical considerations that underpin the present research (chapter 4). 
Deriving predictions, as the second step, mainly refers to the formulation of these 
based on the previously mentioned theories (chapter 4). The third part, making 
observations, is the empirical work, and mainly consists of actually conducting 
field research and collecting relevant data (chapters 6–8). Drawing conclusions, 
as the fourth and final part, is characterized by the comparison of the 
observations in the field with the earlier-formulated theoretical predictions 
meanwhile (chapter 9).  
 
 
                                                           
46 Causal mechanisms are defined here as “a complex system, which produces an outcome by the 


























The second part of this thesis presents the findings of the qualitative 
analysis. As outlined in part I, the prerequisite for the establishment of the 
security mechanisms of AU and ECOWAS was the specific conflict history of the 
African continent. How certain conflicts affected the continent’s self-perceptions 
and shaped decision-makers’ wish for more effective security mechanisms is thus 
illustrated, as is how a lack of action on the part of the international community 
in the late 1990s also decisively influenced the situation (chapter 6 for both 
points).  
As the theoretical chapter has shown, interdependence is the fundamental 
criterion for diffusion processes occurring. Therefore, the chapter concerning 
ECOWAS (chapter 7) and the one examining the AU (chapter 8) both open with 
an elaboration of how interdependent decision-making has shaped the 
institutional design of these two ROs’ security mechanisms. Chapter 7 continues 
with its core focus on ECOWAS, and how learning mechanisms have shaped its 
specific security organs. It thereby describes the AU, UN, and ECOWAS triangle, 
and how influential stakeholders have interacted within this three-way 
configuration. Besides this, it also outlines how Nigeria, and influential 
individuals within that particular country, strongly influenced ECOWAS’ 
thinking about security cooperation. The chapter closes with a consolidation of 
the learning processes of ECOWAS, and how both previous interventions as well 
as Nigeria’s own hegemonic ambitions have interplayed in these learning 
processes.  
The AU’s pathway to its APSA is described in chapter 8. After illustrating the 
interdependent decision-making processes, the subsequent section then analyzes 
how the PSC has evolved over time and furthermore how networks of experts 
have influenced this process. Thereafter, the conceptualization phases of CEWS 
and ASF is elaborated on with a specific view to the role of think tanks and staff 
exchange therein. Chapter 8 closes by looking at the consolidation of the social-
learning mechanisms that it was possible to observe.  
Excerpts from the interviews are periodically cited as evidence in text boxes to 
substantiate the different points being made. As not all text passages are used in 
the analytical chapters, the full transcripts as well as the sound files of each and 
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every interview are available on the attached CD. Furthermore, passages from the 

























6. The Need for Effective Security 
Mechanisms  
 
West Africa is globally the subregion with the highest number of 
experienced military coups and of interventions in civilian politics (Francis 2001, 
11). In states such as Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the consequences 
of the end of the Cold War as well as weak domestic political structures led to 
severe conflicts breaking out. It was the circumstances of this post–Cold War 
environment that would precipitate ECOWAS’ feeling and urgent need for more 
effective security structures. The aforementioned conflicts in Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone not only influenced ECOWAS but also challenged the 
OAU as well. Even more devastatingly, the genocide in Rwanda not only changed 
the African continent forever but also made it very obvious that the existing 
security mechanisms were not sufficient.  
Historical events can serve as triggers. According to historical institutionalism, 
institutions remain stable until they are faced with an external shock. This so-
called punctuated equilibrium would, in the present case, clearly be the end of the 
Cold War. The changes occurring around 1989/1990 were fundamental ones, and 
in a way as radical as any other previous development on the African continent. 
Relating thereto, historical institutionalists pay particular attention to critical 
junctures—“interaction effects between distinct causal sequences that become 
joined at particular points in time” (Skocpol and Pierson 2002, 701). The cited 
interviews and documents in this chapter make very evident that, for the present 
case, the conflicts in Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as well as the 
catastrophe in Rwanda can—along with the multitude of other conflicts on the 
continent—all be perceived as such critical junctures.  
These conflicts, seen as being only the tip of the iceberg when it came to deep-
seated tensions on the continent, caused a fundamental shift in the thinking of 
both AU and ECOWAS decision-makers—as it was clear to everybody involved 
that something had to change. Even the rational-design literature would agree on 
this point, as such scholars argue that institutions are modified when new 
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situations emerge—“because they [institutions] are better suited to new 
conditions or new problems” (Koremenos et al. 2001, 767). This is also in line 
with diffusion theory, which argues that learning processes are triggered by 
political or economic problems requiring an institutional change in order for 
leaders to be able to address them (Risse 2016, 90). To sum up, these different 
theoretical strands all concur that for institutional or policy change to happen 
then severe problems or extreme situations need to precede that. In other words, 
they postulate that crises trigger a shift in thinking that ultimately leads to policy 
change too. 
The following chapter shows how the continent’s recent conflict history, having 
its roots in the repercussions of the Cold War ending, explains the timing of the 
establishment of the security mechanisms of both AU and ECOWAS. The fact that 
these conflicts laid bare that existing security mechanisms were not sufficient 
further propelled the already urgent need for more effective ones being designed. 
Additionally, the neglect of the international community is another crucial aspect 
that influenced these mechanisms’ (re)design, as it highlighted how they needed 
to work far more effectively if the manifest problems on the continent were to be 
dealt with without exclusive dependence therein on external help. These 
developments shaped the thinking of decision-makers in the sense that the latter 
now wanted to show the international community that they would be able to 
handle their own security problems henceforth. As will be shown in the following 
chapter, AU and ECOWAS both responded to their very own challenges in their 
very own ways—but also in ones that were influenced specifically by already-
existing mechanisms elsewhere. ECOWAS was the first African RO that looked at 
what kind of mechanisms it could establish. After having made the first steps 
toward more effective security governance, the OAU later followed in its 
footsteps. By adopting similar institutions to ECOWAS, the OAU had clearly been 





6.1. First Attempts at Regional Security Cooperation 
6.1.1. Organization of African Unity 
Already back in the 1960s, regional security cooperation in Africa had been 
a subject of discussion. Kwame Nkrumah, president of Ghana at the time, would 
reflect on the interference of international (great) powers in the (former Belgian) 
Congo as well as the non-existence of regional cooperation. He noted that,  
 
if at that time, July 1960, the independent states of Africa had been united, 
or had at least a joint military high command and a common foreign policy, 
an African solution might have been found for the Congo; and the Congo 
might have been able to work out its own destiny, unhindered by any non-
African interference (Nkrumah et al. 1963, 138).47 
 
Nkrumah’s vision of an Africa of independent states was built upon the OAU’s 
own one of “the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny” (OAU 
1963, preamble), and the right of every African country “to defend their 
sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence” (ibid. Art. 2). 
Furthermore the OAU charter stipulates the “peaceful settlement of disputes by 
negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration” (ibid., Art. 3), and, with 
Article 7, established a Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. 
As its “mandate was limited to inter-state conflicts, and few such conflicts were 
referred to it” (Touray 2005, 638), the Commission soon became redundant 
(Kabia 2011, 121; Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 58).  
However, in its first years of existence, conflicts and other security threats during 
the 1960s did cause the Commission to think about peace and security strategies 
at least. Particular the conflicts between the newly independent Algeria and 
                                                           
47 Right at the first meeting of the OAU Defence Commission in 1963, a “Supreme Military 
Command Headquarters” and a “Union Defence Council” were suggested by Krumah’s 
representatives (Van Walraven 1999, 330). In fact those two organs resemble the PSC and the 
ASF that the AU eventually did establish, in 2003. According to Klaas Van Walraven (ibid., 332), 
these suggestions were originally rejected due to external influences and also to the lack of a 




Morocco in 1963 and 1964 and between Somalia and Kenya from 1963 to 1967 
respectively already posed challenges to the newly established OAU. Both under 
the auspices of the OAU, and after an intervention by Ethiopia and Mali as well 
as the mediation also of Zambia in the latter case, peace talks could be established 
(Babarinde 2013, 274). The border conflicts that would be increasingly observed 
in the 1960s led the OAU to set down in writing the principle of non-interference 
in member states’ internal affairs—and moreover to adhere to it for decades after. 
In the following years, a Defence Commission, an African High Command, and 
an African Defense Organization were proposed but never actually realized, due 
to their rejection by the majority of member states (Kabia 2011, 121; Sturman and 
Hayatou 2010, 58). 
The following years and decades on the African continent were characterized by 
numerous different civil wars as well as intrastate conflicts, such as the Somalian-
Ethiopian wars (1977–1978, 1982, and 1988), the civil war in Chad (1978–1987), 
with an intervention therein by Libya, and the Tanzanian-Ugandan war (1978–
1979). These violent episodes not only challenged the efficacy of the OAU ad-hoc 
dispute settlement committees that were convened frequently back then, but also 
called into question that inscribed principle of non-interference (Sturman and 
Hayatou 2010, 59). When Tanzanian troops intervened in Uganda in 1979, 
discussions about the OAU’s efficacy in resolving conflicts in general and about 
the principle of non-interference in particular would intensify. At the OAU 
Assembly meeting in Monrovia in 1979, the idea of an African peacekeeping force 
gained more traction and a declaration of human rights was also drafted (Thomas 
1985, 112). Shortly after, an Inter-African Force (of the OAU) intervened for the 
first time in the Chad conflict. It did so “with no proper ceasefire to monitor, [a] 
lack of clear political goals, an ambiguous mandate, [a] lack of commitment by 
warring factions, and differences in opinion by OAU member states about the 
objective” (Kabia 2011, 122). To sum up, the OAU’s effectiveness in resolving the 
abovementioned conflicts had been deemed to be very limited.  
The end of the Cold War made the situation on the African continent even more 
problematic, and also increasingly complex. Strategic support from the great 
powers or other Western countries steadily decreased, resulting in the collapse of 
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numerous African states as well as a dramatic increase in the number of civil wars 
witnessed on the continent. Conflicts broke out in Liberia (1989), in Somalia and 
Sierra Leone (1991), in Algeria (1992), and in Burundi (1993). According to 
Hawkins (2003, 61), nine of the ten worst conflicts of the last decade of the 
twentieth century would take place on the African continent.48 Although the 
number of UN peacekeeping operations did initially increase in the early 1990s, 
these rapidly declined after the events in Somalia and Rwanda—as the UN feared 
thereafter becoming heavily embroiled in further such disasters. Among African 
decision-makers, there was a feeling of disinterest in African affairs on the part 
of the international community—which was preoccupied first with the Gulf War 
and then with the conflict in Bosnia (Kabia 2011, 123). This feeling of being 
neglected by the international community finally forced the African continent 
into a fundamental rethink about how to best respond to its contemporary peace 
and security issues (table 4). 
Table 4: Perceptions of Changing Circumstances 
 
We have noted the changing East-West relations from confrontation to 
cooperation, the socio-economic and political changes in Eastern Europe, the 
steady move towards the political and monetary union of Western Europe, the 
increasing global tendency towards regional integration […]. These, we found, 
constitute major factors which should guide Africa’s collective thinking about 
the challenges and options before her in the 1990s and beyond in view of the 
real threat of marginalisation of our continent (OAU 1990, 1). 
 
This declaration not only depicts the OAU member states’ awareness of the 
changing zeitgeist within the international system, but also emphasizes their wish 
for a strengthened continental organization able to deal with the new situation 
far more effectively (table 5).  
 
 
                                                           
48 The ten-bloodiest conflicts of the 1990s were (in descending order per the number of 
casualities) those in: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, 




Table 5: Wish for Greater Self-Determination 
 
At this crucial juncture when our continent is emerging with difficulty, from a 
phase in its history that focused mainly on political liberation and nation 
building, and is about to embark on a new era laying greater emphasis on 
economic development, we need to strengthen the Organization of African 
Unity so that it may also become a viable instrument in the service of Africa’s 
economic development and integration. Consistent with this goal, we re-
dedicate ourselves to the principles and objectives enshrined in its Charter to 
our faith in ourselves and to our continent, with greater determination to be 
masters of our destiny (OAU 1990, 4). 
 
They recognized that the severe conflicts on the continent hindered the further 
political as well as economic development of Africa, and therefore decided to push 
for a more effective peace and security mandate for the OAU. Thus, from May 19 
to 22, 1991, 300 African decision-makers from government and civil society came 
together in the Kampala Forum to discuss issues of security and stability. The 
later named “Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation” 
constituted a milestone, linking security, stability, development, and cooperation 
as sine que nons for Africa’s progress, and furthermore proposed to the OAU the 
establishment of a continental peacekeeping force and an Africa Peace Council 
comprising eminent persons (Kabia 2011, 123).49 
Influenced by the proposed ideas of the CSSDCA and the ongoing debates, Salim 
Ahmed Salim, then OAU secretary general, declared that the RO “should be 
enabled to intervene swiftly in situations where tensions evolve to such a pitch 
that it becomes apparent that a conflict is in the making” (OAU 1992b). He 
proposed that the original OAU ad-hoc approach to peacekeeping had turned out 
to be ineffective and that there was a severe need for a better—and formally 
institutionalized—mechanism. Although some African heads of state had initially 
been reluctant to support this proposal due to the implications of a strengthened 
                                                           
49 Institutionally, the OAU was partially reformed with the treaty creating the African Economic 
Community (AEC) in 1991. Article 5 of this treaty allowed the Assembly to sanction those 
member states that “fail to honour its general undertakings under this treaty” (AEC 1991). This 
article has never been used in practice, but has, according to observers, set the ground for the 
subsequent sanction mechanisms stipulated in Article 23 of the Constitutive Act (Sturman and 
Hayatou 2010, 60). 
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OAU for their own national sovereignty, the majority of them did agree to work 
on a more central role for the OAU in peacekeeping issues (Muyangwa and Vogt 
2000, 8). The OAU summit in Cairo in 1993 took up this idea, and the various 
heads of state and government in attendance agreed to establish a Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution50 as well as a division—located 
within the Secretariat—to be responsible for the effective management of 
conflicts.  
Established in 1995, the Mechanism also opted for a Central Organ that was 
responsible for the overseeing of decisions on continental security. By aiming to 
take all necessary measures to prevent and resolve conflicts, it had a clear 
anticipatory and preventive focus to its work (Kabia 2011, 123). In addition, its 
tasks include peacekeeping efforts in cases of conflict as well as peace-building 
ones in post-conflict situations. It also opted for strong cooperation with the UN 
and other African ROs. Furthermore the OAU decided to establish several 
supporting units, such as an Early Warning System, a Field Operations Unit, and 
a Peace Fund (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 1f.). With 5.2 million refugees and 13 
million internally displaced persons across Africa in the year 1993, the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention was challenged enormously right from its 
inception. 
 
6.1.2. Economic Community of West African States 
The Economist described the continent as “Hopeless Africa” in the year 
2000, by referring to the bleak situations in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, DRC, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan. The first post–Cold War 
decade especially would be characterized by severe intrastate conflicts. According 
to the UNDP Human Development Report (2002), 220,000 people died in wars 
between states from 1990 to 2002 alongside the nearly 3.6 million more who 
perished in intrastate ones in the same period. As shown in figure 6, compared to 
other world regions with significantly lower numbers of such deaths, Africa had 
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to mourn over 1.5 million conflict-related casualties between 1990 and 1999 
alone. 










Source: Author’s own compilation (based on UNDP 2002, 17). 
And what of West Africa—the region encompassing all of the countries 
represented by ECOWAS? Robert Kaplan (1994) once portrayed this region as 
having the potential to be a real danger to international peace and security. The 
West African subregion is home to approximately 382 million people, 
representing roughly one-third of the entire African population. Consisting of 
anglophone, francophone, and lusophone countries,51 the region not only has a 
diverse colonial history but also significant divergence in sociocultural, ethnic, 
and linguistic terms (Francis 2006, 140f.). The West African countries are also 
often ascribed to the group of least developed or underdeveloped countries, and 
thereby remain heavily dependent on external support.52 Since independence in 
the 1950s/1960s, the region has experimented with a variety of political 
                                                           
51 The anglophone countries are the Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. 
Lusophone ones consist of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo make up the francophone countries, 
meanwhile. 
52 Only Cape Verde and Ghana are in the Medium Human Development category according to the 
UNDP Human Development Report of 2016. All other ECOWAS countries are ascribed to the 
Low Human Development one (UNDP 2016, 198). 
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systems—from multiparty governance, authoritarian one-party governments, to 
military dictatorships.  
ECOWAS—as noted originally established to further economic integration in the 
region—has been challenged by severe conflicts ever since its establishment in 
1975. The 1970s were characterized by violent military coups d’état, numerous 
interstate wars and border disputes, as well as by the Biafran civil war in Nigeria. 
These conflicts, and the politically unstable situations accompanying them, 
caused a number of ECOWAS member states to realize that peace is a sine qua 
non for economic development. In an already violent atmosphere, the attempted 
invasions of mercenaries in Guinea, in November 1970, and in Benin, in January 
1977, gave impetus to the expansion of ECOWAS’ mandate to security 
cooperation (Kabia 2011, 2).  
In 1978 ECOWAS member states adopted the “Protocol on Non-Aggression” that 
urged member states to “refrain from the threat and use of force or aggression” 
(ECOWAS 1978, Art. 1) against each other. Because of intraregional tensions 
between the francophone and anglophone blocs, the seven francophone states 
(with the exception of Guinea) already adopted their own “Accord de Non-
Aggression et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence” (ANAD) in 1977. Although the 
francophone countries form a numerical majority in the region, they still feared 
Nigeria’s dominance in the economic, political, and military realms as well as its 
significant influence within ECOWAS (Coleman 2007, 74; Francis 2006, 146; Obi 
2009, 53).  
As the 1978 protocol did not provide for an institutionalized security mechanism, 
it was quickly criticized as being pure idealism (Kabia 2011, 2). As a response, 
ECOWAS adopted the “Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence” in 
1981. In this protocol, member states declared “that any armed threat or 
aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or 
aggression against the entire Community” (ECOWAS 1981, Art. 2). Member 
states also agreed to “give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any 
armed threat or aggression” (ibid., Art. 3). With these two articles, ECOWAS had 
for the first time ever adopted ones from other ROs—as Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty of 1949 was a parallel to these. 
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Additionally the 1981 protocol points out those situations that require action 
being taken by ECOWAS, namely “any case of armed conflict between two or 
several Member States” and “in case of internal armed conflict within any 
Member State engineered and supported actively from outside” (ECOWAS 1981, 
Art. 4). Article 5 institutionalized a Defence Council, a Defence Committee, and 
the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). However this protocol was 
also heavily criticized, for being ineffective in the prevention, management, and 
resolution of conflict. Additionally, with its concentration on external threats, it 
neglected not only intrastate conflicts but also did not foresee a role for ECOWAS 
in the coups d’état taking place in the West African region. The latter 
circumstance can—as pointed out by many critics—be traced to the individual 
leaders’ very own regime protection strategies at that time (Francis 2006; Kabia 
2011).53 Needless to say, the non-establishment of the institutions named in the 
protocol was also strongly dispraised.  
Once more the rivalry between anglophone and francophone countries affected 
ECOWAS’ peace and security ambitions. The francophone ones, as noted, were 
increasingly fearful of Nigeria’s influence within ECOWAS and of that country’s 
hegemonic ambitions. Besides this, the francophone countries could not support 
the call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the continent (ECOWAS 
1981, Art. 20) as they had strong military ties with France. Their very own ANAD 
protocol from 1977 additionally reduced the prospects of success of the 1981 one 
of ECOWAS. In contrast to the institutions provided for in the ECOWAS protocol, 
the institutions of ANAD were actually both established and made operational 
                                                           
53 In fact, traditionally both protocols were somewhat perceived as external military threats to a 
nation-state’s political sovereignty. Domestic threats—such as intrastate conflicts resulting 
from bad governance, dictatorship, suppression, or political instability, as created by state elites 
themselves—were not considered. Critics argue that West African political leaders at that time 
very consciously decided to exclude these, so as to preserve their own political leadership and 
in order to further their own specific interests. Some critics even go as far as to reason that by 
means of the two protocols, and with the help of ECOWAS member states, domestic opposition 
could be suppressed. Thus, the two protocols can be perceived as ECOWAS’ first attempts at 
regional security governance—but in fact they were adopted so as to guarantee regime survival 
(Francis 2006, 147).  
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(Kabia 2011, 3).54 The early to mid-1980s would not see the furthering of the 
security ambitions of ECOWAS’ member states either. It was only the year 1989 
and the events set in motion in it that would have a tremendous impact on the 
security architecture of ECOWAS.  
 
6.2. Conflicts That Have Changed the Continent 
6.2.1.  ECOWAS: Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
The Liberian crisis was a turning point in the history of ECOWAS. In 
December 1989, Charles Taylor—a Liberian in exile—invaded that country from 
Côte d’Ivoire—leading an armed rebellion against the military regime of 
President Samuel Doe. By June 1990, Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) not only occupied Monrovia and reigned over 90 percent of 
Liberia’s territory (Coleman 2007, 75) but also controlled the export of tropical 
woods and of diamonds (Hartmann 2010, 78). This civil war differed from 
previous conflicts in numerous respects. First, Taylor and his NPFL not only had 
as their aim replacing the regime but much more the taking control of the 
country’s diamond fields. Second, the Liberian state apparatus collapsed almost 
immediately and the emerging war economies quickly posed a severe threat to 
the security of neighboring states. Third, the end of the Cold War changed the 
common support system of the US and the USSR—who were both no longer 
willing to back every regime that they had previously. Thus, the past and common 
security order was no longer stable. 
Referring to the 1981 protocol, Doe requested assistance from the heads of state 
of ECOWAS—arguing that the insurgency by Taylor would destabilize and 
destroy the whole subregion (Weller 1994, 60f.). In May 1990, during its summit 
in Banjul, Gambia, ECOWAS set up a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) 
consisting of Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo—later included were Sierra 
                                                           
54 ANAD also provided for the establishment of a regional military standby force. However the 
involved francophone countries did not deploy this military force under the authority of 
ECOWAS, but of the UN. This—never actually established—deployment force was seen as an 
attempt at reducing Nigeria’s dominance in the region, and also at increasing the influence of 
France there too (Francis 2006, 147).  
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Leone and Guinea too. The SMC aimed to mediate in the Liberian conflict 
(ECOWAS 1991, 5). 55 During the first two months of operations, a peace plan was 
formulated that provided for a ceasefire—in preparation for an interim 
government in which Taylor would not be allowed to participate. However after 
the rejection of this plan by Taylor, as well as by Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire,56 
the situation soon escalated again (Hartmann 2010; Kabia 2011; Obi 2009).57 In 
the following weeks, President Doe would request in a letter that the RO 
“introduce a ECOWAS Peacekeeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing 
terror and tensions and to assure a peaceful transitional environment” (ECOWAS 
1991, 6).  
Following pressure from Nigeria, and with the support of the other three 
anglophone countries Ghana, Gambia, and Sierra Leone as well as francophone 
Guinea,58 ECOWAS would establish and then deploy, on August 7, 1990, its 
ECOMOG (ibid.).59 On August 24, 1990, the first ECOMOG troops—operating 
without any mandate from the UN60—arrived in Monrovia; by October of that 
year ECOMOG had gained control of Liberia’s capital.61 At the end of November 
1990, an ECOWAS summit in Mali reached a ceasefire agreement with Taylor.  
                                                           
55 For further details on the composition and responsibilities of the SMC, see Decision A./Dec.     
9/5/90 “Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee” (ECOWAS 1991). 
56 ECOWAS was divided on how best to react to the Liberian crisis. Nigeria wanted to intervene 
because of the close relationship between its military head of state Babangida and Liberia’s 
President Doe, as well as due to concerns about the security of Nigerians in Liberia; Burkina 
Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, meanwhile, supported Taylor due to their close relationships with the 
son of Liberia’s erstwhile president Adolphus Tolbert. Both countries condemned Doe, as he 
had murdered Tolbert senior in the process of coming to power in 1980 (Coleman 2007, 76). 
57 There is a vast and rich literature on the Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG (intervention without 
UN mandate). Among others, see: Aboagye 1999); Adebajo 2000); Aning 1999); Olonisakin 
2000); and, Sesay 1999). 
58 ECOMOG was established without the approval of francophone Togo and Mali, and in the face 
of bitter opposition from Taylor himself (Kabia 2011, 3). The ECOMOG-supporting countries—
Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia—were also the ones contributing troops to 
it (Obi 2009, 3).  
59 For more details regarding the role and mandate of ECOMOG, see Decision A./DEC. 1/8/90 
(ECOWAS 1991, 6ff.).  
60 ECOMOG, without a mandate from the UN, was not perceived as coordinated units but rather 
as a “coalition of the willing” of national military units reporting to their respective commanders 
(Hartmann 2010).   
61 Unsurprisingly the NPFL under Taylor rejected the ECOWAS peace plan, being convinced by 
its own military strength—he thus announced that his troops would resist ECOMOG. Already 
in September 1990, President Doe—captured at the headquarters of ECOMOG—was executed 
by a splinter group of the NPFL (Coleman 2007, 76).  
93 
 
One year later, in October 1991, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, previously opponents 
of ECOMOG, supported this organ—Senegal even provided troops to it. But even 
these strengthened ECOMOG troops could not end the violent conflict once and 
for all. In late 1992 the UNSC imposed, for the first time, an arms embargo 
(Resolution 788), and thereby clearly was in support of ECOMOG’s role in the 
conflict. In September 1993 the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
(UNOMIL) also provided support to ECOMOG (Hartmann 2010, 79). But as the 
NPFL remained powerful in the countryside and the conflict parties’ constellation 
became more and more complicated, a dozen peace accords failed. In 1996 a new 
peace plan, one this time including Taylor in the political process, led to his 
disarmament as well as to elections in May 1997. Under the observation of 
ECOWAS, Taylor won the election with 75 percent of the vote and thus became 
president of Liberia.62 Although the ECOMOG mission officially ended in 1999, 
the conflict could not be brought to one too. In 1999 civil war broke out again as 
armed rebel groups formed against Taylor’s regime. ECOWAS, this time with a 
UN mandate, again took on peacekeeping responsibilities. In 2003 Taylor went 
into exile in Nigeria,63 and the UN officially took over in Liberia on 1 October of 
that year (Coleman 2007, 76). 
The civil war in Liberia spilled over to Sierra Leone in 1991. Similar to the Liberian 
war, it started as an insurgency that was supported by the Liberian NPFL.64 The 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a rebellion aimed at overthrowing 
the government of President Joseph Momoh. A military coup in 1992 against 
Momoh led to the subsequent expansion of the ECOMOG mandate to Sierra 
Leone, with it being mainly supported by Nigerian troops. Despite several further 
                                                           
62 Taylor won the election because he spread fear among the populace; he announced, for 
example, that hostilities would break out again if he was not elected president (Coleman 2007, 
76). 
63 Taylor later became the first African head of state to be sentenced to prison (for fifty years) by 
an international tribunal, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Since October 15, 2013, 
he has been imprisoned in the UK (Englebert and Dunn 2013, 304). 
64 There have been suggestions that Foday Sankow, RUF leader, was not only supported by Taylor 
but also by Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire too. Besides this, it has been claimed that the RUF 
received training from Libya and that Taylor was therewith mainly seeking revenge for Sierra 
Leone’s earlier support of ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia (Obi 2009, 56f.). 
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military coups and an ongoing civil war, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was eventually 
elected president in early 1996.  
In November 1996 a peace agreement—under the auspices of the UN and 
ECOWAS—was negotiated in Abidjan, aiming at demobilizing the RUF and 
transforming it into a political party (Hartmann 2010, 80; Obi 2009, 7). However, 
before the agreement became effective, another military coup toppled newly 
elected President Kabbah and put Major Johnny Paul Koromah in place instead. 
With Decision A./DEC. 7/8/97 “Extending the Scope Activity and Mandate of 
ECOMOG to cover Sierra Leone” in August 1997, ECOWAS approved the 
broadening of ECOMOG’s mandate to Sierra Leone with the intention of 
reinstating President Kabbah (ECOWAS 1997b, 13). Then in October 1997 a 
negotiated agreement to reinstate Kabbah was broken by that country’s military 
junta and, as a consequence, ECOMOG and Nigerian troops—supported by a 
small UN Observer Mission (UNOSIL)—invaded Sierra Leone in March 1998 and 
reinstated Kabbah.  
In 1999 Kabbah once more had to escape the capital after being attacked by the 
RUF again. Nigeria enlarged its troop deployment, and three weeks later 
ECOMOG had the situation under control once more. The peace agreement of 
Lomé, negotiated in July 1999, officially ended the war and transformed the RUF 
into a political party. By establishing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), the UN deployed 11,000 soldiers there to monitor demobilization. 
ECOMOG, despite the temporary withdrawal of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, and 
Guinea, continued its mission in Sierra Leone until 2002 when elections were 
finally held (Hartmann 2010, 80). 
In the 1990s ECOWAS not only intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone, however, 
but also in Guinea-Bissau. A struggle for power between President Joao Vieira 
and Chief of Armed Forces Ansumane Mané—in combination with subregional 
tensions—lead to a civil war breaking out in the country in 1998.65 In June of that 
                                                           
65 In part these tensions can also be explained by the attempts of Guinea-Bissau, who had close 
colonial ties with Portugal at that time, to strengthen its relationship with both France and its 
francophone neighbors Guinea and Senegal. Guinea-Bissau would also join the West African 
CFA currency zone (Obi 2009, 58).  
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year, Mané organized a coup to overthrow President Vieira. As a consequence, 
Vieria not only asked ECOWAS for assistance but also Senegal and Guinea—with 
both of whom Guinea-Bissau had bilateral defence pacts. In fact, the very day that 
the coup was announced Senegal already deployed its troops—Guinea followed 
suit a day later (Obi 2009, 59). Although both countries initially had no official 
mandate, ECOWAS subsequently still authorized these missions and also 
organized a round of negotiations with the Community of Portuguese-Speaking 
Countries (Comunidade de Paises de Lingua Portuguesa, CPLP).66 A first 
ceasefire agreement between Vieira and Mané was signed on August 26, 1998, 
but it would be broken soon after. A second peace agreement was negotiated in 
November 1998 (Kohnert 2000, 47).67 In April 1999, ECOMOG had to watch the 
eruption of new violence from the sidelines. After two weeks of combat, Mané 
took over Guinea-Bissau’s leadership in May 1999—meanwhile Vieira went into 
exile. ECOWAS troops would already be withdrawn in June 1999, due to the 
insecure security situation on the ground.  
These different conflicts set the ground for the “Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and 
Security.” Between them they had also a tremendous influence on how ECOWAS 
member states, heads of state, and civil society actors68 thought about conflict 
management and resolution, as the following statements of interview section 1 
show. 
Interview Section 1: Perceptions of Previous Conflicts in the Region 
 
If you look at that, it was basically inspired by the tragic incidence of […] 
intrastate conflicts in West Africa, in Central Africa and in the Horn of Africa 
(#19).  
                                                           
66 The CPLP consists of Portugal, Angola, Brazil, East Timor, Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Sao 
Tome and Principe, and appeared herewith for the first time vis-à-vis mediation in the 
international arena (Francis 2006, 167). 
67 This second ceasefire agreement stipulated the withdrawal of the aforementioned troops from 
Guinea and Senegal, to be replaced by ones from Benin, Gambia, Mali, Niger, and Togo. Without 
the support of Nigeria, ECOWAS did not succeed in deploying the agreed upon 1,500 soldiers 
however (Hartmann 2010, 81). 
68 The terms “civil society” and “think tanks” will be used synonymously in this thesis. 
96 
 
The fact that there have obviously been a number of civil wars in the West 
African region, and […] they have tried to build upon that past experience, 
whether it being Liberia or Côte d’Ivoire, or on the ongoing conflict in Nigeria 
(#8). 
And the leaders of that time […] they also had crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
And some of the West African Leaders of that time decided they would not wait 
for external involvement and responded, first to Liberia, and based on their 
response to the Liberian crises, they were requested by the United Nations […] 
to restore democracy back in Sierra Leone (#21). 
 
It also became very obvious that the way ECOMOG had been installed, and how 
it had performed in every single conflict to date, would determine the subsequent 
discourse about this newly established security mechanism (interview section 2). 
Interview Section 2: Perceptions of ECOMOG’s Deployments 
 
It made it very difficult for those consultants who were coming from those two 
institutions, from ECOWAS and then knowing about ECOWAS and Nigeria’s 
intervention at that time in Sierra Leone and to think about how the Security 
Council has really helped. It limited them in terms of what they could imagine 
for the African continent (#11). 
I believe that there have been many hard reasons why ECOWAS has thought 
about establishing a new security architecture. There is this immediate 
influence of the previous interventions that have been deployed. This actually 
influences their thinking very strongly for many reasons. Because they have 
caused high costs, have been unpopular, had no legal basis and Nigeria has 
been criticized despite their strong engagement. The francophone countries 
became restless as well, as they felt that a culture of intervention is spreading 
in the region (#4). 
 
The violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau not only 
influenced ECOWAS’ thinking however, but also the later establishment of the 






Interview Section 3: Perceptions of West African Conflicts 
 
 
6.2.2. OAU: The Genocide in Rwanda 
As shown in the previous section, very specific conflict experiences shaped 
ECOWAS’s thinking about its own ways of dealing with future conflicts more 
effectively. This not only holds true for ECOWAS though, but also and especially 
applies to the OAU too—with the specific case of the genocide in Rwanda of the 
mid-1990s. 
In October 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded northern Rwanda 
in an attempt to force a sharing of power with it. Starting in the same year, the 
OAU launched several attempts at mediation efforts which led to a ceasefire 
agreement and an OAU observer mission. The Military Observer Group in 
Rwanda (NMOG) arrived there in 1991, with peace negotiations then being held 
in Arusha in 1992—with Tanzania acting as the main mediator (Muyangwa and 
Vogt 2000, 11).69 The Arusha Peace Agreement, signed in August 1993, envisaged 
“the inclusion of the RPF in an integrated national army and […] the presence of 
a neutral international force to provide security and [to] supervise the 
inauguration of the transitional government, demobilization of combatants and 
creation of a new army, and preparations for national elections” (ibid., 11). 
                                                           
69 Egypt, the former Zaire, and Senegal, the OAU and UN, as well as Belgium, Burundi, France, 
Germany, Nigeria, Uganda, the US, and Zimbabwe all attended the Arusha talks as observers 
(Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 11).  
 
Quickly, we have been faced with security challenges in that region and there 
was a clear commitment to then deploy ECOMOG. ECOMOG in the 1990s, 
1991 and 1993, combined with some of the tragic events on the continent like 
the Rwandan genocide, all shaped and contributed in very useful ways to the 
development of the APSA (#19). 
It became evident that there was some new thinking on the continent about 
recent crises […] with the realization that post–Cold War interests have 
changed and African needed to take care of its own interests, coupled with the 
fact that there was a lot more democratization on the continent (#21). 
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Shortly after, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)70—
a 2,500-person-strong UN peacekeeping force—arrived in Rwanda and 
subsumed NMOG due to the OAU’s difficulties in financing the latter (Kabia 2011, 
124).  
As radical Hutus did not accept the peace agreement, due to the absence of an 
amnesty for Hutu elites suspected of corruption, militias were thereafter founded 
by those radicals. Lists of names with leading Tutsis and moderate Hutus were 
prepared, munitions were arranged, and radio stations such as Radio Télevision 
Libre des Mille Collines systematically defamed the Tutsis. As early as the 
beginning of 1994 General Dallaire had warned the UN about the threat of a 
genocide, but he was not heard (Bundestag 2007, 6). On April 6, 1994, a plane 
with Rwandan president Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien 
Ntaryamira on board was shot down shortly before it was due to land in Kigali. 
Thirty minutes later, the assassination of moderate Hutu politicians as well as of 
the Tutsi population at large commenced.  
Continuing until June 1994, up to one million Rwandans were murdered in total. 
After Belgium withdrew its troops, UNAMIR—already too weak in terms of 
material and personnel to make a difference—was further undermined.71 The 
OAU begged the UN for assistance; the latter not only refused, but even reduced 
its deployment to a total of just 270 soldiers on April 21, 1994.72 Only after the 
scale of the genocide became public and pressure on the UN increased did the 
organization bolster its peacekeeping force there. However it did not manage to 
secure a larger mission, and requested that African countries provide their own 
troops for UNAMIR. The OAU accused the Security Council of being passive, and 
committed to deploying troops itself instead. As the OAU had neither the 
                                                           
70 UNAMIR was based on UNSC Resolution 872, adopted on November 1, 1993. It aimed at 
stabilizing the country without giving a mandate for military action. Roméo Dallaire, a major 
general from Canada, was appointed UNAMIR’s chief commander (Bundestag 2007, 6).  
71 After the escalation in Somalia, the US was now very reluctant to intervene in other African 
countries. Among the African countries themselves, Ghana was the only one to contribute 
troops to UNAMIR (Babarinde 2013, 275).  
72 The UN had just recently lost 18 American Rangers, 25 Pakistani peacekeepers, and an 
estimated 1,000 Somali civilians in its UNOSOM II mission in Somalia. Observers argue that 
the UNSC was mainly affected by these experiences in its decision to reduce troops in Rwanda 
(Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 11).  
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necessary logistical nor material prerequisites however, then this deployment of 
troops could only be realized with a five-month delay. In the meantime, the 
genocide escalated and UNAMIR withdrew (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 11f.). It 
was the military victory of the RPF under Paul Kagame that eventually ended the 
massacre. The ascent of this transitional government under Kagame, a Tutsi, led 
to the fleeing of two million Hutus to neighboring countries such as Tanzania and 
the DRC. These streams of refugees represented further humanitarian 
catastrophes in the two countries. Additionally, some 2.5 million people were 
internally displaced within Rwanda itself (Bundestag 2007, 7).  
The genocide in Rwanda changed the entire African continent. On the one hand, 
African leaders were massively criticized for hiding behind the principle of non-
interference, as no African peacekeepers were present in Rwanda during the 
genocide (Babarinde 2013, 275). On the other, the international community was 
also heavily denounced for its failure to even prevent the genocide (Bundestag 
2007, 8f.).73 It has additionally been argued that the transformation of the OAU 
mission into a UN one also contributed to the massacre. Margaret Vogt (1998), 
an influential Nigerian scholar working for ECOWAS, AU, and UN, argues that 
the failure of the UNSC to take an immediate decision, the fears of Western 
countries about the safety of their troops and the domestic disapproval of foreign 
interventions on African soil, as well as a lack of resources and personnel all led 
to the catastrophe witnessed in Rwanda.  
As mentioned above, the genocide changed the continent. It was soon perceived 
as a catastrophe that should never be allowed to happen again, as the following 
statements in interview section 4 show. 
 
 
                                                           
73 Afterward, Kofi Annan confessed that the UN could indeed have prevented the genocide. In a 
speech given in April 2004, he said that “we must never forget our collective failure to protect 
at least 800,000 defenceless men, women, and children who perished in Rwanda 10 years ago 
[…]. First, we must all acknowledge our responsibility for not having done more to prevent or 
stop the genocide. Neither the United Nations Secretariat, nor the Security Council, nor 
Member States in general, nor the international media, paid enough attention […]. Still less did 
we take timely action” (Annan 2004, 1f).  
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Interview Section 4: Perceptions of Happenings in Rwanda 
 
There was a lot of discussion about the reform of the charter. Especially, when 
in 1994 we had the Rwandan genocide and there were a lot of movements to 
see how the OAU could become more effective at intervening (#23). 
I believe Rwanda has played a fundamental role. This evident failure has been 
extremely painful for the African people (#26). 
The ultimate worst was seen on the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 where […] it 
became obvious that we should not allow this to happen again (#22). 
Of course, you have two key events I would say. One will be genocide against 
the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 (#27). 
 
But Rwanda did not happen in isolation. As already described, there were other 
severe conflicts taking place in Africa at the end of the twentieth century—such as 
the ones in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The fact that the 1990s were a decade packed 
full of severe and deadly conflicts to which existent security mechanisms could 
not respond adequately changed the thinking of African leaders. As shown below, 
interviewees mainly referred to the interventions of ECOMOG and the genocide 
in Rwanda as critical junctures—ones leading to a fundamental rethink of African 
security policy. 
Interview Section 5: Perceptions of Severe Conflicts in Africa 
 
In terms of the African Peace and Security Architecture, […] in terms of 
thinking about what we want to do, [that] was—what I consider to be a turning 
point in the history of security policy on the African continent. In the early 
1990s, you remember that a lot of African countries experienced so much 
conflict, e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and so on. And Rwanda as a cutting 
point, right. There was this broader ideational movement among Africans that 
this cannot continue (#11). 
 
Furthermore, African decision-makers seemed to be aware of the historical 
situation and also the accompanying tremendous challenges lying ahead of them. 
Excerpts of the report of the brainstorming meeting of the CSSDCA illustrate that 
the situation was evaluated as a unique one, and that changes not only had to be 
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made but they also had to be made in both radical and sustainable ways. The 
assessment that economic development could only be achieved on the basis of 
peaceful societies was once more underlined too. The following excerpts from the 
mentioned report illustrate very well how the discourse unfolded in the early 
1990s.  
Table 6: The Search for Changes in Security Policy 
 
All the speakers agreed that there is need for a new outlook in Africa. The 
continent is facing problems of monumental proportions requiring an urgent 
and radical approach. The conflict situations, the refugees, economic 
stagnation, environmental degradation and a host of other problems have 
undermined Africa’s security. There is therefore urgent need to take measures 
to arrest the situation (ALF 1990, 1). 
Profound geo-political changes have melted borders and radically altered 
global strategic equations. These changes left in their trail the collapse of the 
Cold War structures and a search for new alliances and directions (ALF 1990, 
15). 
Let us hope therefore that given how terribly low Africa has fallen, we will 
accept our historical challenge and become the frontliners in establishing the 
process that will lay the foundation for security, stability, co-operation and 
structural transformation in Africa. It is not going to be a quick fix. Rather it is 
going to be an arduous task. But it is a tack that must be performed (ALF 1990, 
33). 
 
Debates were not only held in the CSSDCA but also in the OAU itself too. In their 
official documents, the latter underlined the devastating nature of the 
experienced conflicts in order to justify new approaches in institutional design 
(table 7). 
Table 7: Mentioning of Conflicts in Official Documents 
 
Gravely concerned with the proliferation of conflicts in Africa and the immense 
suffering which they have brought to the people of Africa, as well as their 
adverse implications for the security and stability of Africa and the socio-
economic development of the continent (OAU 1992a, preamble). 
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No single internal factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic 
problems on the continent than the scourge of conflicts in and among our 
countries. They have brought about death and human suffering, engendered 
hate and divided nations and families (OAU 1993a, 9). 
 
 
6.3. Impotence of ROs and Lack of Action by the UN 
6.3.1. ECOWAS 
In light of the experienced conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-
Bissau, ECOWAS member states signed the “Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping 
and Security” in Lomé, Togo, on December 1o, 1999. Important aspects of how 
decision-makers thought about the new mechanism were on the one hand a felt 
sense of impotence on the part of ECOWAS vis-à-vis interventions and on the 
other the inactivity of the international community. 
The outbreak of the first Liberian civil war did not, despite its violent character 
and its development into a humanitarian catastrophe, entail the immediate 
involvement of the international community. The US, which had strong ties to 
Nigeria at that time, had been actively engaged in the Gulf War against Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq in 1990/1991. The UN of these years had itself been struggling with 
the new post–Cold War era and its changing circumstances and growing 
responsibilities (Kabia 2011, 151). ECOWAS claimed that it had urged the UN to 
help by “warning [that] the situation was getting worse, but there is no help 
forthcoming. Therefore, ECOWAS countries decided to act together” (Coleman 
2007, 98).74 Thus, it became obvious that the new international order would 
make it necessary to think about one’s own peace and security strategies. 
However this inactivity by the international community and former allied great 
powers, coming with the resulting feeling in Africa of being left all alone, heavily 
influenced the way decision-makers imagined their new and very own security 
                                                           
74 Cited interview of Katharina Coleman with Frank Ofei, acting deputy executive secretary 
(economic affairs) and director of studies, ECOWAS, in 2000 (Coleman 2007, 98).  
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structures. This becomes obvious when looking at the following official 
documents adopted by OAU/AU and ECOWAS. 
Table 8: Official Documents Urging International Support 
 
CONVINCED that the responsibility for security, stability, development and co-
operation on the African continent rests not only with the people of Africa 
themselves but also on international co-operation, support and participation 
(ALF 1991, preamble). 
While recalling that maintenance of international peace and security is the 
primary responsibility of the UN Security Council, WE URGE the United 
Nations and the international community to pay necessary attention to the 
management and resolution of conflicts in Africa and actively support the 
initiatives deployed under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (OAU 
2000b, 5). 
EXPRESSES ITS DETERMINATION to address the scourge of conflicts in 
Africa in a collective, comprehensive and decisive manner, within the 
framework of the AU and its relevant organs, and with the full support of the 
wider international community (AU 2003b, 5). 
AWARE that the review of the treaty arises, inter alia, from the need for the 
community to adapt to the changes on the international scene in order to derive 
greater benefits from those changes (ECOWAS 1993, preamble). 
 
In Sierra Leone, the situation was different as it would be perceived as the “first 
time that a military junta was overthrown in the name of democracy and 
constitutional order” (Kabia 2011, 162). Although UNAMSIL had suffered from 
logistical and financial difficulties—as did most UN missions—it was still 
perceived as being rather successful, for a number of reasons.75 In the Guinea-
Bissau conflict meanwhile, “the UN only intervened after a rather messy and 
rather problematic ECOMOG intervention” (Kabia 2011, 168). Following UN 
                                                           
75 UNAMSIL was deemed successful as it was a first attempt at what Kofi Annan had named 
“robust peacekeeping,” backed up by the support of the UK and Nigeria. Second, it was adjudged 





Resolution 1233, UN and ECOWAS were jointly responsible for the organization 
and supervision of subsequent elections.  
Therefore not only the official documents above show the strong will of Africans 
to be able to handle their own security problems but also the interviews do too 
(interview section 6). It becomes clear that decision-makers were not longer 
willing to depend exclusively on external support. The interviews also underline 
the importance of timing. As visible in the last one (#21), they set the ground for 
changes for which the timing seemed to be right; or, as historical institutionalists 
would argue, a critical juncture had reached. 
Interview Section 6: Perceptions of International Involvement 
 
And so, the leaders of that time […] after Rwanda, they also had the crises in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. And some of the West African Leaders of that time 
decided they would not wait for external involvement and responded, first to 
Liberia, and based on their response to the Liberian crisis, they were requested 
by the United Nations then to restore democracy back in Sierra Leone (#21). 
So, it became evident that there was some new thinking on the continent about 
recent crises and all of this […] with the realization that post–Cold War 
interests have changed and Africa needed to take care of its own interests 
coupled with the fact that there was a lot more democratization on the 
continent. So, the whole idea of a bad boys’ club, which all came to power by 
the barrel and the guns, that was no longer appealing. […] And so, I think, there 




The newly established OAU mechanism was born because of the causality 
of a security environment characterized by a multitude of conflicts occurring on 
the African continent, ones varying in complexity, scale, and intensity. While 
some could be ended, new ones soon erupted—such as those in Angola, the 
Central African Republic, Comores, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
(Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 11). As could be readily seen, not only Rwanda 
challenged the newly founded capabilities of the OAU in terms of peacekeeping 
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but also other severe conflicts did too. The OAU responded in different ways to 
different conflicts. It mediated and imposed sanctions (Comores), it sent special 
envoys (Comores and Burundi), and it deployed fact-finding and military 
missions (Rwanda, Burundi, and Comores). Although the OAU did initially start 
to establish a certain kind of credibility in handling peace and security issues, its 
practical performances made obvious that the organization did not—at that 
time—have the capacity, resources, or experience to handle these conflicts alone. 
Therefore, support from IOs and/or the international community was not only 
badly needed but also expected. Accordingly the failure of the international 
community in Rwanda came as a profound shock to African decision-makers and 
left them with a feeling of impotence, as the following interviews show. 
Interview Section 7: Disappointment in the International 
Community 
 
The second has much to do with […] the genocide in Rwanda and the fact that 
the OAU at that time and the UN failed to prevent the genocide […]. It was also 
the key element (#27). 
Now, if you go to West Africa, East Africa also, there was a crisis in Burundi in 
which again the international community has failed to respond to (#21). 
 
Rwanda was not only a turning point in African history due to its catastrophic 
nature, but also because of the new situation on the continent ensuing from it. 
While during the Cold War the great powers had been actively engaged in Africa, 
the decade after its end showed the African continent its decreased global 
importance. The following statements from a brainstorming meeting of the 
CSSDCA illustrate just how disappointed and frustrated African decision-makers 
were. 
Table 9: Fatigue of the International Community 
 
The loss of the little strategic value Africa ever had for super-power Cold War   
rivalries, has come against a background of declining inflows of aid and foreign   
investment, a crippling debt overhang, and the collapse of major commodity 
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prices […], [and] greater international attention and priority to Eastern Europe 
(ALF 1990, 16). 
There is change everywhere except in Africa. Africa has moved from being at 
the periphery to the periphery of the periphery of the global economy – the 
permanent political and underdog of the world, the world’s basket case, the 
permanent mezzogiorno for which there is little hope! Indeed, in many non-
African chanceries–West, East, and other Third World countries – many 
officials wished Africa would just go away (ALF 1990, 32)! 
Africa, the once major client forced into the Cold War era on the hope of 
maximizing rewards, remained its most impoverished victim and now emerges 
into the post–Cold War era, disorganized and frustrated, unsure and isolated 
economically and politically–perhaps more than any other region (ALF 1990, 
16). 
 
At that time, the feeling dominated that other regions in the world would attract 
more attention from the international community. African leaders felt that they 
had been marginalized at the expense of the involvement of the international 
community elsewhere, and consequently that the world no longer cared about 
Africa. 
Interview Section 8: Crises Receiving More Attraction 
 
When you look at the international community’s response to the crisis of the 
former Republic of Yugoslavia and its response to the crisis in Rwanda, you can 
clearly see that the international community did not care about Africa (#21). 
What happened in Rwanda, what happened earlier in Liberia, actually led some 
of the African leaders to believe that they have been marginalized and that they 
have been abandoned. And that the world was more interested in what was 
happening in the Balkans. And so it was a time for Africa to begin to own its 
own problems and begin to own its own solutions and to demonstrate the 
capacity that if the world does not care, Africa will step up to the plate (#9). 
 
Based on this feeling of abandonment, debates on the African continent remained 
conducted in a rather passive way only briefly—with them shifting quickly in the 
direction of self-empowerment. As interview section 9 shows, stakeholders 
reflected on the current situation in a rather pragmatic way and decided that 
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radical change was necessary. It was deemed that the reliance on external support 
would no longer be enough, and that—at least rhetorically—the OAU and the 
African continent as a whole now had to step up and to develop its own solutions 
to its own problems. 
Interview Section 9: Empowerment as a Reaction to Neglect (I) 
 
Well, the experience of all of that [Rwanda] showed that you cannot fully rely 
on external support when it comes to address some specific issues. […] We can 
no longer say we simply rely on the UN for the promotion of peace and security. 
[…] The genocide in Rwanda has shown that external support cannot be fully 
relied upon (#27). 
The second broader background has to do with the fact that there was also a 
kind of fatigue with the UN system in terms of its ability to resolve African 
conflicts. As a result, there was a tendency to empower regional organizations 
to be able to also develop their own capacity […]. There was a need for them to 
also step up (#11).  
The AU has given itself a far-reaching mandate in the area of peace and security 
based on the experiences in Rwanda where neither OAU nor UN have been 
capable of intervening. […] That has been the big learning effect. […] To take 
control of its own business and to say: we will take our own responsibilities 
(#26). 
 
Interestingly, this empowerment is two-sided. On the one hand, it was based on 
the assumption of pure necessity as international partners were no longer as 
reliable as previously. On the other, empowerment was connected with the wish 
to give a signal to the international community that Africa is very capable of 
finding its own solutions. 
Table 10: Empowerment as a Reaction to Neglect (II) 
 
Africa’s experience may be bitter but the lessons are clear. Any rational analysis 
of the current state of the world leads to an inescapable conclusion that this 
millennium of the 20th century represents a critical turning point for Africa. It 
is a great challenge largely because of a long historical dependency imposed on 
the region by an inequitable international economic system; but, it is also an 
opportunity stemming from the forced isolation and the realization that 
acceptance of a radical change is now of vital necessity (ALF 1990, 16). 
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We recognize also that it is only through the consolidation of our unity that our 
continent will move from the periphery to a position where Africa will become 
an equal and effective participant in the world economic, political and social 
order. Let us not be under any illusion the rest of the world will do it for us. On 
the contrary, just as the birth of the OAU was greeted with cynicism by skeptics, 
there are many who have refused to give our Union any chance of survival, let 
alone success let us ensure that they are wrong (Essy 2002, 2). 
 
But despite the signaling of its own strength, the OAU was very aware of the fact 
that it would have to rely on international support in order to be able to respond 
to crises more effectively. Table 11 shows that the OAU in its official documents 
not only reminded the international community of its responsibility as laid down 
in the UN Charter, but also asked international partners for help and support in 
that stepping up. 
Table 11: Calling for International Support 
 
While recalling that maintenance of international peace and security is the 
primary responsibility of the UN Security Council, WE URGE the United 
Nations and the international community to pay necessary attention to the 
management and resolution of conflicts in Africa and actively support the 
initiatives deployed under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (OAU 
2000b, 5). 
FURTHER CALL ON the international community to do its utmost to ensure 
that globalization serves the interest of all countries without discrimination 
and, in particular, facilitate the effective participation of our countries in the 
global trade system, thereby helping us to lay the foundations for durable and 











7. ECOWAS: A Pioneer in African 
Regional Security  
7.1. Interdependence between ROs and IOs 
As interdependence is the main criterion for diffusion occurring, the next 
subchapter is concerned with the interdependent relations between ECOWAS 
and the UN as well as the AU. Already in its revised treaty document of 1993, 
ECOWAS underlined its closed cooperation and harmonization of policies not 
only with the African Economic Community but also with the by then OAU and 
the UN as well as other IOs too (table 12). 
Table 12: Institutionalized Cooperation of ECOWAS 
 
The integration of the region shall constitute an essential component of the 
integration of the African continent. Member states undertake to facilitate the 
co-ordination and harmonization of the policies and programmes of the 
community with those of the African Economic Community (ECOWAS 1993, 
Art. 78).  
In pursuit of its objective, the community shall also co-operate with the 
Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations system, and any other 
international organization (ECOWAS 1993, Art. 83). 
 
The official legal documents of ECOWAS not only provide for institutionalized 
cooperation in general, but also—and in particular—for close collaboration on 
peace and security issues too. In its Conflict Prevention Framework from 2008, 
ECOWAS set out in detail how close the collaboration between the UN, AU, and 
itself was planned to be (table 13). Accordingly ECOWAS was heavily influenced 
by the normative frameworks of other regional and international organizations, 
and established its own normative foundations very closely in line with those of 
the UN and AU. As illustrated in table 13, the close security cooperation of 
ECOWAS, AU, and UN would range from conflict prevention, to peace-building, 




Table 13: Security Cooperation of ECOWAS, AU, and UN 
 
Increase awareness and preparedness for cooperative ventures between 
ECOWAS, member states, civil society and external constituencies (RECs, AU, 
EU, UN, international financial institutions and development/ humanitarian 
agencies) in pursuit of conflict prevention and peace-building (ECOWAS 2008, 
Art. 28 (e)). 
ECOWAS draws its mandate and legitimacy to shape conflict prevention 
policies and practices in West Africa from diverse but related regional and 
international normative framework documents. These include foundation and 
related legal documents of ECOWAS, AU, NEPAD and UN (ECOWAS 2008, 
Art. 30). 
A firm legal basis underpins the relationship between ECOWAS, the African 
Union and the United Nations on the cardinal issue of peace and security. […] 
Thus, key ECOWAS normative standards that speak to conflict prevention, 
resolution and peace-building broadly radiate from the Constitutive Act of AU 
and the UN Charter, and the related normative standards on peace and security 
(ECOWAS 2008, Art. 40). 
 
How this cooperation is implemented in practice is shown in table 14. The conflict 
mechanism of ECOWAS is not only put into effect on the decision of the Authority 
and the MSC, at the request of a member state, or on the initiative of the Executive 
Secretary but also at the request of the UN—and previously of the OAU too 
(ECOWAS 1999, Art. 26). ECOWAS’ standby force, ESF, is also very closely 
connected to the AU and other RECs, as they need to coordinate strategies and 
activities.  
Table 14: Practical Peace and Security Cooperation 
 
The mechanism shall be put into effect by any of the following: […] e) At request 
of the Organisation of African Unity or the United Nations (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 
26).  
ECOWAS shall coordinate ESF strategy with the African Union, promote 
exchanges between the two institutions and other RECs, and ensure that ESF 
activities in the region are in harmony with those of the African Standby Force 




ECOWAS, AU, and the UN reveal their interdependence not only in their legal 
documents and normative frameworks but also vis-à-vis personnel and logistical 
aspects, as will be shown in the next chapter.  
 
7.2.  Triangle ECOWAS-AU-UN  
Based on the demonstrated interdependence of ECOWAS and other 
regional and international organizations, the triangle of ECOWAS-AU-UN is thus 
addressed here. The relationship between the UN on the one hand and the two 
most important African ROs on the other is a special one. When bearing in mind 
the fact that all three organizations have peace and security mandates for Africa, 
it becomes obvious how challenges and opportunities regarding effective and 
successful cooperation are very closely linked (Ajayi 2008, 2). Out of fifty-seven 
UN peace operations to date, twenty-four have taken place in Africa. Concerning 
current such operations, seven out of fourteen are on the African continent.76 
Thus, close cooperation is not only necessary but also crucial for the successful 
realization of common peace and security aims in Africa. 
In order to fulfill these, close cooperation between ECOWAS, AU, and the UN is 
necessary—and indeed, as noted, already practiced. As illustrated in interview 
section 10, interviewees confirmed the intimate collaboration between ECOWAS 
and both AU and the UN on peace and security issues. According to these 
interviewees, drafted concepts are discussed and partners consulted. 
Interview Section 10: Work Exchange 
 
What we did is we drafted a concept and we had an expert seminar at the Kofi 
Annan Peacekeeping Centre in Accra, Ghana, and there we had UN experts and 
we had various representatives from African governments and the AU (#15). 
Sometimes we invite the UN as a strategic partner […]. There is a constant 
interaction with partners throughout this process […]. Partner consultations 
happen both formally and informally (#19). 
                                                           




Of course, the UN and the AU were operating alongside each other and we 
anticipated that they would act together a lot, so that was a major influence 
(#15). 
 
By working together, knowledge is exchanged. As illustrated in interview section 
11, expertise from the UN has been available to ECOWAS and AU—and both 
organizations would make use of it. The last box of interview section 11 gives one 
example of strengthened cooperation between ECOWAS and AU, particularly on 
peace and security issues as well as over related institutions. 
Interview Section 11: Exchange of Knowledge 
 
So, expertise from the UN was usually available, and almost always [funded by] 
the UN as part of [its] support, which is important for an institution which does 
not have the resources it needs to get on (#14). 
The role of the competent organizations of the UN system should be integrated 
into the CSSDCA process (ALF 1990, 24). 
STRONGLY ADVOCATE co-operation in the area of peacekeeping and security 
between the United Nations Organization (UNO), the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) and African Regional Organizations (OAU 2000b, 4). 
 
This exchange of knowledge is also characterized by personnel linkages, as staff 
move between the three organizations. The interviewee in section 12 described 
how—most often higher-ranking—officials from African ROs not only move 
between those ROs themselves but also later on to the UN and its various agencies 
too. 
Interview Section 12: Movement of Knowledge in ECOWAS 
 
The relationship between AU and the subregional organizations is very, very 
close. A lot of people start in ROs and later go to New York. And a lot of very 
good people that go to New York with their knowledge are very important for 





One of numerous examples—but a particularly important one—is Margaret Vogt. 
She not only worked for a number of institutions in Nigeria, such as the Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairs, before joining the International Peace Academy 
in New York. In 2000 she became chief of staff of the AU Commission 
chairperson and worked also for UNOSOM II. She was also one of the principal 
advisers to the UN assistant secretary general for political affairs, was the acting 
deputy special representative of the secretary general in the UN Political Office 
for Somalia, and deputy director of the Africa I Division in the Department of 
Political Affairs at the UN Secretariat in New York (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 
ii).  
Interview Section 13: Movement of Margaret Vogt 
 
On the other hand, Margaret has also worked within the UN system and was 
very much aware of [their security mechanism] (#11). 
There was a very important stakeholder, Margaret Vogt, who was also Chief of 
Cabinet of Konare and has worked a lot on the UN. She was also directly 
involved in the draft of the PSC Protocol. […] She was the link to the UN (#2). 
 
Margaret was a crucial and highly influential person in the establishment process 
of peace and security structures in both ROs, as she actively shaped the design of 
their security institutions (interview sections 13 and 14). As a highly respected 
intellectual, she brought knowledge from her various post in Nigerian as well as 
international institutions. Having completed her academic education in the US, 
she believed deeply in institutions—not only as a result of her extensive work in 
academia on regional and international organizations but also due to the vast, 
rich knowledge that she had acquired over a lifetime of serving in those very 
organizations. 
Interview Section 14: Margaret Vogt (I) 
 
I believe that Margaret Vogt has been the most crucial stakeholder (#4). 
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Yes, Margaret Vogt was central to a lot of that before she then moved on to the 
UN (#9). 
Others were people who had been groomed within Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
who are—what I call—hard-boiled technocrats. Some of them had served in 
some of these institutions in the West, some of them had served in UN, some 
of them had served in UN-affiliated agencies, and they had seen or studied 
these various integrationalist organizations (#9). 
 
Margaret not only served as a linkage between ECOWAS, AU, and the UN, she 
also had a very close relationship with the Nigerian administration too. As the 
interviews in section 15 reveal, she not only worked closely together with Nigeria’s 
military head of state at that time who—after consultation with Margaret—
brought new ideas into the ECOWAS fold.  She was also—during her time as chief 
of staff at the OAU—very close with the chairperson of the Commission, as well 
as with the head of the AU Conflict Management and Prevention Division too.  
Interview Section 15: Influence of Margaret Vogt 
 
You remember that Margaret Vogt and her co-author happened to be 
individuals from the ECOWAS system. Margaret at that time worked for the 
Nigerian government and was aware of the ECOWAS Conflict Management and 
Prevention Division, and wanted to some extent to draw on that—and wanted 
to inform the AU (#11). 
And people like Margaret Vogt, they were a group of Nigerian scholars who 
were policy advisors who were actually able to influence Ibrahim Babangida. 
That was the military head of state there. And he in turn went to the ECOWAS 
meeting with his ideas (#9). 
The director […] of the AU Conflict Management and Prevention Division was 
a Nigerian […]. He relied heavily on Margaret and V77, […]. You know, there is 
a revolving door, these international people work for IOs and then the NGO 
community. So, they knew each other and I think he brought both together 
(#11). 
 
                                                           
77 Names of officials of AU and ECOWAS are written out as they have/had already prominent 
positions and their role in the respective organizations is already well-known. The names of 
consultants however are abbreviated with A, B, etc. due to protection of privacy rights. 
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The question of where exactly a significant part of the exchange of information is 
taking place is answered by Engel, when he refers to the headquarters of regional 
and international organizations as “portals of globalization” (2018, 151). He 
argues that these headquarters have changed in character by moving from small 
and badly equipped entities to big bureaucracies that are well connected with 
other such headquarters (ibid., 152). Following this logic, headquarters can be 
seen as “hotspots of contemporary processes of globalization” (ibid., 152), 
wherein particular knowledge is not only developed but also exchanged between 
relevant stakeholders from different organizations. This argument fits well with 
the diffusion theory one that headquarters represent one possible channel of 
diffusion. As an example of this Engel describes how the UN, with its Agenda for 
Peace, and the AU with its subsequent report Resolving Conflicts in Africa. 
Implementation Options, influenced each other—particularly in aspects such as 
norm transfer (ibid., 157).78 He further describes how the headquarters of both 
AU and the UN have organized special formats of interaction, such as a Joint 
United Nations–African Union Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace 
and Security (ibid., 161). Other types of exchange include meetings between the 
AU’s PSC and the UNSC, as well as interactions with ECOWAS (ibid., 164).   
However, despite being dependent on a close and efficient relationship existing 
between each other, such organizational collaboration is not free from problems 
and obstacles. As will be shown in the next chapter, the AU learned a lot from 
ECOWAS and its exploits in the peace and security area—wherein it has been 
widely acknowledged that ECOWAS was more advanced and experienced. For the 
AU—in its own self-perception, the leading RO on the African continent—it was 
not always easy to admit that it had learned directly from ECOWAS, and that 
there was hence another RO on the continent more developed than itself 
(interview section 16). 
 
 
                                                           
78 Famous examples include the debate about the origin of norms such as Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) or of humanitarian interventions (Engel 2018, 157). 
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Interview Section 16: Tensions between AU and ECOWAS 
 
So, there was a sense in which ECOWAS was more sophisticated than the AU. 
If you have a look at the relationship between the AU and ECOWAS, sometimes 
ECOWAS justices the AU to get lost. […] It’s one of those tensions you are 
seeing (#9). 
And ECOWAS has learned all that, and so what they simply did was that a lot 
of it was then taken to the AU level to form it. AU also learned from what has 
happened in ECOWAS. ECOWAS has been ahead of the curve so to speak. But 
the AU people did not want to talk about it and did not want to concede but of 
the regional economic communities, ECOWAS was really the frontrunner in 
terms of peace and security frameworks. There was not another person, not 
EDC, not ECCAS, not the Maghreb Union, nobody, it was just ECOWAS (#9). 
 
 
7.3. Nigerian Influence on the Security Ambitions of 
ECOWAS 
Whereas for some Nigeria is a “military giant in Africa” (Ogunnubi and Okeke-
Uzodike 2016, 110), for others it is a “crippled giant” (Osaghae 1998, 1) or a “giant 
with rickety feet” (Adebajo and Mustapha 2008, 25). However Nigeria still is—
without any doubt—a major stakeholder in the West African region. This basic 
assumption has been not only widely discussed in the literature but also proved 
by the interviews too (interview section 17). 
Interview Section 17: Nigeria as Hegemon in West Africa 
 
In West Africa, there was a clear hegemon, that was Nigeria. There was a clear 
hegemon that had the money and that had the relevant policy advisors and 
technocrats to push that agenda on a regional level (#9). 
Nigeria always felt as a hegemon and has dreamed of sitting in the UNSC at 
some point (#4). 




Nigeria’s predominance in the subregion is not only determined by its size, 
population, as well as military, economic, and political resources—which far 
exceed those of the other West African countries. As visible in figures 7 and 8, 
Nigeria’s supremacy is mainly based on its material predominance. Figure 7 
shows that Nigeria’s relative material power in 2007 was, in relation to its region, 
over 50 percent. Accordingly, Nigeria’s share of regional GDP (figure 8) was 
around 80 percent in 2014. As a result, Nigeria pays for roughly three-quarters of 
the entire ECOWAS budget (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 80). 
Figure 7: Nigeria’s Relative Material Power in 2007 in West Africa 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation (based own Hulse 2016, 15). 
This supremacy is rooted in three main aspects. First, the Biafran civil war in the 
1960s—and, as part of that, the extent to which extra-regional powers tried to 
destabilize Nigeria from within neighboring countries would change its former 
isolationist policy to a proactive one, wherein regional security could no longer 
be separated from national security (Francis 2006, 147).79 Second, the discovery 
of oil in general, as well as the oil crisis of 1973 specifically, made Nigeria not only 
                                                           
79 After independence Nigeria had originally not been interested in becoming the leader of the 
West African region. It followed instead a Western-oriented foreign policy, as it perceived its 































a key oil producer for the West but also—in comparison to its West African 
neighbors—a very wealthy country too (Francis 2006, 148). Third, both of these 
aspects—Nigeria’s experience during the civil war and its increased wealth based 
on oil production—led to a change in its own self-perception vis-à-vis peace and 
security matters. Nigeria has, consequently, since developed a rather proactive 
peace and security policy in the region, as it perceives any threat in the subregion 
to be one to itself as well.  
Figure 8: Share of Regional GDP (2014) in West Africa 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation (based on Hulse 2016, 15). 
After the end of the civil war, scholars and policy-makers from the country started 
to think and talk about Nigeria’s destiny to “lead not only West Africa, but also 
Africa as a whole” (Hulse 2016, 16). Under Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian president 
from 1966 until 1975,80 policy-makers began to discuss the idea of an RO 
encompassing both the francophone and anglophone countries of the region, one 
that would not only counterbalance French influence in the region but that would 
also serve as a medium for furthering Nigeria’s own interests. Although some of 
the other West African states had originally been against founding such an RO, 
these initially skeptical states could still be convinced to join ECOWAS. This was 
                                                           
80 Obasanjo was afterward the (military) head of state of Nigeria from February 1976 until October 
1979, before eventually handing over the presidency to (civilian and elected) Shehu Shagari 














mainly due to Nigeria’s wealth, which made it possible to finance infrastructure 
projects, give loans and political donations, as well as invest heavily in 
neighboring countries (Ihonvbere 1991, 519). As such, ECOWAS has always 
represented an attempt by Nigeria to further its own goals based on the domestic 
situation at hand. The affluent years of the 1970s were followed by ones of 
economic standing still and military juntas in the 1980s—which also led to the 
stagnation of ECOWAS. It was under Olusegun Obasanjo, president from 1999 
until 2007, that Nigeria not only progressed to a more democratic system but also 
proclaimed once more its assuming of leadership within ECOWAS (Hulse 2016, 
16f.).81 
What becomes clear is that Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS is mainly determined by 
the one that the incumbent president envisages for the country in that RO. 
Interview section 18 illustrates how crucial Obasanjo was for the revised 
orientation of ECOWAS. Interviewees mainly described Obasanjo as being part 
of a new generation of African leaders who, by instigating a series of initiatives,82  
wanted to change the self-perception of Africa—as well as the foreign image of the 
African continent too. 
Interview Section 18: Nigeria’s Influential Heads of State 
 
It was also partly ideological because that period was a period where Abdulaye 
Wade, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Thabo Mbeki were talking about an African 
renaissance (#9). 
And in fact, it is important to have a look at the leaders that you had in 
ECOWAS at that time. How they also influenced the developments on a 
continental level, so we had Wade of Senegal, we had Obasanjo in Nigeria, we 
had Mbeki in SADC. How they have inspired, how they have worked together 
to further this new idea or what was supposed to be a new idea of a collective 
security on the continent (#19). 
                                                           
81 Nigeria’s leadership could be mainly observed in the security sector, but not in trade aspects. 
According to Cilliers et al. (2014), Nigeria was impeded here by the corruption and government 
inefficacy that are characteristic of neopatrimonial regimes. 
82 Next to the CSSDCA initiative of Obasanjo, South African president Thabo Mbeki launched the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) that goes back to his core idea of an African 
renaissance, and aims at taking responsibility oneself for the development of African countries 
(Meyns 2002, 64). 
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You are looking at Nigeria and Obasanjo, you are looking at the new-generation 
leaders […]. All those people were the people who wanted to take the decisions 
(#9). 
 
This new generation of leaders not only aimed at advancing Africa’s development 
in general but also at influencing the discourse on peace and security across the 
African continent too. It was particularly Obasanjo who developed and advanced 
the idea of how security, stability, development, and cooperation are linked with 
each other, and thus advocated for an African security architecture. In 1990 
Obasanjo, then chairperson of the Africa Leadership Forum, initiated the earlier-
mentioned CSSDCA. In November 1990, the ALF and the secretariats of both 
OAU and ECOWAS invited NGOs to a “brainstorming meeting” in Addis Ababa. 
In May 1991, 300 delegates from nearly all African countries came together to 
continue the discussions and they concluded with the Kampala Document—
which included a detailed proposition for the foundation of the CSSDCA (Nathan 
1992, 212).83 
Interestingly, as noted in part I, the CSSDCA is modelled after the CSCE, which—
as a forum for the US, the Soviet Union, and thirty-three Western and Eastern 
European countries—discussed guidelines for interstate relations regarding 
security, economic cooperation, and human rights (ALF 1990, 3).84 The 
organizers of the CSSDCA—which was operating under the leadership of 
Obasanjo—believed that the realization of its goals would be “a radical departure 
from existing practices in Africa” (ibid., 216). According to Nathan (1992), the 
CSSDCA characterized a turning point in Africa’s self-perception. Instead of 
blaming colonialism for all of the negative developments on the continent, the 
discussions during the conference were now defined by a high degree of self-
criticism too. The CSSDCA was described by many interviewees as a genuine 
                                                           
83 Obasanjo, in his opening statement to this brainstorming retreat, referred to the CSSDCA as 
being a “‘New Deal” for Africa—and thereby, intentionally or not, made a nod to the New Deal 
of the US during the 1930s (ALF 1990, 15). 
84 The CSCE gained in reputation as it, according to majority opinion, led to a more stable security 
situation in Europe and to improved cooperation between the involved countries—as well as a 




turning point in the development discourse of the African continent. Adebayo 
Adedeji, executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, referred 
meanwhile to the “democratic winds of change blowing through Africa” that had 
initiated by the CSSDCA’s inception (Nathan 1992, 217).  
During a brainstorming meeting in November 1990 to discuss the general idea of 
CSSDCA and to prepare a concrete future version of it, participants agreed that 
the African continent faced monumental problems that would not only require a 
radically new but also urgent approach (ALF 1990). As illustrated in table 15, the 
organizers found their role model in the Helsinki Process of Europe and tried to 
convince participants that an equal path—one including non-state actors in 
discussions—could lead to success in Africa as well. Furthermore they recognized 
that mechanisms of communication needed to be established to reach ordinary 
African people, and to generate greater comprehension and participation from 
among them. 
Table 15: European Processes as Role Models 
 
In Europe, non-governmental organizations while not formally involved in the 
negotiation process of the Helsinki Act did have a significant impact in its 
subsequent implementation. In Africa, non-governmental organizations, 
professional and grassroot organizations must be given an enhanced role (ALF 
1990, 3). 
At any rate, it will be necessary also to mobilize and sensitize governments, 
NGOs, the youth and women on how such a process can be embarked upon. 
Presently, no mechanism of communication [exists] by which the collective 
decisions of African governments can reach the ordinary people. In 
consequence, there is little or no public opinion input into the decisions that 
affect the continent (ALF 1990, 4). 
 
This brainstorming meeting led, as mentioned, to a further one of 300 delegates 
from almost every African country, along with eight national heads of state, in 
May 1991, in Uganda. Until then the biggest such conference involving both state 
and non-state actors, this meeting had a crucial impact on the discourse about 
how peace and security are linked with development and cooperation on the 
African continent. The interviewees in section 19 reveal that they still evaluate the 
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CSSDCA process, and the discussions accompanying it, as being the initial spark 
for the subsequent institutionalization of the peace and security ambitions of 
African ROs. The CSSDCA marked a first phase of crucial civil society 
involvement in the peace and security discourse gradually unfolding on the 
African continent. 
Interview Section 19: Importance of CSSDCA 
 
And I would refer you to the whole process of the Conference on Security, 
Stability and Development in Africa. […] It was a non-governmental initiative 
that influenced and contributed significantly to the establishment of the APSA. 
[…] And, in fact, it is important to have a look at the leaders that you had in 
ECOWAS at that time of the establishment of the APSA. […] How they inspired, 
how they worked together to further this new idea […] of a collective security 
on the continent (#19). 
This non-governmental initiative began to gain political momentum following 
the election of Obasanjo and […] the processes within this Conference on 
Security and Stability fed into deliberations that led to the establishment of the 
AU and of course, subsequently, the APSA (#19). 
 
However attempts to anchor the impetus behind the CSSDCA into concrete 
politics were not successful,85 and it would fall into oblivion for the time being. It 
was only when Obasanjo became president of Nigeria in 1999 that the CSSDCA 
was reinvigorated, by him (Meyns 2002, 64). By then, Obasanjo not only tried to 
resurrect the discourse surround the CSSDCA but also supported it with financial 
contributions (table 16). In the early 2000s Nigeria donated some US$ 500,000 
to the OAU in order to initiate and support the work of the CSSDCA within it.  
Table 16: Financial Contributions of Nigeria to CSSDCA 
 
COMMENDS Nigeria and South Africa for their generous contribution of five 
hundred thousand dollars (US$ 500,000) each for the operationalization of the 
CSSDCA and CALLS upon OAU member states, the United Nations and all 
                                                           
85 It has been discussed how the CSSDCA was not successful for the time being, as decision-
makers in Africa found it difficult to investigate problems within their very own governments. 
As a result the OAU founded its own Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution (Meyns 2002, 65). 
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OAU partners to provide financial support for the CSSDCA process (OAU 
2000a, 1). 
WELCOMES the pledge by the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
to contribute the sum of US$ 500,000 towards the takeoff of the CSSDCA 
within the work programme of the OAU, and CALLS ON other member states 
to contribute towards this process (AU 2001b, 1). 
 
This example illustrates not only how important the CSSDCA process was for 
Obasanjo himself but also, once again, how interlinked ECOWAS and the AU are. 
The CSSDCA process, originally started as a project by the civil society forum ALF 
under the leadership of Obasanjo, was transferred to the OAU—wherein, almost 
ten years later, it is still a crucial component of the discourse underpinning and 
influencing the APSA. This interpretation was also shared among interviewees, 
who argued that Nigeria is not only a key player inside ECOWAS but also of 
enormous importance for the security structures of the AU too (interview section 
20). 
Interview Section 20: Influence of Nigeria 
 
What Nigeria thinks about the AU peace and security agenda is enormously 
important, and has huge influence. Nigeria is also a massive player […] inside 
ECOWAS (#8). 
 
According to Kabia (2009, 189), the realization of the ECOWAS “Protocol for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” would 
not have been possible without the explicit consent and involvement of Nigeria. 
Hartmann and Striebinger (2015, 78f.) name three aspects outlining the key 
importance of Nigeria in the process leading to the 1999 protocol. First, Obasanjo 
managed to achieve the acceptance of the idea of democratic institutions among 
Nigeria’s military forces; this was crucial as, up until 1998, the country had been 
a military dictatorship. Second, Obasanjo urged ECOWAS member states not 
only to realize radical reforms in general but also to significantly revise the RO’s 
security mechanism specifically. Third, the broader democratization processes 
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within West African countries86 that eventually led to the election of Obasanjo—
who, for the reasons already outlined, was crucial to these developments, and so 
had the ability to convince member states to agree to wide-ranging reforms. 
Nigeria’s president Obasanjo was thus not only crucial for energizing the CSSDCA 
and the related discourse unfolding on the African continent but was also 
significant for ECOWAS’ own evolution too—as many of his Nigerian peers noted 
(interview section 21). 
Interview Section 21: Influential Nigerians in ECOWAS and AU 
 
It was also because Nigeria, certain Nigerian policy advisors and academics 
took it upon themselves. People like Margaret Vogt and some ambassadors in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nigeria’s foreign minister and certain 
military officers took it upon themselves (#9). 
Of course, the AU had a number of West Africans and the head of the Peace and 
Security Department was a Nigerian, Ben Kioko. There was always the sense 
then, at least on paper, ECOWAS was more developed that any other region, 
and so borrowing from their example […] was very important (#29). 
 
In Margaret Vogt’s earlier career stages, she worked, as mentioned earlier, for the 
NIIA, where she not only oversaw the establishment of a Strategic Studies Unit 
but also took on an influential role as an academic who initiated discourses—as 
well as gained a strong reputation as an expert on peace and security issues. The 
NIIA was also identified among respondents (interview section 22) as a think 
tank that was very influential in shaping the discourse regarding African peace 
and security policies. ECOWAS actively tries, as many other regional and 
international organizations also do, to integrate such civil society actors and their 
ideas into its considerations—as the core criticism of this RO has always been the 
non-integration of ordinary West Africans into its decision-making processes. 
                                                           
86 After the end of the Cold War, a rising number of ECOWAS member states became democratic. 
Hartmann and Striebinger (2015, 78f.) use Polity IV data to group these states. Benin, Cape 
Verde, and Mali were therefore among the early democratizers of the 1990s, followed by Ghana 
and Nigeria with their own democratization phases in the late 1990s. Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal 
had their democratic transition right after the ECOWAS protocol was signed in 1999. Prior to 
the ratification of this protocol, the majority of ECOWAS member states—for the first time ever 
since the RO’s foundation—had thus become democracies. 
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Interview Section 22: Nigeria’s Think Tanks 
 
At that point of time, Nigeria had an institute called Nigerian Institute for 
International Affairs which was really very influential (#9). 
Steps are taken under the new ECOWAS Strategic Vision to transform the 
region from an ‘ECOWAS of States’ into an ‘ECOWAS of the Peoples’ […]. 
Consequently, civil society shall play an increasingly critical role alongside 
member states in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security 
(ECOWAS 2008, 9). 
 
It was reported by the interviewees that it was WANEP, a Nigerian think tank, 
that was really “inside” ECOWAS—meaning that advisors and consultants from 
this body had very close relationships with the various decision-makers within 
ECOWAS. WANEP is not only an interesting case due to its particularly close 
cooperation with ECOWAS but also, as reported in interview (#23) below, 
because of its potential influence on a whole continent. As noted WANEP had 
tremendous influence on ECOWAS’ peace and security structures and, as argued 
in this thesis, that RO had for its part a huge effect on AU’s APSA. This can be 
seen as another example underlining just how interdependent regional politics 
are, including their respective stakeholders, and how this affects institutional-
design choices. 
Interview Section 23: Think Tanks in ECOWAS 
 
Again, to fall back on ECOWAS, I think the role of civil networks like WANEP 
is very important for an organization like ECOWAS (#8). 
ECOWAS is your best model where they actually got WANEP, West African 
Network for Peacebuilding to exist inside ECOWAS as technical advisors on the 
development of the Early Warning System. […] They have influenced ECOWAS’ 
thinking. And ECOWAS has then influenced AU's thinking […]. The civil society 
influence in ECOWAS is quite strong (#23). 
The Nigerian Defence College, […] African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes […], the Institute for Security Studies—which is a civil-




7.4. Consolidation: Learning in ECOWAS  
Diffusion theory argues that learning mechanisms are characterized by 
processes in which stakeholders “use the experience of other countries to estimate 
the likely consequences of policy change” (Gilardi 2013, 463), before themselves 
introducing a new policy. After having shown how ECOWAS is interlinked with 
AU and the UN, and how important individuals helped to establish and maintain 
these connections, Nigeria’s influence—as a crucial stakeholder in ECOWAS—
was elaborated on. The following subchapter consolidates these descriptions, and 
illustrates how learning processes have influenced the lead-up to the revision of 
ECOWAS’ security structures. Those learning processes are embedded in two 
factors that sit at the heart of the following chapter: first, the intervention 
experiences of ECOWAS against the backdrop of not having legal authorization 
for them from the UNSC and, second, the ambitions of ECOWAS’ hegemon 
Nigeria vis-à-vis gaining international legitimacy.  
 
7.4.1. Experiences based on Previous Interventions  
As already described in chapter 6, the events in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea-Bissau had a strong influence on the initiated process to think about how 
security institutions in general, as well as intervention mechanisms in particular, 
could be improved. It is necessary to go back once more to search for the drivers 
here, in order to be able to better explain the eventual institutional outcomes 
witnessed. The revised ECOWAS treaty of 1993 can be seen as a first step toward 
an institutionalized security mechanism, as Article 58 obligated member states to 
“co-operate with the community in establishing and strengthening appropriate 
mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-
state conflicts” (ECOWAS 1993).87 The treaty not only referred to economic and 
fiscal aspects regarding globalization challenges but also linked together as one 
security, conflict resolution, and conflict management (Kabia 2011, 4). The 
                                                           
87 Further important declarations by ECOWAS on the road toward a more sophisticated peace 
and security approach were the “Declaration of Political Principles” in 1991 and the 
“Moratorium on Small Arms” in 1998 (Kabia 2011, 5). 
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intervention in Sierra Leone in May 1997 ultimately led to the agreement of 
member states to institutionalize ECOWAS’ security ambitions, and thus to sign 
the protocol for the ECOWAS security mechanism in December 1999. The 
subsequent “Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance” of 2001 
complemented the 1999 one “by providing a more explicit framework of reference 
for appropriate governance standards within member states” (Hartmann and 
Striebinger 2015, 68). In West Africa, a region with fragile states and a history of 
coups d’état, both protocols not only represented an important step toward 
democracy but also established a specific mandate for ECOWAS “to defend these 
principles by force if necessary” (ibid., 68).88 
The MSC, the most important institution established with the 1999 protocol, 
consists of nine member states89 who by majority rule “authorise all forms of 
intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military 
missions [in member states]” (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 10). Until then, the UNSC was 
the only entity having the right to intervene in a member state—and, until 1999, 
no other regional or international organization had followed in its footsteps in 
this regard (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 68). Among other effects—namely 
the already-described institutions—the protocol also provided information 
regarding ECOMOG. It described it as “a structure composed of several stand-by 
multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and 
ready for immediate deployment” (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 21). According to Article 
22 of the protocol, ECOMOG’s missions range, inter alia, from observation and 
monitoring, peacekeeping and restoration of peace, humanitarian interventions, 
to preventive deployments as well as peace-building (ibid., Art. 22).  
The protocol exemplifies how ECOWAS attempted to transfer the lessons learned 
from past interventions into the new protocol (Coleman 2007, 110). Most notably, 
ECOWAS did less “to ensure the legality of future peace enforcement operations 
                                                           
88 ECOWAS is the only RO that, on a regular basis, threatens its member states with intervention 
if they violate norms, as could be observed recently in Côte d’Ivoire (2010), Guinea-Bissau, and 
Mali (both in 2012) (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 69). 
89 According to Hartmann and Striebinger (2015, 83), the practice on the ground has looked 
different since 2001, as all member states are now represented within the MSC and furthermore 
they decide unanimously. 
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launched within the ECOWAS framework” (Coleman 2007, 110). In contrast, the 
protocol does not provide for the UNSC approval that would be necessary for 
ECOWAS member states to launch a new peace-enforcement operation (ibid., 
111). During the drafting phase of the protocol, this issue was one of the most 
discussed ones among member states and experts. In the end, member states 
decided against the inclusion of a legal requirement for peace-enforcement 
operations as they “did not want to tie their own hands. They do not trust the 
Security Council to decide in the interest of the region: it is too removed and too 
slow” (ibid., 111).90 This illustrates how ECOWAS positions itself concerning 
international stakeholders, something that becomes even more apparent if we 
look at the different factors that led to the establishment of the 1999 protocol in 
the first place. 
ECOWAS’ first intervention in Liberia, following the armed rebellion of Charles 
Taylor, was executed as noted earlier without the mandate of the UNSC. The UN 
Charter explicitly determines that “no enforcement action shall be taken under 
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the 
Security Council” (UN 1945, Art. 53). According to Weller (1994, 67ff.), the 
ECOWAS’ SMC explicitly asked for financial support from the UN but did not also 
request a mandate for intervention. A letter from Nigeria’s minister of external 
affairs to the UN secretary general, two days after the operation started, stated 
that,  
 
in view of our shared responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, we have no doubt that you will lend your considerable 
moral support to the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia. We are also confident 
that [you will] generously contribute materially towards the attainment of 
the stated ECOWAS objective in the Republic of Liberia (Weller 1994, 75ff.). 
 
                                                           
90 Cited interview of Katharina Coleman with Margaret Vogt, special assistant to assistant UN 
secretary general, UN Department of Political Affairs in 2000 (Coleman 2007, 111).  
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The reasons why ECOWAS was acting without a mandate are subject to 
discussion. The most plausible explanation is the lengthy process to attain a UN 
mandate—time that ECOWAS simply did not have (Coleman 2007, 78). ECOWAS 
was not only violating international law hereby, but also acting against its own 
legal frameworks too. According to the 1981 protocol that was the legal basis for 
ECOWAS at that time, the Authority of ECOWAS was the body that decided on 
military action (ECOWAS 1981, Art.6). However, Liberia’s President Doe directly 
asked the SMC for an ECOWAS intervention—and with good reason. The 
Authority, a body encompassing heads of state and government from all 
ECOWAS member states, also included Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso—who 
both supported the rebellion of Taylor and thus would not, as Doe had 
anticipated, support his request. However the SMC—a five-member-state organ 
that was founded by Nigeria and dominated by anglophone countries—did 
approve Doe’s request, which ultimately led to the creation of ECOMOG on 
August 7, 1990 (Coleman 2007, 79).  
It has been said that Nigeria supported this course of action, as sources later 
revealed that Doe and Nigeria’s President Babangida had met and discussed 
exactly this approach of avoiding the approval of ECOWAS’ Authority. A further 
breach with ECOWAS’ legal frameworks took place in the composition of 
ECOMOG. As inscribed in the 1981 protocol, military interventions by ECOWAS 
were to be undertaken by the AAFC (ECOWAS 1981, Art. 13). In practice, the SMC 
only invited its own member states, as well as Guinea and Sierra Leone, to 
contribute troops to ECOMOG. Therefore, the claim that ECOMOG was an 
ECOWAS force is only partly correct as certain important francophone states 
were excluded (Coleman 2007, 80).  
The push for ECOMOG by certain states, and above all Nigeria, resulted in the 
fear that the civil war in Liberia would embarrass sub-Saharan Africa (Babangida 
1995, 12). But, at the same time, it also offered the possibility to “earn 
considerable prestige […] by providing welcome proof that African could serve 
their own security crisis” (Coleman 2007, 91). As illustrated in table 17, ECOWAS 
convincingly demonstrated that West Africa as a region had successfully resolved 
the crisis in Liberia. 
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Table 17: ECOWAS’ Intervention in Liberia 
 
The Authority stressed that the restoration of peace to Liberia had convincingly 
demonstrated West African solidarity and its ability to resolve regional 
problems through mutual trust, tolerance, self-sacrifice and strong leadership. 
Heads of state and government made a strong appeal for continued support 
from both within and outside West Africa for re-building Liberia (ECOWAS 
1997a, 10). 
 
In fact, ECOWAS wanted to show how united member states had been in their 
peace operations. According to Coleman (2007, 109), ECOWAS’ institutional 
structures set the ground for doing this. As the SMC, in its decision to deploy 
ECOMOG without the backing of all member states, had presented them with a 
fait accompli, those not supportive of the intervention had only two options: they 
could either tolerate the decision or destroy ECOMOG. They would go for the 
first.  
How does this explain the institutional design of the 1999 protocol? Together with 
the positive experiences that were made in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, 
ECOWAS gained—both for itself and for the African continent—considerable 
prestige for its self-confident appearance during all three interventions (interview 
section 24). 
Interview Section 24: Perceptions of ECOWAS’ Capabilities 
 
ECOWAS, definitely; but it goes more above what we feel as the proactive 
character of ECOWAS rather than the design per se. But I would say the 
proactiveness (#27). 
 
The very evident lack of international support, as already outlined in Chapter 6, 
nevertheless led to the belief among member states that—when it came to the 
legal framework of ECOWAS—improvements were needed, and learning 
processes had to be initiated. The nascent processes of democratization among 
ECOWAS’ member states led to their increased wish for international legitimacy. 
In signing this 1999 protocol, member states thus aspired to greater global 
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standing—but, at the same time, also hoped for the protocol’s non-enforcement 
(Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 70). 
 
7.4.2.  Nigeria’s Search for Legitimacy 
 
Nigeria’s Afrocentric foreign policy has been further strengthened under 
Obasanjo’s democratic government, with Nigeria assuming the leadership 
of a number of international organisations, including ECOWAS, the AU and 
the G-77. […] With the assurances that it is able to tackle Africa’s problems 
through its enormous human and material resources, wealth and strong 
military, Nigeria’s role in Africa has been triggered by a genuine moral 
conviction and commitment, which are critical ingredients for regional 
hegemonic status (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016, 119). 
  
Without any doubt, Nigeria is a key player not only in the West African 
region but also in ECOWAS itself.91 The following subchapter shows how 
Nigeria’s ambitions to not only strengthen its position as a regional hegemon but 
also to gain international legitimacy affected the learning processes leading to 
ECOWAS’ specific peace and security structures. 
A first aspect is concerned with the search for legitimacy by Nigeria within the 
new security mechanism. Around the end of the Cold War, Nigeria was not 
skeptical about its role in the region or even on the continent, where it was sure 
to have an extraordinary one. Nigeria at that time was, however, unsure about its 
image in the world at large, as it felt that it would not gain the respect from 
international partners that it deserved. Its economic shortcomings, at least as 
compared to developed countries, made it “dependent on international 
recognition and prestige as a resource for power and influence” (Coleman 2007, 
92). However its repressive domestic politics under a military regime, in the years 
from the start of the 1970s to the end of 1990s, heavily undermined its reputation 
                                                           
91 For a detailed consideration of the question of how far Nigeria can be really seen as a hegemon, 
see among others: Engel 2007); Hulse 2016); and, Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016). 
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on the international scene. To step up on the regional level would be one way to 
improve its own image, as the following statement reveals: 
 
Liberia was an opportunity to break back into the international 
community, to show how good Nigeria and Nigerians are, and that 
although we still might also be isolated by the Western powers, that we are 
doing good things in Liberia and Sierra Leone. I think that was part of the 
calculation—breaking out of the isolation of the international community 
(Coleman 2007, 92).92 
 
According to observers, this plan was successful: as Coleman further notes, 
Nigeria received significant recognition by the West—that despite the Abacha 
military regime being in power at the time—because the country was perceived as 
one of the few willing to intervene. Its goal of becoming a kind of spokesperson 
for the whole African continent was further promoted by prominent Nigerians 
arguing for the country having a permanent seat in the UNSC (Coleman 2007; 
Engel 2007; Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016). According to the UN Charter, 
non-permanent members of the UNSC need to contribute to “the maintenance of 
international peace and security” (UN 1945, Art. 23). Nigeria hoped that the 
further appointment of permanent members in future would follow the same 
logic, and that as such it would receive international gratitude for its “massive 
involvement in areas that Western powers do not want to be involved with” 
(Coleman 2007, 93).93 This illustrates how strongly Nigeria wanted to gain 
international legitimacy with its respective interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Guinea-Bissau.  
But the search for improved global standing was not only visible in Nigeria’s 
intervention practices but also in its behavior in establishing the new 1999 
protocol. This provision allowed Nigeria to maintain its military capacities, so as 
                                                           
92 Cited interview of Katharina Coleman with Dr. Kole A. Shettima, country coordinator, John D. 
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, in 2000 (Coleman 2007, 92). 




to be able to intervene in (rival) neighboring states without any having 
institutional restrictions imposed on it in doing so (Hartmann and Striebinger 
2015, 80). Also according to the 1999 protocol, the MSC was able to “authorise all 
forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and 
military missions” (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 10). As such, decisions are taken in a 
smaller forum than that of the Authority—in which all member states are 
represented. Furthermore the 1999 protocol allowed ECOWAS to decide on 
interventions without the prior consent of the UNSC. Whereas a majority of 
scholars would argue that this violated international law, ECOWAS 
representatives countered that the decision-making process of the UNSC vis-à-
vis an intervention is time-consuming and, as the case of Rwanda had proved, not 
even assured of success (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 83). Abass (2000, 211f.) 
postulates, meanwhile, that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 also had a 
strong influence on ECOWAS’ decision to not include UNSC content in its 
protocol.   
Thus, learning mechanisms can be observed rather more at the procedural level—
as the protocol enabled Nigeria to pursue its own hegemonic ambitions through 
ECOWAS. As it led to increased procedural legitimacy, international support was 
also secured given that it involved a negotiated agreement by an RO. Additionally, 
the norms included in that 1999 protocol—such as promotion of democracy, the 
protection of human rights, and the responsibility to protect (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 
2)—fit very well with the expectations of an RO aspiring to greater 
acknowledgment by the international community (Hartmann and Striebinger 
2015, 81). At a point in time where not only the international community expected 
Africa to solve its own problems but also Africa itself did too, the 1999 protocol 
thus legalized ECOWAS’ intervention in conflicts in which external powers did 
not want to. Additionally, it gave ECOWAS the legitimacy to ask for the 
international (financial) support that it badly needed.  
A further aspect consists of the role of specific successive heads of state of Nigeria. 
After the death of former president Abacha in 1998 and the installation thereafter 
of interim one Abdulsalami Abubakar, a democratization process got underway 
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in Nigeria. Under Obasanjo, the next president, Nigeria’s Polity IV score94 sharply 
increased from -6 in 1997 to +4 in 1999 (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 79). 
Nigeria’s domestic discourse regarding its role in peace and security in the West 
African region also significantly changed hereafter. Shifting priorities, in 
combination with domestic pressures, led to a Nigerian rethink of its previous 
ambitions in leading military interventions in the region, toward a now more 
preventive and mediation-oriented approach (Obi 2009, 63).95 However its 
leading role in the region’s peace and security realm remained fixed—not only 
due to the country’s economic supremacy, but also to its significant financial 
contributions to ECOWAS (ibid.).  
A crucial role herein, as already outlined briefly in chapter 7.3, was played by 
Obasanjo—Nigeria’s president from 1999 till 2007. Characterized as “a kind of 
elder statemen” (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015, 79), when he came again to 
power in 1999 he urged ECOWAS member states to reform the RO’s existing 
structures in order for it to be able to cope with the new peace and security 
challenges in the region more effectively. His previous engagement with the ALF 
and the CSSDCA, wherewith he promoted a significant change in continent-wide 
perceptions regarding peace, security, stability, and development in the early 
1990s, was influential in the last years of that decade too. As illustrated in 
interview section 25, Obasanjo was part of a new generation of leaders who 
wanted to significantly change how the continent approached its challenges and 
how the world saw Africa. For Obasanjo as well as for Mbeki, it was crucial to 
show to the world that they were able to tackle their problems and that the African 
continent was not as weak and helpless as some of the Western countries believed 
it to be. 
Interview Section 25: Search for Legitimacy  
 
You are looking at Nigeria and Obasanjo, you are looking at the new generation 
leaders […]. All those people were the people who wanted to take the decisions. 
                                                           
94 This refers to the measure that is used by Hartmann and Striebinger (2015, 79) to explain their 
democratic lock-in hypothesis specifically for the establishment process vis-à-vis ECOWAS’ 
security mechanism. 
95 In 1999, for example, Nigeria quit ECOMOG (Obi 2009, 63).  
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[…] I think there was a sense in which several of those African leaders wanted 
to make a name for themselves and they wanted to stamp Africa’s identity and 
legitimacy in terms of [the] international scene (#9). 
There was a lot of introspection, and Thabo Mbeki and Obasanjo they were part 
of the whole dissolution of the OAU and the creation of the AU and the 
establishment of an Early Warning System which many scholars have already 
spoken about. How come that we all have been asleep [concerning Rwanda] 
(#14)? 
 
The foundations on which Obasanjo would build were already there in fact. 
Nigeria’s various (military) engagements within the frameworks of AU, UN, and 
ECOWAS formed an image of the country “as a major contributor to global peace 
and security” (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016, 120). Its continued support 
of various peacekeeping missions is also visible in its contribution of 
commanders, which have exceeded those of any other developing country 
worldwide by far. By contributing over 200,000 uniformed personnel to UN 
peacekeeping missions as of 2010, Nigeria is ranked fourth overall worldwide in 
terms of number of troop contributions to UN global missions (ibid., 121). Based 
on this commitment in its foreign policy, Nigeria wants to signal that it is able to 
play a central role in international affairs—as part of its core goal of gaining 
greater global legitimacy. By doing so, Nigeria has not only stationed itself 
prominently within the international arena but also made itself pivotal to the 












8. Lessons Learned in the African 
Union 
8.1. Interdependence between ROs and IOs 
As diffusion theory argues that regional and international organizations do 
not act in isolation, this subchapter is concerned with interdependent processes 
between them—taking into consideration specifically the case of the OAU/AU.  
The establishment of the APSA, with its various components, was not realized in 
a vacuum. Rather, one major source of influence herein was ECOWAS. As already 
shown in chapter 6.1, the conflict history of West Africa and how ECOWAS 
reacted to the ones in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau shaped also AU’s 
security structures enormously—as the interviews in section 26 illustrate. They 
additionally show that ECOWAS was perceived as the African RO having the most 
advanced security institutions at that time. Based on this, the involved 
consultants (#14) took ECOWAS as a role model of best practice when 
considering the different possibilities for the revised security mechanism of the 
AU.  
Interview Section 26: Influence of ECOWAS on APSA 
 
ECOMOG in the 1990s, 1991, and 1993, combined with some of the tragic 
events on the continent like the Rwandan genocide, all shaped and contributed 
in very useful ways to the development of the APSA (#19). 
ECOWAS became an important vector for those ideas. And this is partly what 
explains why you see a great deal of uniformity [between AU and ECOWAS] 
because it is very easy at the end of the day for people to then say, well, you 
know, why do you want to reinvent the wheel and then there are best practices. 
ECOWAS is a best practice in terms of what ECOMOG did in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone (#14). 
 
Although ECOWAS can be seen as one major source of influence, and despite the 
interdependencies between AU and ECOWAS having been particularly strong, 
other RECs have also been relevant herein as well. Particularly in the creation of 
its CEWS, the AU heavily relied on what had been already crafted in the early 
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warning systems of IGAD and ECOWAS. As the interviews in section 27 illustrate, 
the AU was inspired by the approaches of ECOWAS and IGAD—but did also 
nevertheless rely extensively on its own policy documents and legal frameworks 
too (#17). 
Interview Section 27: Influence of RECs on APSA 
 
Back then, CEWARN was framed after 1994 and the genocide. The member 
states needed to establish structures. Meanwhile, the OAU did not have such 
an Early Warning System but IGAD and ECOWAS [did] (#25). 
When we began our Early Warning System in 2006 or 2007, the two 
operational Early Warning Systems then, within Africa, were ECOWAS with 
ECOWARN and IGAD with CEWARN. They were the only two Early Warning 
Systems that were operational and we did benefit a lot from those two 
institutions. Because they already had an established Early Warning System, at 
least they had all the policy documents, all the legal instruments, legal 
framework that they needed in place. So, that contributed as an input in the 
establishment of our system, also we benefited from their experience (#17). 
 
Not only African ROs were influential in the establishment of APSA, so was the 
UN too. It both served as a supporter as well as a source of influence in terms of 
institutional design. According to an involved consultant (interview section 28, 
#15), how the UN manages its peace operations had a significant impact on the 
way that such missions were thought about in the AU. Right after the end of the 
Cold War, the brainstorming meeting for the CSSDCA had discussed these OAU 
peacekeeping missions and evaluated them to be insufficient. The report of the 
meeting explicitly recommended adapting the UN’s system of funding for OAU 
peacekeeping missions. Another interesting fact is revealed by the last interview 
of section 28 (#21). It divulges the decision-making process behind the OAU 
secretary general, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, recommending the adaption of the 
UNSC model to the AU. As described in diffusion theory, decisions that have 
already been made in other organizations (the establishment of security councils 
in the UN and ECOWAS) influence those still to be taken in other such 
organizations (the establishment of one’s own security council). It becomes 
obvious that decision-makers look around at what has been already realized in 
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other organizations, and include those observations in their own decisions about 
ideal future institutions. 
Interview Section 28: Influence of the UN on APSA 
 
The UN was of course the primary frame of reference we had, especially in the 
area of peace operations (#15). 
So far in OAU–or ECOWAS–sponsored peacekeeping operations, contributing 
governments have been responsible for their own administrative and logistical 
support and have also been exclusively responsible for providing their own 
financial support. This system is unsatisfactory and needs to be reviewed. […] 
It is very strongly recommended that the OAU review its present systems with 
the view to adapting United Nations practices, which are more practical and 
realistic in this regard. In funding OAU peacekeeping operations, the United 
Nations assessment system may be worth considering for adaptation. 
Operations launched by Africa’s regional groups should follow a similar pattern 
(ALF 1990, 6f.). 
You know, AU member states, to be frank with you, they were very sensitive 
with these kinds of organ. To that extent, that if you are coming with the idea 
telling them you want to establish a court or a council, they are very sensitive. 
So, what Dr. Salim did as he is the one who started this idea, was to make them 
feel not too threatened. He borrowed the idea of the UNSC and said we can have 
something like that and of course even in terms of power, peace and security 
issues are under the UN. Although it will have authority to deal with African 
conflicts but still it has permission from UN. In that way, he could convince 
member states to accept his idea in the first place (#21). 
 
As this section has illustrated, AU and ECOWAS did not act in isolation in the 
process of establishing their respective security mechanisms. Rather, they 
assembled knowledge about similar and already-existing institutions in other 
organizations, particularly with the help of experts—as will be shown in the 
following subchapters.  
 
8.2. The Evolution of the PSC 
“The OAU’s efforts to deal with African conflicts deserve credit, but much 
more remains to be done in order for its potential to be fulfilled” (Muyangwa and 
Vogt 2000, 33). This feeling was shared among numerous other observants of the 
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security policy of the OAU in the 1990s too. According to the two quoted authors, 
the creation of the Mechanism in 1995 improved the OAU’s peace and security 
management as it increased its impact and visibility. Furthermore, they argue 
that, via the Mechanism, African leaders now felt much more determined to play 
a central role in peacekeeping on the African continent. However the OAU’s 
growing visibility neither led to fewer conflicts on the continent nor to highly 
effective conflict management practices.  
The OAU and its Mechanism have been criticized for not being very effective on 
the ground, and also for being overstrained by the multitude of conflicts on the 
African continent (Muyangwa and Vogt 2000, 33). Furthermore, the RO’s 
indifference to and paralysis in bureaucratic matters are noted. It was also written 
off as an elite club of dictators, one that was not only very far away from the daily 
reality of most ordinary African citizens but that also hid behind declarations 
incapable of ever providing adequate responses to the severe conflicts occurring 
on the continent (Engel and Porto 2010, 1). Especially the inviolability of the 
norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of OAU member states and the, 
related to that, lack of a more robust mandate in peacekeeping operations were 
strongly dispraised in the early 1990s.  
The OAU itself thus started to work on conceptualizing how to improve its peace 
and security structures in general and the Central Organ in particular—so as to 
make them far more effective. At a workshop on “Future Peace and Security 
Structures in Africa,” in 2002, Aziz Pahad, deputy minister of foreign affairs of 
South Africa, stated that there is an urgent need to strengthen the Central Organ 
of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in order 
to make it more effective (Pahad 2002, 4). During this workshop, the procedure 
regarding this improvement was discussed and ideas shared. Pahad also claimed 
that: 
 
In addition, other issues identified in Addis Ababa require closer analysis 
including the mandate and scope of the new organ, membership thereof, its 
policies and the need for close coordination with the work done by […] the 
UNSC. Indeed, the experiences of the UNSC with respect to membership etc. 
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should be closely looked at. While we look at other experiences, at the end, 
we must find African solutions to African problems (Pahad 2002, 5). 
 
This statement by the South African deputy minister of foreign affairs illustrates 
four important factors. First, the admission by African decision-makers that the 
existing Central Organ had not—despite having only recently been established— 
been effective enough in the handling of conflicts on the African continent. 
Second, in contemplation of improvements, decision-makers had looked around 
at what was already there in other organizations, which once more proves the 
validity of the diffusion theory argument. Third, in the consideration of other 
organizations, the nature of the UNSC played a significant role—including via the 
acknowledgement of its both strengths and weaknesses. Fourth and finally, this 
statement reveals that—despite that casting around—African decision-makers 
ultimately aspired to finding their own solutions to their own specific problems. 
To sum up, the 1990s were characterized by a significant struggle on the part of 
the OAU regarding how to deal with a number of serious complaints raised about 
its modi operandi and indeed very makeup.  
A series of brainstorming meetings, organized by the OAU itself, led to the 
summit in 1995 during which member states agreed to provide contingents from 
within their national armies for the RO’s peacekeeping operations. Although a 
slight change could be observed, the OAU still maintained its rather preventive 
stance by attributing main peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN (Williams 
2009,605). During the severe conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-
Bissau, some OAU member states acted—as already elaborated in chapter 6.1—
via ECOWAS and thereby took a much more active path than the OAU Charter 
had provided for. Similar things happened in Lesotho and the DRC with member 
states of the SADC too.  
The latter half of the 1990s were characterized by two dominant opinions on the 
African continent. Whereas for some the OAU was still an important organization 
only needing certain institutional reforms, others called for the shutting down of 
it entirely due to its malfunctioning. The latter view, mainly promoted by Libyan 
head of state Gaddafi, slowly prevailed—then becoming concrete on September 
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9, 1999, in Sirte, when the OAU decided to transform into the new AU. On July 
11, 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted in Lomé, Togo. 
This transformation has been widely acknowledged as a resolute step being taken, 
as it not only gave the erstwhile OAU a radical new mission but also clearer 
defined objectives and norms (Engel and Porto 2010, 2).96 Alongside certain 
norms that had already been in place, the AU established innovative principles 
for the possible intervention in member states’ territory too. Article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act states that the AU may intervene in member states in case of 
“grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity” (OAU 2000c). The transformation of the OAU into the AU also shifted 
its weight firmly in the direction of peace and security issues. Right in the 
preamble, the Constitutive Act stated that member states are  
 
conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitute a major 
impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the 
need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the 
implementation of our development and integration agenda (ibid.). 
 
In order to realize these ambitions, the AU decided to establish more effective 
peace and security structures. During its 27th ordinary session in Lusaka, the AU 
Assembly requested “the Secretary-General to undertake a review of the 
structures, procedures and working methods of the Central Organ, including the 
possibility of changing its name” (AU 2001a, 8(a) (iii)). There were intense 
discussions about the various problems that the old Organ suffered from. First, 
conflict parties are themselves members of such organizations and therefore 
often their own judges. Second, the organ was criticized for its lack of appropriate 
rules of procedure. Consequently meetings happened only infrequently, 
chairmanships were only poorly maintained, and documentation insufficient. 
Third, the interpretation and understanding of sovereignty among certain 
                                                           
96 For a more detailed description of the (institutional) transformation of the OAU into the AU, 
see chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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member states fearful of external domination were quite difficult to overcome in 
attempts to realize the goals of the OAU (Williams 2009, 606).  
Subsequently the secretary general drafted a “Background Document on the 
Review Structures, Procedures and Working Methods of the Central Organ,”97 
drawing on experiences of the Central Organ in conflicts prevention as well as 
conflict resolution, that discussed conceptual issues regarding its reorientation 
(AU 2002a). The report also noted that there are not many experiences of peace 
enforcement or intervention on which the Central Organ could look back. This 
was mainly due to the fact that the Assembly, in founding the Central Organ, had 
been very clear on the preventive ethos of that body. Therefore, and based on the 
failure of the UN in African conflicts as well as on the new Article 4 (h), the 
secretary general “stressed the need to enlarge the mandate of the Mechanism 
[…], the Mechanism should be enhanced to be able to respond more effectively to 
conflict situations” (ibid., 4). 
In conceptualizing the new Mechanism, as well as an improved Central Organ, 
AU decision-makers particularly relied on the UN and ECOWAS—and their main 
related organs for peace and security issues—as the following statements from 
interviewees show.  
Interview Section 29: Evolution from Central Organ to PSC (I) 
 
I would say the UN has served to some extent as a role model. […] The PSC is 
modeled along the lines of the UNSC (#27). 
You know, the whole thing came up because of the transformation from the 
OAU to the AU. Under the OAU, there was a Central Organ, the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention of 1993. Now, when they transformed the OAU to the AU, 
they said, this Central Organ also needs to be transformed. And we want to have 
a kind of Security Council model of the UN (#12). 
The establishment of the PSC was the evolution of the old Organ but borrowing 
and pasting from the UN (#23). 
                                                           
97 This report is based on the results of a brainstorming retreat that was held in George, South 
Africa, in March 2002. Ambassadors from the Central Organ, the NEPAD Implementation 
Committee, and the interim AU Commission all participated in this meeting.  
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Whereas some interviewees said the UNSC served as a key frame of reference 
(interview section 29), others referred to the MSC of ECOWAS as the primary role 
model for the establishment of an improved AU Central Organ (interview section 
30). As all the interviews illustrate, the transformation process from the Central 
Organ to the PSC was characterized by an evolution away from old practices—a 
shift in thinking that was based specifically on considerations about how to 
establish an institution similar to the UNSC and to the MSC of ECOWAS.  
Interview Section 30: Evolution from Central Organ to PSC (II) 
 
At the time, ECOWAS was the most advanced and reference was made to that 
as well (#11). 
These are the people who were really instrumental, particularly in ECOWAS 
because a lot of what ended up in APSA ended had been tried and tested in 
ECOWAS (#9). 
 
Originally it had been planned to incorporate a reformed Central Organ into the 
AU, but the RO eventually changed its mind. During the first ordinary session of 
the AU Assembly in Durban, on July 9, 2002, a completely new framework was 
presented and the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union” adopted. The PSC was conceptualized as 
the  
 
standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall be a collective 
security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient 
response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa (AU 2002b, Art. 2). 
 
Its main objectives were to “promote peace, security and stability in Africa,” 
“anticipate and prevent conflicts,” “undertake peace-making and peace-building 
functions for the resolution of these conflicts,” “promote and implement peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction activities,” and to “develop a common 
defence policy for the Union” (ibid., Art. 3). Given the limited success of the 
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Central Organ, the lack of available (financial and personnel) resources, and the 
severity of conflicts on the continent, these objectives appeared ambitious and 
grandiose (Levitt 2003, 116). In order to achieve these aims, the following 
structures and organization were agreed on: the PSC would be a standing organ 
as the AU wanted it to work continuously, with members of the PSC being present 
at the headquarters of the AU at all times—as in the case of the UNSC; the PSC 
would meet at the level of permanent representatives as often as required—at the 
level of ministers at least twice a month, and at the level of heads of state and 
government at least once a year (AU 2002b, Art. 8).  
As shown in chapter 3 of this thesis, membership is one of the most important 
aspects of the PSC. The question of which member states would be involved in it 
exactly was also one of the most intensely debated ones in the PSC’s creation 
process, as it meant finding a balance between what at that time all fifty-three of 
them had pictured for themselves. As everyone agreed that the inclusion of all 
member states would be inefficient, a solution in the form of a “smaller committee 
of big minds” (Williams 2009, 606) had to be sought. After some debate, it was 
agreed to include fifteen member states in the PSC. A committee of states was 
established to work on the operationalization of the debated ideas. Under the 
chairmanship of South Africa, and representing all five African regions, three 
brainstorming retreats (1998, 2002, 2004) were arranged to discuss the new 
APSA.  
One previous proposal had envisaged a PSC comprised of seventeen members 
with ten permanent ones. Another suggested five permanent member states. Both 
proposals were supported by the five influential countries Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Nigeria, and South Africa who argued that those African states having the biggest 
military and financial capabilities should be encouraged to play a leading role in 
the PSC (Sturman and Hayatou 2010, 62). However the other AU member states 
strongly rejected this idea, by referring to the Constitutive Act and its included 
principle of equality. Furthermore, Tanzania vehemently disagreed with the idea 
of permanent memberships and any potential veto powers for member states as 
in the UNSC (Franke 2009, 97). As the following interviews underline (interview 
section 31), the question regarding permanent membership for certain influential 
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countries was a crucial one. On the one hand, smaller states feared the dominance 
of bigger ones and their own consequential powerlessness. They also had 
concerns about the impotence of the newly established PSC if the great powers 
blocked all decisions contradicting their own goals. On the other, the bigger states 
themselves feared their own waning influence as well as indifference on the part 
of smaller states regarding the work of the PSC. 
Interview Section 31: Permanent Membership of PSC 
 
The idea of creating a non-permanent member of the Security Council was 
driven by the idea that once you create a permanent member, this makes it 
really difficult for the institution to reform and for the member states to change. 
But at the same time, they also did not want to go back to the situation where 
every country was equal and would not take the work of the council very 
seriously, and that the work of the council would be undermined which was the 
problem of the League of Nations (#11). 
Two years where everyone is equal were proposed and three years were 
proposed, and the idea was that the big countries would always compete for the 
three-year term. That was how they learned from it. So, yes, the UNSC was a 
model in terms of that it provides, it was a good foundation but it also limited 
what you could imagine for the African continent. So, if the African PSC is not 
as creative as you can be, part of it has to do with the ideational setting that the 
Security Council has provided (#11). 
When the AU was established they said, “There should be the ideal model on 
the Security Council.” Even before the AU was established, it was an idea that 
came through Sierra Leone’s president who said: “We should have a Security 
Council of our own in order to deal with our own problems etc.” Some member 
states said: “No, if that is the case then there will be only a few member states 
that will become permanent members” (#24). 
 
These statements illustrate that the membership question mainly turned around 
whether certain states should be permanent members and how long member 
states in general should be part of the PSC. Prior to the Durban summit, three 
options regarding the composition of the PSC were discussed: a council with 
fifteen members elected for two years; a council with fifteen members of which 
five were permanent ones, and ten elected for two years; and, a council with 
fifteen members of whom ten are elected for two years and five are elected for 
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three years (Franke 2009, 97). Interview section 32 underlines again how 
strongly the AU has relied on the provisions of the UNSC in terms of membership, 
but also how AU decision-makers have also critically evaluated the UNSC—and 
thereby avoided making the same mistakes that the UN did in the setting up of 
its main body for peace and security issues. 
Interview Section 32: Length of Membership of the PSC 
 
If you have a look at the PSC, five regions, fifteen members, three years, two 
years, no veto—that is virtually New York and adopted for the African context, 
and avoiding the veto provisions which makes life very difficult (#23). 
Then the idea of fifteen member states came, so that five regions were 
represented […]. Then that way the Peace and Security Council started 
operating (#24). 
 
A Council with fifteen member states with equal voting rights was the final 
compromise on which member states would eventually agree.98 The PSC protocol 
states that ten member states are elected for two years, whereas five are elected 
for three years “in order to ensure continuity” (AU 2002b, Art. 5). In doing this, 
the AU follows the ECOWAS model rather than the UN one: the MSC comprises 
nine member states of which seven are elected by the Authority; the other two are 
the current chairman and the immediately preceding chairman of the Authority, 
each of them is elected for a renewable two-year term (ECOWAS 1999, Art. 8).  
As would become obvious, the conceptualization phase of the PSC was highly 
complicated. According to the literature, increasing complexity in international 
relations leads to a greater need among decision-makers for knowledge that often 
is limited to specific groups of experts (Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992b). 
Transnational expert networks are one important provider hereof, and thereby 
exert essential influence on such decision-makers (Jetschke and Lenz 2011, 458). 
According to Haas, networks of knowledge-based experts are crucial for 
                                                           
98 Members are elected on the basis of regional representation. Each of the five African regions—
Central Africa, East, North, Southern, and West—choose member states as candidates. Based 
on their different geographical sizes, Central Africa, East, and Southern elect three PSC 
members each—whereas West Africa elects four, and North Africa only two (AU 2002b, Art. 5). 
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“articulating the cause-and-effect relationship of complex problems, helping 
states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing 
specific policies, and identify salient point for negotiation” (Haas 1992b, 2). 
Networks are consulted in order to obtain new ideas, and information that is not 
already available to individuals from within their own institution. As the 
interviews reveal (interview section 33), decision-makers in OAU/AU also 
consulted (external) experts so as to gain the necessary information for 
constructing their new peace and security structures.  
Interview Section 33: Existence of Policy Networks 
 
There is a group of people who are obviously working, writing, thinking, and 
trying to fit in to influence, consult, and affect the way that peace and security 
is interpreted and implemented (#8). 
There was a need to then create a successful institutional mechanism, and that 
is where policy networks played a very fundamental role (#11). 
 
The mere existence of expert networks is not very surprising, as it is widely 
researched how decision-makers often use knowledge from external consultants 
when the required insights are not available inside their organization already 
(Adler and Haas 1992). What is particularly interesting, however, is the 
development of these expert networks. In them, such individuals not only work 
together but also strengthen their ties to one another—and thus knowledge is 
repeatedly exchanged. In the AU context, another important phenomenon is the 
movement of peoples between organizations too. As illustrated in interview 
section 34, numerous people start in one organization but move to different ones 
during the course of their career. In this context, such movement can be observed 
between regional and international organizations as well as to think tanks too. 
Interview Section 34: Movement of Knowledge 
 
These are people who are sometimes inside the secretariat, sometimes out in a 
think tank now working for the government, now out of the government, maybe 
in a UN peacekeeping mission, now back in Addis. In the same way, you see 
those dynamics taking place in other ROs […]. The existence of those people is 
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very important for the institutional memory, and for essentially constituting 
the collective brain of an organization (#8). 
Most of the individuals connected with B. who worked with B., a lot of them 
ended up transitioning into the AU process and then working for the AU (#11). 
 
Interview #8 of section 34 illustrates a crucial dimension of experts and their 
knowledge. It not only underlines the dynamics within ROs and IOs resulting 
from the movement of individuals, but also stresses the fundamental importance 
of those experts. By referring to them as “constituting the collective brain” of an 
organization, the interviewee highlights the latter’s interdependent nature. As 
Adler and Haas (1992, 373) note, the ideas and innovations of expert networks 
diffuse on the national, transnational, and international level and thereby may 
change numerous such organizations. With this growing interdependence, 
organizations transmit their innovations; with networks helping to share ideas 
too, international relations are hence restructured hereby. Additionally, as in the 
present case, policies become similar too as well—as experts spread their ideas 
not only in one organization but in others too. 
One important aspect of expertise coming from outside an organization is its 
actual impact. Experts and their networks can only exert influence when they are 
actually heard by the respective decision-makers. According to Keck and Sikkink, 
new ideas “are more likely to be influential if they fit well with existing ideas and 
ideologies” (2008, 504). As networks act as a type of idea carrier, they also have 
to find ways to frame the latter in order to make them opportune for the larger 
belief system(s) in which decision-makers act. In the OAU/AU, expert networks 
have successfully found ways to build confidential relationships with respective 
decision-makers—as is apparent in interview section 35. On the one hand, it is 
described how both experts and decision-makers have not only been educated in 
similar institutions and/or had analogous career paths but also share a passion 
for the continent as part of their desire to improve the living situation of billions 
of ordinary Africans (#9). On the other, it is described how curious and open-
minded El-Ghassim Wane, one of the most important decision-makers for the 
new APSA within the AU, was toward new ideas and vis-à-vis the open and 
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fruitful discussions that would form the basis for successful consultancies with 
these expert networks. 
Interview Section 35: Networks of Decision-Makers–Policy 
Networks 
 
The other logic that also moderates what the intelligentsia does is that 
relationship to the political decision-makers. […] Some of them were advisors 
to the government, some of them were people in universities, some of them 
were consultants. A lot of the people who eventually became consultants were 
people who have been in universities, either within or outside Africa. Both had 
the passion for Africa, or were African citizens who had found themselves in 
other parts of the world (#9).  
It was El-Ghassim Wane. Generally, he is a very curious individual and he does 
not care where he gets his ideas from; if you can help him, he will let you. But 
just at the beginning, he struck up a relationship with B. and almost all the 
documents and almost everything to B., so B.’s team was the one which 
prepared most of the earlier draft documents and consultancy reports that have 
been created in the establishment of the APSA (#11). 
 
Two influential individuals in the OAU at that time were the aforementioned El-
Ghassim Wane and also Said Djinnit. El Ghassim Wane—now chief of staff as well 
as chief advisor of the chairperson of the AU Commission—has also moved 
between organizations. Between 1994 and 2009, he held numerous senior 
positions relating to peace and security in the OAU/AU before becoming director 
of the Peace and Security Department in the AU Commission and assistant 
secretary general for peacekeeping operations at the UN. Said Djinnit, 
meanwhile, is special envoy of the UN secretary general for the Great Lakes 
region. Previous to that, he was special representative for West Africa. In the 
OAU/AU, he would hold numerous senior positions—including those of OAU 
assistant secretary general for political affairs and commissioner for peace and 
security.  
Just how close those networks can be is illustrated with the example of Margaret 
Vogt. Margaret, as already described in detail, was not only a very influential 
scholar for ECOWAS but also moved later to various important positions in AU 
and UN. As the following statements show (interview section 36), Margaret was 
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considered to be a crucial stakeholder in drafting not only the ECOWAS 
Mechanism but also in later bringing those related ideas to the AU too. 
Interview Section 36: Margaret Vogt (II) 
 
Margaret Vogt was very very instrumental and was […] closer to the head of the 
Conflict Management Division of the OAU at that time who happened to be a 
Nigerian. That played a very important role in terms of the development of the 
first conceptual ideas for the APSA and this transition (#11).  
Yes, Margaret Vogt was central to a lot of that before she then moved on to the 
UN (#9). 
 
By moving between numerous organizations, Margaret built an excellent and 
widely spread network for herself during her long, illustrious career. According 
to the interviewees, Margaret brought knowledge from all of her previous posts 
to each new one, particularly when it came to the conceptualization of the peace 
and security structures of both ECOWAS and AU.99 
Interview Section 37: Network of Margaret Vogt 
 
You remember that Margaret Vogt and her co-author happen to be individuals 
from the ECOWAS system. Margaret at that time worked for the Nigerian 
government and was aware of the ECOWAS Conflict Management and 
Prevention Division and wanted to some extent to draw on that and wanted to 
inform the AU […]. Later, she worked for the UN system and she was moving 
between UN as well as civil society (#11). 
 
What Wane and Djinnit have in common with Margaret Vogt is their excellent 
personal networks. As visible in Figure 9, all three not only moved between the 
AU, ECOWAS, and the UN but also either worked directly within civil society and 
academic organizations or at least closely together with them. All three 
individuals were, between them, additionally crucial to the process of establishing 
                                                           
99 Margaret passed away in September 2014. An obituary commemorating her life and work can 




peace and security structures in ECOWAS (Margaret Vogt) and in the OAU/AU 
(Wane, Djinnit and Vogt), by bringing with them knowledge from a variety of 
posts previously held in other organizations. This observed interdependence is 
exactly what Adler and Haas (1992, 373) described in diffusion theory when 
referring to the increased interdependence between experts and organizations—
and how this leads to the diffusion of innovation on a number of different levels. 
Figure 9: Network of Decision-Makers of AU and ECOWAS 
Said Djinnit     Margaret Vogt       El-Ghassim Wane 
 
       AU   ECOWAS    UN 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation, based on the interviews. 
 
Another crucial actor group is constituted by the (external) experts who consulted 
with AU decision-makers in the conceptualization phase of that RO’s security 
mechanism. As interview section 38 shows, interviewees described the influence 
of consultants as tremendous and fundamental—that for two core reasons. First, 
they identified these individuals as knowledge-holders who share their insights. 
As most of these consultants have already worked for other organizations as well, 
they are able to divulge what best practices already exist and furthermore how 
they can be adapted for the particular circumstances of the AU (#17 and #18). The 
UN and ECOWAS have been frequently used by consultants to illustrate such best 
practices.  
Second, the work relationship that exists—which is characterized by the 
discussion and evaluation of what has already been done elsewhere. According to 
the interviewees, consultants induce dialogue about previous policies or erstwhile 
institutions and how they can be improved on. At best, consultants succeed in 
creating open and honest communication with the RO as well as in bringing key 




Interview Section 38: Importance of Policy Networks 
 
Policy networks and consultants have had such a tremendous impact when it 
comes to implementation (#11). 
I would say that policy networks carry a role, in the sense of allowing us to 
reflect and assess from an intellectual perspective what we have done (#13). 
The consultants were the ones helping us, develop some of the best practices 
from the different organizations. So, they would give us an insight […] how 
similar institutions also developed similar mechanisms, and we could learn 
from their experience what to take and what not to take, how do we customize 
those types of systems, and how to use them internally. So, the consultants also 
helped us in terms of conducting best practices and lessons learned. 
Consultants are knowledge-holders, also knowledge-sharers (#17). 
The influence of those experts is fundamental. I would say that none of the work 
that the Panel has done […] would have been possible without these critical 
consultations and exchanges. I think it is fundamental whenever you are 
aiming to develop or to craft a new policy, because that is what that is all about, 
that you get the best brains on the matter because there is nothing really new 
under the sun. […] It has been fundamental, they not only have been the 
drafters, there were more than influential, there have been the crafters, they 
have been inputing, bringing their ideas, bringing their innovative thinking, 
and supporting the work throughout (#18). 
 
Unquestionably, a major concern regarding consultants is their deployment. The 
question of from which organization or country they have been appointed plays a 
central role in what the consultants promote or how they advise the respective 
organization. In the case of AU, consultants are appointed by the UN and EU as 
well as other by smaller organizations such as the GIZ, a German development 
agency.100 As the interviews reveal in section 39, these consultants are seen as 
technical experts who often work with the respective organizations on a long-
term basis. Although they are ultimately paid by large organizations such as AU 
and the UN, consultants often are affiliated with think tanks. Accordingly, 
consultants have their work origins in such think tanks as the Institute for 
Security Studies (ISS), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of 
                                                           




Disputes (ACCORD), and in the earlier-mentioned WANEP—as well as in other 
African and international ones too, as will be shown in the course of this chapter.  
Interview Section 39: Appointment of Consultants 
 
There is this distinction, they would not only come from civil society but they 
would also come from the UN, from international consulting firms, 
international companies. X. runs a company, he is an academic and runs his 
own company [...]. Technical experts have influence because they are writing it 
down but they are appointed by the OAU/AU (#23). 
Some of them were consultants that were actually paid by GIZ and the 
Norwegians and they were able to make important inputs. Even X. and Y., all 
of them, particularly when it comes to the Early Warning System. X., Y., and a 
lot of them were involved on a long-term basis (#9). 
Consultants are usually commissioned by the AU. A typical process of this, 
given the intergovernmental nature of the AU and the highly political nature of 
it, means that there would be an invitation sent to every country as a member 
state to send an expat either from the Ministry of Justice or Defence, or both 
[…]. They would have commissioned consultants who are technical experts in 
the domain (#14). 
Some consultants have been payed by the UN, some by the EU, some by AU, 
some, for example X. and Y., mostly by the GIZ. Z. was UN (#12). 
 
According to the interviewees, there are certain consultants who influenced the 
security structures of the AU in a fundamental way. These individuals are 
important for two reasons. First, they have worked with the OAU/AU repeatedly 
over a long period of time and they have been able to build confidence and trust 
during their working relations with decision-makers. Second, they are able to 
work closely with the decision-makers in the Peace and Security Departments—
vital so as to be heard. As in the case of consultant B., who serves as an example 
for the following arguments, he had a longstanding and confidential relationship 
with El-Ghassim Wane who, at that time, was head of the Peace and Security 
Department of the OAU/AU. As illustrated in interview section 40, the respective 
decision-makers trusted him insofar as he was not only the originator of ideas 
that later became crucial components of the respective security structures but 
also because it was he who drafted the relevant documents for the OAU/AU.   
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Interview Section 40: Influential Consultants 
 
He (B.) was actually typing the documents for the OAU. In peace and security, 
he is the one that stands out. He was rapporteur and all of that (#23). 
The conflict management and conflict prevention, management and resolution 
mechanisms were turned into the APSA. But that transition process, in terms 
of turning it from the mechanisms into the APSA, the early ideas, you can credit 
B. [who] was at that time head of ideas of the OAU and the transition process 
(#11). 
 
As becomes clear, the network component—meaning how closely a consultant 
can work together with both decision-makers and other consultants—is crucial 
for a successful liaison process. As these individuals not only carry the relevant 
knowledge but also share it among decision-makers and other relevant 
consultants or advisors too, then a good network is essential. As visible in the 
network map (figure 10), relations between the different stakeholders in the 
peace and security field for both AU and ECOWAS not only exist but are, indeed, 
numerous. We can observe strands between both ROs, but also between 
consultants and think tanks as well as donor organizations. Consultants are, as 
noted, partly paid by the UN, EU, or GIZ but are employed at think tanks and 
advisors to the EU and ECOWAS (and partly to other African ROs). Consultants 
know each other and work together in the respective organizations, and exchange 











Figure 10: Network of Knowledge in African Security Policy 
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Source: Author’s own compilation, based on the interviews. 
 
African think tanks have played an important role in the establishment process 
of the APSA. The OAU—as ECOWAS did earlier—recognized that its civil society 
involvement had been insufficient in the post–Cold war era, and thus included 
the need for strengthened cooperation between itself and civil society in its 
official documents. As visible in table 18, the OAU tried to frame this civil society 
inclusion along the lines of the greater involvement of the “African people” and a 
shift toward open and solidary organizations wherein all parts of society could 
find their place.  
Table 18: Need for the Involvement of Civil Society 
 
GUIDED by our common vision of a united and strong Africa and by the need 
to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, 
in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order to strengthen 
solidarity and cohesion among our peoples (OAU 2000c, preamble). 
The symmetric relation that must exist between the Union and the African 
people, calls for increased popular participation in its edification. As such, we 
must break with the prevailing logic, whereby everything is dictated from the 
top. As articulated by you the leaders, the African Union should be the collective 
and undivided property of all Africans, but especially the women, the young 
and the not—so young (Essy 2002, 4). 
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The earlier-mentioned ISS, ACCORD, and WANEP have all, according to the 
interviewees, been quite influential vis-à-vis the AU (interview section 41). They 
have had a particular impact as a result of having seconded key consultants and 
written the background papers that these individuals would then bring into the 
decision-making processes of the RO. Among all of the think tanks that were 
eventually mentioned by interviewees (prominent herein too were, inter alia, the 
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs and the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre), ISS, ACCORD, and WANEP were identified by all 
of those asked to name the policy institutes that had been key players in the 
conceptualization of the APSA. 
Interview Section 41: Think Tanks in AU 
 
Since then, we have been working with some of them, we have a Memorandum 
of Understanding that we have signed with WANEP, with ISS, with ACCORD 
and a couple of them (#17). 
Through the Norwegian Training for Peace Programme, organizations like 
ACCORD, ISS, and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs have been 
working at many different levels in providing support for the AU to develop 
policies, to develop guidelines and policies, to provide training, and so forth 
(#15).  
I think ACCORD played a role and the Pearson Centre in Canada played a role 
(#22). 
 
While it can be argued that think tanks were quite influential in this 
conceptualization process, this view is not without its critics. As interviewees 
describe in section 42, they sometimes felt they had been consulted, on the one 
hand, only to appease civil society’s quest to finally become more involved. On 
the other, the AU needed to show the general public that it really did care about 
what “the African people” think. According to the interviewees, some think tank 
representatives felt that the AU thus only wanted to improve its public image vis-





Interview Section 42: Critical Evaluation of Civil Society Involvement 
 
Basically, they only needed the civil society to say “ok” or at least to make the 
civil society feel consulted. Which is not really the case. They would finalize it 
how they want to finalize it (#23). 
All you can say is that we were consulted and the extent to which civil society 
views filter into institutional thinking is difficult to demonstrate [...]. Actually, 
it was crucial that the AU reached out to the civil society. It could not have done 
it without the civil society at all, 100 percent, so I think it was important that 
this happened and second, it is important that civil society got the possibility 
to share its views. But what the intergovernmental organization does after that 
with the information, it is up to them (#23). 
 
To sum up, African as well as select international think tanks have not only been 
consulted by the AU but also have been heard by them—as they are represented 
by influential consultants. According to the interviewees, particular organizations 
such as ISS, ACCORD, and WANEP have had both close relationships to the RO 
as a whole and also to the respective persons in charge. The collaboration between 
ROs and specialist think tanks is as tight-knit as it is due to its network character 
(interview section 43). It seems that specific organizations have worked with the 
OAU/AU for many years, and that—due to this intense and longstanding 
cooperation—close working relationships have developed—ones that have 
furthermore laid the foundations for trustworthy collaboration between ROs and 
specific civil-society organizations. 
Interview Section 43: Network of Think Tanks and ROs 
 
And then, at the third level, there is the African civil society institutional 
networks. And there, again, I think there has been an important evolution 
which has been a much-improved engagement to what previously existed 
between African civil society and the leadership and the management of the AU 
(#14). 
It is quite a network […] the ISS was working extensively with the OAU, and we 





8.3. ECOWAS’ Influence on the CEWS and ASF 
The PSC protocol not only established that body but also provided, moreover, 
for the creation of a series of new institutions within the framework of the APSA: 
the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, an African Standby 
Force, and a Peace Fund (AU 2002b, Arts. 11–13, 21). As outlined in chapter 3, 
ECOWAS was the first of these ROs to establish a peace and security architecture 
comprised of, inter alia, the MSC, Council of Elders, ECOWAS Early Warning 
System, ECOMOG, and a Peace Fund. The following table shows the comparison 
of ECOWAS structures with their equivalents in the AU, and makes clear that the 
latter has a very similar institutional structure to the former—given that ECOWAS 
set up its peace and security architecture prior to the AU doing so. 
Table 19: Peace and Security Structure of AU and ECOWAS 
 ECOWAS African Union 
Decision-Making 
Body on Peace and 
Security 
Mediation and Security 
Council 
Peace and Security 
Council 
Council of Prominent 
Personalities for 
Mediation 




Political Affairs, Peace 
and Security (PAPS)/ 
Directorate for PAPS 
Commissioner for Peace 
and Security/ 
Directorate for Peace 
and Security 






ECOMOG—ESF African Standby Force 











Source: Elowson and MacDermott 2010, 27f. 
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These similar structures did not, of course, simply evolve randomly. As already 
argued in chapter 8.1, they are the outcome of interdependent decision-making 
processes. That these learning processes diffusing from ECOWAS to the AU could 
be observed in the establishment of APSA is strongly supported by the following 
statements. Interview section 44 reveals that ECOWAS not only served as a role 
model but also as a sort of trial balloon, in the sense that AU decision-makers 
could evaluate what had already been realized in ECOWAS—and thereby increase 
their reliability of expectations. 
Interview Section 44: Diffusion Processes ECOWAS–AU (I) 
 
A lot of what ended up in APSA had been tried and tested in ECOWAS (#9). 
ECOWAS was the other example that we borrowed on and drew upon in the 
design (#29).  
 
Interestingly, AU decision-makers were not only influenced by the institutional 
structures of the peace and security architecture of ECOWAS however. They were 
also affected by the manner in which ECOWAS handled the crises in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone (interview section 45, #9). As already outlined in chapter 6, these 
crises were not only far-reaching for ECOWAS and its self-perception but also 
affected the AU too. The proactive manner in which ECOWAS reacted in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau impressed observers and also decision-
makers in the AU. ECOWAS was praised for proactively intervening—and that 
without a mandate from the UNSC—in Liberia, where—according to the 
prevailing opinion—its mission was a resounding success.  
Interview Section 45: Diffusion Processes ECOWAS–AU (II) 
 
ECOWAS, definitely but it goes more above what we feel as the proactive 
character of ECOWAS rather than the design per se (#18). 
ECOWAS in its sense was ahead in terms of the Constitutive Act. ECOWAS had 
been able to justify humanitarian interventions without the UNSC. There was 
a sense in which ECOWAS was more sophisticated than the AU (#9). 
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ECOWAS had the advantage of being the first to actually go out of their way to 
build a peace and security architecture. And that was dictated by the events 
which took place in Liberia and in Sierra Leone (#9). 
 
A further important aspect of the newly established APSA is its continental 
character. According to the Constitutive Act, “the Regional Mechanisms are part 
of the overall security architecture of the Union” (AU 2002b, Art. 16). The REC’s 
are not only embedded in the new APSA but they were also, partly, influential in 
its design too. As the following statements show (interview section 46), while 
ECOWAS was the most important role model for the APSA it was not the only 
one; other RECs in general were too. In particular, those already having peace 
and security structures; IGAD with its early warning system, CEWARN, and 
SADC are to be mentioned here. 
Interview Section 46: ECOWAS and RECs as Role Models 
 
We did not have the APSA overnight, we did not have the protocols for the 
standby force, or early warning, or whatever, you can mention any. It evolves 
through […] the regional economic communities.  The different mechanisms 
came also up in the RECs because they also started having their own peace and 
security architecture, and mechanisms that deal with conflicts (#24). 
I would say, ECOWAS was influential to a large extent, but other regional 
economic communities as well […].  As you know, the RECs were not 
necessarily focused on peace and security. It was only after the establishment 
of APSA that the AU began to embrace a peace and security focus. 
Organizations like SADC were not focused on security, but ECOWAS was 
because of its particular history of crises and that partly contributed to the 
process of establishing the APSA (#19). 
 
After illustrating that there have been strong bonds between AU and ECOWAS in 
general, the following sections will now show how this influence has translated 
into specific institutional design features in the CEWS and the ASF. For the Panel 
of the Wise and the Peace Fund, there was not enough data—meaning policy 
documents and expert knowledge obtained from interviews—available to be able 
to trace and explain the processes leading to the special institutional design of 
these two remaining pillars of APSA. 
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8.3.1.  Continental Early Warning System 
One of the crucial elements of APSA is its early warning system. This was 
first established in the PSC protocol “in order to facilitate the anticipation and 
prevention of conflicts” (AU 2002b, Art. 12). It consists of an “observation and 
monitoring centre” (ibid., Art. 12) that is directly linked with the observation and 
monitoring units of the RECs. It supplies the Commission with information “to 
advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace 
and security in Africa” (ibid., Art. 12).  
The following statements show, again, how the genocide in Rwanda shaped the 
discourse on the African continent, and how the experiences made during and 
after it not only built the groundwork for the establishment of security structures 
but also clearly demonstrated just how badly an improved conflict-prevention 
mechanism was needed within the OAU/AU. 
Interview Section 47: Background of CEWS 
 
The early warning system was connected […] to the discussions postgenocide. 
How come that we were all asleep? When such a horrendous crime was going 
on. […] How to understand the Rwandan genocide? […] I mean, between being 
completely stunned by what was happening and confused about what could 
have been done, it was a slow reaction [by the OAU] (#14). 
In this regard, we noted with satisfaction the remarkable progress made in the 
establishment of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), both at the 
level of the AU and the Regional Mechanisms […]. The operationalization of the 
CEWS is all the more important in view of the fact that conflict prevention is at 
the core of the mandates of our respective organizations (AU 2008, 6f.). 
 
During the Maputo Summit in 2003, the Commission was mandated with the 
establishment of the CEWS (AU 2003a). Anticipated to enter into force in late 
2003, the Commission organized an expert workshop in Addis Ababa in October 
of that year “to brainstorm on the practical modalities and steps, drawing lessons 
from existing regional and international experiences on the establishment and 
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functioning of an early warning system” (AU 2003d).101 As is very apparent, the 
conceptualization of CEWS was heavily influenced by the experiences that other 
regional and international organizations had previously made with their own 
early warning systems. The following interviews (section 48) support this view 
too. 
Interview Section 48: General Influence on CEWS 
 
Other regional and international organizations have definitely served as role 
models. When we began our early warning system in 2006 or 2007, the two 
operational ones then, within Africa, were ECOWAS with ECOWARN and 
IGAD with CEWARN. They were the only two early warning systems that were 
operational and we did benefit a lot from those two institutions. Because they 
already had an established early warning system, at least they had all the policy 
documents, all the legal instruments, legal framework that they needed in 
place. So, that contributed as an input in the establishment of our system, also 
we benefited from their experience (#17). 
For the CEWS, the RECs became quite involved in helping to design it. 
ECOWAS is your best model where they actually get, they got WANEP, West 
African Network for Peacebuilding, to exist inside ECOWAS as technical 
advisors on the development of the early warning system (#23). 
 
As visible in section 48, the interviewees—both of them involved in the design of 
the CEWS—reported that the already-existing early warning systems of ECOWAS 
and IGAD had served not only as institutional role models but also when it came 
legal frameworks too. Alongside the already-mentioned expert workshop in 
October 2003, the Commission also organized a series of activities aimed at 
institutionalizing the CEWS. These took the form of workshops, with officials 
attending from the RECs, the UN and its agencies, civil society, academic 
institutions, IOs, and African think tanks (Wane et al. 2010, 95). In July 2005 
recommendations from these workshops were incorporated into a draft 
“Roadmap for the Operationalization of the CEWS” with “the purpose of 
developing an operational, cost-effective structure and [to] determine the key 
                                                           
101 According to Cilliers, this workshop came up with a number of pertinent recommendations 
that were, however, never implemented—and so “early warning in the AU remained limited to 
the small staff in the situation room” (2005, 8). 
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steps and requirements necessary for the implementation of the early warning 
system” (Wane et al. 2010, 95). In June 2006 the PSC requested that the 
Commission accelerate the operationalization of the CEWS, leading to an 
intensification of efforts on the part of the Commission. From December 17 to 19, 
2006, another meeting of experts from AU member states as well as from the 
RECs was realized. In Kempton Park, South Africa, this gathering of 
representatives from African research centers, academic institutions, and NGOs, 
as well as from IOs, urged the Commission and the RECs once more to implement 
the recommendations made in the draft roadmap within three years—thereby 
ensuring that the CEWS would be fully operational by 2009 (AUC 2007, 1). The 
participants of the meeting also urged member states and AU partners to provide 
the necessary financial and technical assistance for the implementation of CEWS 
in the near future.  
As a consequence, the “Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental 
Early Warning System”—including the request for sufficient supporting financial 
and technical resources from member states and partners—was backed by the AU 
Executive Council. Finally, during the 8th ordinary session of the AU on January 
29–30, 2007, in Addis Ababa, the implementation of the CEWS was realized at 
last (ibid., 97). How this whole process had been characterized by diffusion 
processes, ones wherein decision-makers and the involved staff looked around at 
what had also been created in other organizations previously, is illustrated in 
interview section 49. A staff member of the Conflict Prevention and Early 
Warning Division of the AU described a process that was not only characterized 
by several phases of looking around for and evaluating possibilities, but also—and 
mainly—by learning from the success and failure of the already-existing early 
warning systems of other RECs.   
Interview Section 49: Operationalization Process of CEWS 
 
It started when we tried to establish the early warning system, we said, so what 
do we need to put in place? So, first, the main task was to get the contribution 
from member states. So, in that case, we organized a first meeting called “expert 
meeting of member states” where representatives from all the member states 
attended. It was in 2006; the document that was endorsed during that meeting 
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was called “Framework for Operationalization of the Continental Early 
Warning System.” So that is our blueprint document (#17). 
In those expert meetings, we always made sure that RECs were involved in the 
development and establishment of our early warning system. So, they 
contributed a lot in the development of our policy documents. But we also had 
the experience of learning from some of the institutions on how they tried to 
establish an early warning system. We did visit some institutions (#17). 
We were trying to identify [them], actually the consultants were the ones 
helping us in developing some of the best practices from the different 
organizations. So, they would give us an insight into how DFID developed its 
early warning system, how similar institutions also developed similar 
mechanisms, OECD and others, and we could learn from their experience what 
to take and what not to take, how do we customize those types of systems and 
how to use them internally. So, the consultants also helped us in terms of 
conducting best practices and lessons learned (#17). 
 
The statements in section 49 show not only how important member states were 
during the early warning system’s establishment process but also, as described 
above, how many different meetings were convened with the various stakeholders 
to discuss the institutionalization of the CEWS. According to the interviewees, 
consultants were crucial in assembling information on how similar institutions 
function within other organizations, and in monitoring what elements to adopt 
and which ones not to. Interviews with several consultants revealed that they 
develop expertise over time, and exercise it not only in one RO but in several 
different ones in fact. As visible in figure 11, consultant C.—an expert on early 
warning systems—has previously advised AU, SADC, IGAD, as well as ECOWAS. 
Similarly, consultant Y.—who is extremely knowledgeable regarding the Panel of 
the Wise—has consulted not only in AU and ECOWAS but also SADC and IGAD, 
who have similar systems. While this fact cannot be seen as a causal argument for 
why certain design features are similar between different ROs, it is nonetheless 






Figure 11: Overlap of Consultants in ROs                  
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Source: Author’s own compilation, based on the interviews. 
 
The CEWS is the APSA pillar in which think tanks have played a particularly 
important role (interview section 50). For the CEWS, it was especially useful to 
gain external input as the required knowledge is of a very technical nature. 
Experts, ones working for African think tanks, advised the AU in three main 
areas: data collection, the engagement with decision-makers, as well as 
collaboration with civil-society organizations. According to the interviewees, a 
group of experts worked together to conceptualize the exact framework in which 
the CEWS would operate. Also reported was the fact that, for the CEWS, civil-
society organizations both from Africa and from abroad were involved. 
Interview Section 50: Think Tanks in CEWS 
 
The meeting agreed that the CEWS should focus on three main priorities, data 
collection, the engagement with decision-makers, and coordination and 
collaboration—particularly with the early warning system of the RECs, but also 
with civil society organizations, IOs, and others. But in the development of 
those documents, it was done with a consortium of organizations and experts, 
civil society organizations were involved in the final development of the 
framework. We also had experts, international experts (#17). 
The three mainly have been our experts or our consultants. There have been 
with us now for a while. So, we had those three experts, but we had also invited 
civil society organizations (#17). 
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Another influential actor group consists of staff from AU (and ECOWAS) who 
were seconded from other organizations such as the UN and EU. According to the 
UN’s own definition hereof, secondment means the “movement of a staff member 
from one organization to another for a fixed period, normally not exceeding two 
years, during which the staff member will normally be paid” (UN 2012, 2). As the 
interviews show (section 51), secondment of staff happens regularly in both AU 
and ECOWAS. 
Interview Section 51: Exchange of Staff in General 
 
There is a lot of personnel fluctuation between the organizations. People often 
remain in the foreign services of their country and are seconded to one 
organization, later to another organization (#4). 
 
Interviewees cited that the UN is “physically inside the system” (#23), and has 
advised both AU and ECOWAS in the conceptualizing and implementing of new 
policies and institutions (interview section 52). According to interview #12, this 
secondment is not a one-way street—as AU staff are seconded to the UN, and UN 
staff to the AU. In both cases, knowledge from other organizations is transferred 
to the respective “new” one. 
Interview Section 52: Secondment of Staff 
 
Security organs from the UN or ECOWAS have absolutely served as a role 
model. Representatives from both organizations would be embedded, they are 
physically inside the AU system as advisers or technical support. Seconded. 
And some of them are still there [...]. When R. came in, R. came from the UN 
Political Affairs Department, Security Department for the Operationalization 
of the Secretariat of the Panel of the Wise. Which means that the UN was/is 
completely inside of the system (#23). 
There is a lot of mobility of these people between […] those institutions. […] 
They become important vectors for ideas around these issues. And I think this 
is probably the best way to understand it (#14). 
There was an agreement under this AU-UN cooperation to have some staff from 




The early warning system of the AU heavily benefited from this knowledge 
transfer. As described in the interviews in section 53, a colleague from IGAD— 
where, as noted, an early warning system had already earlier been established—
came to the AU and brought their previous experiences to that RO (#17). As 
reported, they used their knowledge about the conceptualization and 
implementation of CEWARN, as well as the prior cooperation with RECs, to help 
install the CEWS at the AU. The interviews reveal again how important processes 
of learning from the experiences of other organizations have been for AU, and 
how crucial certain stakeholders—meaning the ones that possess the relevant 
knowledge—were for the RO in the installation and improvement of its security 
mechanism. 
Interview Section 53: Exchange of Staff 
 
The other thing was that some of the staff that we recruited at the AU already 
had the experience with working with established mechanisms. For example, 
my colleague H. came from IGAD, CEWARN. So, we had some individuals who 
were more experienced in terms of dealing with subregional organizations 
doing early warning. So, they had also contributed to the establishment of the 
early warning system. There were also some of the tools that were used by these 
institutions. But we also acquired those tools, we did not reinvent the wheel but 
some of the tools that were already used by these institutions that were tested 
and used and we know from experience that they were of good quality. So, we 
also customized that and acquired it (#17). 
I was involved in the establishment of the APSA from 2006 onward, I was 
working on the CEWS. From 2002 to 2006, I worked for CEWARN at IGAD. 
[…] CEWARN was framed after 1994, and the genocide. The member states 
needed to establish structures. Meanwhile, the OAU did not have such an early 
warning system but IGAD and ECOWAS did (#25). 
 
To sum up, consultants were one crucial provider of knowledge in the 
establishment process of the CEWS. They have been characterized as knowledge-
holders who share their expert insights in the field of political institutions, and 
how to structure them. They are often working for one organization, either on a 
long-term basis or recurrently, so that close collaboration is possible. Due to this 
tight-knit cooperation, networks between consultants and decision-makers, as 
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well as between IOs (by whom they are paid) and think tanks (with which they 
are affiliated), develop. Consultants are also often educated to believe in 
institutions and in regionalism, and as some of them have already worked in IOs 
or ROs then they can bring best practices and lessons learned into the “new” 
organizations. As consultants often do not only advise one African RO, they share 
they knowledge between several different ones—this cannot be seen as a causal 
mechanism explaining similarities, but it can be seen as one more piece of the 
puzzle regarding the whole phenomenon of diffusion processes (interview section 
54). The secondment and exchange of staff between organizations is a further 
important channel of such knowledge transfer. The interviews illustrate how 
intense the exchange of staff between the UN and AU (and ECOWAS) has been, 
and how seconded staff bring knowledge from their parent organization to the 
new one—and how fruitful the accompanying learning processes can be for all 
sides. 
Interview Section 54: Policy Networks 
 
There is another group called the expert group […]. Those are the people with 
content knowledge and how to shape institutions and processes. Legal and 
political analysts, conflict resolution specialists, transitional justice experts 
(#23). 
What you call the intelligentsia or the technocrats, part of the thing you need 
to understand is that those people who actually drafted the documents, […] 
most of them get their PhDs or their master degrees from countries like the 
United States, France, Britain, Canada […]. Not only were they Western-
trained, a lot of them were people who were trained to believe in regionalism. 
A lot of them were trained to mainstream peace and security studies and so 
ideologically, they had gone through Western education even if they had the 
sense that as Africans they had to stamp an African identity. They were 
institutionalists, people who believed in the capacity of institutions to influence 
international relations. So, what institutions did they have to look up to? 
Existing institutions, of course, they knew, and they had studied in school and 







8.3.2. African Standby Force 
The ASF is the most critical element of the PSC framework, one that aims 
at enabling the AU to keep its promise of protecting the African people in grave 
circumstances and to be able to respond in a timely and effective manner to 
conflicts breaking out on the African continent (Dersso 2010, 6). The idea of a 
continent-wide military force goes back to the early days of the OAU, when 
President Nkrumah had suggested the creation of an AHC so as to be able to 
respond to African crises without being dependent therein on international 
support.102 Interview section 55 not only illustrates the historical roots that the 
ASF is built upon, but also shows how, again, the experienced violence on the 
African continent contributed in a significant way to the discourse about the need 
for a continent-wide force behind which all African countries could unite. The 
interviews also show that the introduction of Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act, 
as well as the increasing agency of the newly established AU, were crucial factors 
in the institutionalization of the ASF. 
Interview Section 55: Historical Roots of ASF 
 
The ASF is, I would say […], is an accumulation of efforts which date back to 
the OAU when President Nkrumah had suggested the establishment of an AHC 
[…] and his suggestions came from the fact that when the crisis broke out in the 
newly independent state of Congo, it was difficult to get an international 
response (#21). 
This is where the idea started coming up with this standby force, African 
standby force; at least United States of Africa was one of the ideas that were 
there, the ultimate pan-African idea. And then also a pan-African army, which 
can intervene on standby whenever they should be able to intervene (#24). 
You remember the holy due of the establishment of the ASF. You cannot 
separate that with the […]  transition from old AU to AU itself. […] The 
paradigm shift in the thinking that we can no longer sit on the fence. You know, 
this principle of indifference (#22). 
 
                                                           
102 For further details on this, see again chapter 3.1 of this thesis. 
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Thinking about an AFC had also been discussed in the Kampala Document that, 
already in 1991, explicitly referred to the urgent need for the African continent to 
establish conflict resolution mechanisms within the framework of the OAU (table 
20). 
Table 20: Discourse of a Future Continent-Wide African Force 
 
There is, indeed, the urgent requirement to prevent conflicts and disputes from 
escalating into armed hostilities. This calls for the strengthening of conflict 
resolution mechanisms for negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration 
at the governmental, political and diplomatic levels, within the framework of 
intervention. Africa under CSSDCA should revitalise the operational 
effectiveness of the OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration. In conformity with African tradition, the emphasis should be put 
on timely mediation and reconciliation (ALF 1991, 3). 
 
According to Article 13 of the PSC protocol, the intention behind the ASF was to 
enable “the Peace and Security Council to perform its responsibilities with respect 
to the deployment of peace-support missions and intervention pursuant to 
Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act” (AU 2002b). The ASF is composed 
of standby multidisciplinary contingents, including both civilian as well as 
military components, in their countries of origin—ones that furthermore should 
be ready for rapid deployment at the appropriate moment’s notice (ibid.). To able 
to do this, every member state is asked to “establish standby contingents for 
participation in peace support missions decided on by the Peace and Security 
Council or intervention authorized by the Assembly” (ibid., Art. 13).  
Furthermore, the “strength and type of such contingents, their degree of 
readiness and general location shall be determined in accordance with 
established African Union Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), 
and shall be subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and 
conflict situations” (ibid., Art. 13). The ASF’s mandate includes: observation and 
monitoring missions; other types of peace-support mission; intervention in a 
member state’s territory if necessary; preventive-deployment missions; peace-
building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; and, 
humanitarian assistance. Close cooperation with the UN and other relevant 
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regional and international organizations as well as NGOs is also ascribed to the 
ASF. A special representative of the chairman of the Commission heads the 
missions, whereas a force commander coordinates and directs operations and 
reports to the special representative. Furthermore, a Military Staff Committee 
was established in order “to advise and assist the Peace and Security Council in 
all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and 
maintenance of peace and security in Africa” (AU 2002b, Art. 13); it is composed 
of senior military officers from the members of the PSC. 
After adopting the PSC protocol, African chiefs of defence and security then 
crafted, in May 2003, ‘The Policy Framework Document on the Establishment of 
the African Standby Force and of the Military Staff Committee.”103 Not long after, 
African ministers of foreign affairs made recommendations for consolidated 
proposals to be contained within the ASF framework. After another important 
meeting of African chiefs of defence and security in January 2004, African heads 
of state and government finally adopted an amended framework document in 
July 2004 (Cilliers 2008; Cilliers and Malan 2005; Kasumba and Debrah 2010). 
This framework scheduled the establishment of the ASF in two phases: phase I 
was planned to be implemented by June 30, 2005 (but was actually delayed until 
2008), whereas phase II was originally envisaged to have been realized by June 
2010 meanwhile.104 Furthermore, it was agreed that the ASF would consist of 
standby brigades from each of the five African regions105—as well as to 
incorporate a police force and a civilian dimension as well (Cilliers and Malan 
                                                           
103 The framework outlined a number of typical conflicts that the ASF is likely to face, and will 
potentially need to respond to: 1) AU/regional military advice to a political mission; 2) 
AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission; 3) stand-alone AU/regional 
observer mission; 4) AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI enforcement and 
preventive-deployment missions; 5) AU peacekeeping force for complex, multidimensional 
peacekeeping mission with low-level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts); 6) AU 
intervention—for example situation of genocide where the international community does not 
react promptly (AU 2003c, 3). 
104 For a detailed overview of the contents of both phases I and II, see AU 2003c). 
105 A previous concept, one that was presented to the AU in 2003, contained the proposal of a 
single standby high readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG) arrangement at the AU level, and the 
subsequent development of standby brigades in the RECs too. By having agreed to five regional 
standby brigades, African heads of state and government returned to a concept of African 
peacekeeping that had first been discussed in meetings of African chiefs of defence in July 1996 
and October 1997 (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 2). 
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2005). Figure 12 illustrates the allocation of regions (Central Africa, East, North, 
Southern, and West) for the ASF. 
Figure 12: Allocation of ASF regions 
 
Source: Cilliers 2008, 2 
 
The various heads of state also approved the establishment of a specialized 
technical committee, comprised of ministers of defence, to work closely with the 
PSC, to follow up on the founding of the ASF. Originally aiming to have made 
substantial progress by mid-2004, several factors led to an eventual setback in 
this timeframe. Thus the approval of the policy framework was delayed, key 
follow-up consultations failed to materialize, and the level of information 
exchange between AU and RECs was far from optimal. The difficult 
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transformation process within the AU Commission additionally slowed down the 
establishment of the ASF too (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 2).106 
In March 2005 a “Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby 
Force” was adopted at an expert meeting in Addis Ababa. This roadmap 
contained details regarding the “installation of an appropriate Africa-wide, 
integrated and inter-operable command, control, communication and 
information system (C3IS) infrastructure, that would link deployed units with 
mission headquarters, as well as the AU, planning elements (PLANELMs) and 
regions” (Cilliers 2008, 2). Later that year, the AU hosted another expert meeting 
in Addis Ababa, in November/December 2005, to conceptualize a series of 
workshops aimed at developing concepts relating to the doctrine of the ASF, 
standard operating procedures, guidelines on C3IS, logistics, as well as to training 
and evaluation (ibid., 4f.). An internal roadmap document of the AU Peace 
Support Operations Division (PSOD) was developed in November 2006, but this 
writ did not have a formal status (ibid., 2). As the close cooperation of the AU 
Commission and RECs is one of the most crucial elements of the ASF, a MoU was 
signed in 2008. Aiming at facilitating cooperation on peace and security issues 
between the Commission and RECs, the MoU stipulated details regarding regular 
meetings and exchanges of information, as well as concerning liaison officers 
(Kasumba and Debrah 2010, 14).  
In the process of operationalizing the ASF, decision-makers relied on already-
existing institutional role models. As the interviews in section 56 show, it was 
particularly ECOWAS, and its standby force ESF, that influenced decision-
makers within the AU in this context. Interviewees’ statements underline the 
exemplary function of ECOWAS on the African continent, as outlined in chapter 
6. Based on its self-confident interventions in the early 1990s and a security 
architecture that had been institutionalized prior to the AU’s, ECOWAS thus 
served as a role model not only for APSA in general but for the establishment of 
the ASF in particular. An excerpt from the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention 
                                                           
106 Indeed RECs such as ECOWAS and IGAD furthered their own arrangements, not all of which 
were in accordance with what the AU had originally planned (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 2). 
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Framework, cited in the last row of section 56, illustrates that ECOWAS perceives 
itself as the model upon which other RECs build their own standby forces. 
Interview Section 56: ECOWAS as a Role Model for the ASF 
 
ECOMOG in the 1990s, [in] 1991 and 1993, combined with some of the tragic 
events on the continent like the Rwandan genocide, all shaped and contributed 
in very useful ways to the development of the APSA (#19). 
Yes, reference for example was made to NATO, including in some of the ASF 
policy documents you will find references, also to security architecture on the 
continent. At the time, ECOWAS was the most advanced and reference was 
made to that as well (#21). 
ECOWAS has developed a comparative advantage in the area of peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement, and has become a model for the continent. Under the 
aegis of the African Union, a Pan-African Stand-by Force (ASF) is in the process 
of being established. [..] ECOWAS is well placed to be the first REC to deliver 
its brigade and it is the lead organization in the development of the ASF 
Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) (ECOWAS 2008, Art. 25). 
 
Despite the elevated position of ECOWAS in the creation process of the ASF, 
other RECs as well as member states have also been crucial herein too though. 
Table 57 shows just how intensively member states have been involved in the 
various creation processes during the past thirteen years or so, ones that have 
been characterized by the very strong cooperation and collaboration between 
individual member states and the AU hierarchy. Furthermore the second 
statement (#21) makes clear once again quite how important the other RECs, 
further to ECOWAS, are—as they are the fundamental basis for a functioning 
ASF. 
Interview Section 57: Importance of RECs and Member States for 
ASF 
 
In order to operationalize the ASF, we have been going through a number of 
processes toward this full operationalization in the last thirteen years or so. 
That has been realized based on regular consultations and meetings and 
regular updates with the member states in order for them to track the 
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implementation of the decisions they have made and to consider ways on how 
we can enhance our efforts (#19). 
You know, the ASF and its existence is upon the RECs—so everything that has 
been done toward its development, had been done with the RECs. Because 
without them, you will not have a standby force (#21). 
 
The conceptualization phase of the ASF was also characterized by the key 
influence therein of expert consultants. As interviewees who liaised with the AU 
regarding the ASF reported (interview section 58), numerous such individuals 
were involved with this founding process. The interviews reveal that the 
elaboration of the civilian component of the ASF was a process in which much 
consultation took place. It was explained how the original design was mainly a 
military one, and consultants were invited to discuss the current state of the art 
hereon. As the involved consultants reported, a series of meetings occurred; in 
the end, civilian components would also be included based on the expert input of 
non-state actors.  
A further example of how external advisors have shaped RO policies is shown in 
interview #21 specifically. It reveals how consultants managed to change the 
classification of stakeholders by the ASF. Originally the AU, for financial reasons, 
had planned to treat women and children as like-for-like stakeholders. Invited 
consultants managed to convince the AU, however, to ultimately treat these two 
demographics as separate ones—thereby meeting international standards as well. 
Interview Section 58: Consultants in ASF 
 
We [consultants] were particularly involved in the development of the civilian 
dimension of the ASF. […]  So, the result was that the first design of the ASF 
was basically 90 percent a military design with only a little bit of civilian 
elements in it. […] We then organized a meeting and drafted the first policy 
framework and so forth, and then how to implement it in the coming years 
(#15). 
Non-state actors have been influential. It was not easy […] but yes, we did 
manage to influence [the AU]. I still remember very well in 2006, one of the big 
meetings on the civilian standby force and something that has stuck with me 
was the notion that, because the AU has no money, we should take women and 
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children together. And it took us about thirty minutes to discuss and to say, 
sorry, but women are not children and children are not women and we need to 
separate those two. And if you do not have money, well, go find it. So, back and 
forth but in the end, it had been separated (#21). 
The ASF, the African Standby Force, was driven by consultancy reports often 
written by Sarjoh Bah with strong support from A. A. used to work for ISS (#11). 
 
 
8.4. Consolidation: Social Learning in the AU 
As already outlined, diffusion theories argue that regional and 
international organizations can learn from the examples of more successful peers. 
In learning—a process wherein a change occurs in one’s own beliefs—
stakeholders adopt a given institutional design based on the assumed 
effectiveness of it, as they have observed already in other institutions, and 
founded on the hope of being able to translate the same success to their own 
organization too (Lee and Strang 2006; Meseguer 2009; Sommerer 2011). 
According to the literature, such processes are particularly intense if stakeholders 
learn from close peers (Hall 1993). 
In the case of the establishment of the APSA, learning processes can be observed 
in both the OAU and in its successor the AU. However the interviews reveal that 
the initial impulse for the creation of new institutions was based on two aspects 
in this particular context. First, the violent conflicts of the 1990s—and the 
circumstances accompanying them, both during and after—made clear that 
existing security institutions were insufficient to resolve current conflicts on the 
continent. The experienced impotence vis-à-vis those conflicts paired with the 
inefficiency of existing structures changed the thinking of African decision-
makers.  
The second observation is built on the first one, namely the existing but inefficient 
peace and security structures of the OAU/AU. The interviews in section 59 
illustrate just how intimately decision-makers learned from their very own 
experiences. Interviews #15 and #27 reveal that the experiences with the OAU 
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mechanism and the Central Organ in the 1990s fed into the creation of the new 
security structures.  
Interview Section 59: Lessons Learned from Own Experiences 
 
And what we then later had as the Peace and Security Division and other parts 
of the AU were partly developed out of the lessons learned from the first days 
of the Conflict Management Division (#15). 
I think it was really driven by what we learned from our own experience, from 
what we learned from our own experience regarding working with the Central 
Organ and also made by the ideals of the moment (#27). 
It was not for lack of manpower or resources, for example, that Africa stood in 
apparent haplessness when a band of armed mercenaries took over Comoros 
last year! What is at the heart of the problem is the lack of political consensus 
on the kind of response Africa should have to such situations. It is, therefore, 
important to begin from a thorough examination of the political problems that 
have hamstrung effective action on the continent. This is important in order to 
understand how a new plan can be elaborated building upon the experiences of 
the past (ALF 1990, 28). 
 
That this procedure is nothing new is divulged in the last row of section 59, where 
the report from a brainstorming meeting for the CSSDCA illustrates that, already 
in 1990, a similar procedure could also be observed. This demonstrates that, in 
the case of the OAU, a first starting point for the creation of new structures was 
the recollection of its own past achievements and subsequent deep discussion 
about how successful existing structures—institutions as well as policies—had 
actually been.  
The OAU did not only learn from its own inability to react to those conflicts, 
however, but also from the disinterest of the international community. As visible 
in interview section 60, interviewees underlined that the initial spark for reform 
also arose out of this indifference overseas to the violent conflicts currently 
occurring on the African continent. As illustrated, African decision-makers not 
only felt abandoned and neglected by those abroad but also left to deal with these 
severe conflicts alone. As a consequence, a strong belief in the fundamental 
necessity of one’s own agency, and ownership of presenting problems, developed 
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on the continent. The ambition now was to show to the world that Africa was not 
only capable of handling its own problems but also that, as such, it should be 
respected and treated as an equal partner in international negotiations 
henceforth. 
Interview Section 60: Signal of Own Strength 
 
What happened in Rwanda, what happened earlier in Liberia, actually led some 
of the African leaders to believe that they had been marginalized and that they 
had been abandoned. And that the world was more interested in what has 
happening in the Balkans. It was a time for Africa to begin to own its own 
problems and begin to own its own solutions, and to demonstrate the capacity 
that if the world does not care, Africa will step up to the plate. And I think this 
was how some of these scholars or academics were actually able to win these 
leaders to their side, because that kind of argument will be good for any kind of 
political leader. Because politicians want to look good (#9).  
Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its 
rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations (OAU 
2000c, Art. 3 (i)). 
The challenge of the leadership in Africa is to create an Africa which is noticed 
for its strength and not for its misery and weakness. A strong Africa must be 
one which is economically integrated, financially stable, politically united, and 
with a distinct culture and set of values (ALF 1990, 2). 
 
Following these considerations, there was a very strong belief and wish on the 
continent to take greater ownership of African issues. By thinking about new 
institutions, decision-makers thus aimed at bringing about a revision in how the 
AU handled peace and security issues and, at the same time, at showing that 
Africa was able to deal with its own afflictions. Interview section 61 illustrates that 
the OAU/AU did not aim to isolating itself in peacekeeping efforts but rather to 
be an equal partner—next to the UN—in the handling of peace and security 
matters. Africa’s leadership being on equal standing with international partners 





Interview Section 61: “African Solutions to African Problems” 
 
It is more a question of Africa taking responsibility for its own problems, and 
African leadership, so that others do not come and make peace on the 
continent; they can help us, but the primary responsibility must be an African 
responsibility. And that is really what African solutions to African problems 
means. It is sometimes reflected as, then, we want to deal with our problems in 
isolation. It is not the case because it is not possible, and I think all thinking 
Africans know that Africa needs the UNSC, and the UN system more than any 
other region globally. […] What we have seen over the last twenty to thirty years 
is much greater African leadership efforts and engagement, and that has all 
been quite positive (#29). 
It was the felt renewal of Africa taking charge of its own destiny and then 
playing a leading role or key role in addressing the peace and security 
challenges of the continent (#27). 
All African states, by virtue of their membership of the African Union, recognize 
that unity is strength. We recognize also that it is only through the 
consolidation of our unity, that our continent will move from the periphery to 
a position where Africa will become an equal and effective participant in the 
world economic, political and social order (Essy 2002, 2). 
 
This connotation of change and a new beginning is also reflected in the interviews 
of section 62. The ability to create something new and innovative had already 
been reflected in the Constitutive Act and its Article 4 (h). Based on that, African 
decision-makers orientated themselves toward existing security councils—but 
also keenly tried to establish something altogether new and more effective for the 
African continent itself. 
Interview Section 62: Change in African Peace and Security 
Ambitions 
 
People were believing while it would be really that we will start a new 
beginning, and therefore possibilities were open, new frontiers could be 
reached. So all that contributed to this giving birth. I mean, the protocol, which 
in my view even today, it remains one of the most advanced documents of this 
guide. When you look at the protocol, you would see very advanced in terms of 
progression and trying to prohibit as much as possible push back by a number 
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of days, extremely advanced with its council including how and where I refer to 
progression including the progression of genocide (#27). 
We made sure that the UNSC, its global responsibilities, be acknowledged in 
the PSC protocol, and that therefore if you find that the slight dissonance 
between the AU’s constitution, which is really not that the UN does not feature 
that prominently, but within the piece of Security Council protocol there is a 
clear establishment of a hierarchy between the UNSC and the PSC. But that is 
because of the very strong belief and hope in the importance of the Security 
Council for Africa, and that continues to this day (#29). 
 
Interviewees underline diffusion arguments by stating that, once this turning 
point of creating new institutions had been reached, existing organizations then 
served as role models therein. In the case of APSA the latter were, as already 
outlined, the UN and ECOWAS. But both of these bodies have not only served as 
role models but above all as organizations from which the OAU/AU has continued 
to keenly learn. The AU has learned also from their flaws, trying itself to improve 
on them (interview section 63). Consultants and decision-makers have played a 
central role in these learning processes, being individuals who have worked for 
and in all three of those organizations—acquiring and bringing new knowledge 
with them each time.  
Interview Section 63: Role Models for the APSA: UN and ECOWAS 
 
You can say that, to some extent, the UN was an inspiration as well as a lessons-
learned for them in two ways. One was an inspiration, as some structures of it 
were created. But they were much more interested in learning from the flaws 
of the Security Council and trying to improve upon it. That is not necessarily 
driven by member states, but was driven by the consultants who worked on it. 
You remember that Margaret Vogt and her co-author happen to be individuals 
from the ECOWAS system. Margaret at that time worked for the Nigerian 
government and was aware of the ECOWAS Conflict Management and 
Prevention Division, and wanted to some extent draw on that and wanted it to 
inform the AU (#11).  
 
In answering the question of which of the two organizations, ECOWAS or the UN, 
was the ultimate role model for APSA, answers were divergent. Whereas some 
interviewees stated that it was clearly ECOWAS that had paved the way for OAU 
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and AU with its own previous peace and security ambitions (section 64), others 
posited that the UNSC was, indeed, the most important such role model 
(interview section 65).  
Interview Section 64: Lessons Learned from ECOWAS 
 
ECOWAS was really the frontrunner in terms of peace and security 
frameworks. There was not another person, not EDC, not ECCAS, not the 
Maghreb Union, nobody, it was just ECOWAS (#9). 
ECOWAS has been consequence and cause for the APSA (#19). 
Most of these things happened in the early 2000s and they have happened in 
the same footage. I do not see that we took a model from the UN, it is really 
reflecting the needs that were happening on the continent and also in 
international politics. And it was really more the focus on the regional 
approach. So, ROs started to be more active in the area of peace and security 
(#16).  
 
What the interviews illustrate quite well is that ECOWAS was perceived as a 
rather positive role model based on its missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Furthermore, that West African body’s interventions painted a picture of a strong 
RO capable of breaking the cycle of full dependence on international support. As 
a consequence, the interviewees—when speaking about ECOWAS—referred only 
to the achievements of, but not to the potential problems in, ECOWAS’ peace and 
security architecture. When speaking of the UNSC, however, almost all 
interviewees pointed out the severe institutional problems that it faces. While 
commenting that the UNSC had indeed served as a certain kind of role model, all 
interviewees very quickly brought up their concerns about its institutional 
structure—and, furthermore, how strong the consensus was among decision-
makers to prevent the new Peace and Security Council from making the same 
mistakes (interview section 65). 
Interview Section 65: Lessons Learned from the UNSC 
 
We obviously took our cue from the UNSC, and we were trying to look at ways 
to make up for the, what we saw as the deficits, within it (#29).  
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To some extent, the Security Council acted as a model as well as what I consider 
to be an ideational setting. In a positive way, it helped to imagine what the 
African continent can create and then to be able to learn from the Security 
Council’s flaws. […] At the same time, it limited the scope of the consultants 
because they have the Security Council. It made it very difficult for those 
consultants who were coming from those two institutions, from ECOWAS, and 
then knowing about ECOWAS and Nigeria’s intervention at that time in Sierra 
Leone and to think about how the Security Council had really helped. It limited 
them in terms of what they could imagine for the African continent. The 
limitations of the Peace and Security Council as well as it threats were driven 
in part by the UNSC, by wanting to learn from them (#11). 
 
When speaking of lessons learned regarding the Security Council, interviewees 
often—unsurprisingly—made reference to the membership issue. According to 
them (interview section 66), a major problem with the UNSC lies in the 
permanent membership therein of certain states—a situation that can not only 
lead to institutional gridlock but that also exacerbates the lack of parity between 
member states. The latter shortfall represents, according to the interviewees, a 
crucial reason behind the non-adaptation within the AU itself of permanent seats 
or veto power for a select group of states—as equal standing among members is a 
determining principle of this RO.  
The election of member states to the AU is based, as noted previously, on 
geographical distribution. Not only is it important to the AU to have the five 
African regions equally represented, but also to ensure a fair geographical 
rendering in the election process for new members of the PSC too. The interviews 
confirmed once more that the UNSC’s own difficulties initiated learning 
processes in the OAU/AU regarding the ideal design of the newly established PSC. 
Interview Section 66: Lessons Learned on Membership Questions 
 
Yes, we borrowed the idea from the UN but adopted it for the African 
circumstances because now you can see the difference here, for example, we 
have a principle of equal and sovereign states. So, they totally rejected the idea 
of veto [as in the UNSC]. There is no veto. But they accepted the idea of two 
rotational groups, one three years, one two years. So, it helps for the continuity 
and the institutional memory (#12). 
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And the problems of course affected these permanent seats, but at the same 
time […] you wanted to acknowledge that those countries in particular that 
were regional powers, had to be able to be elected and reelected back to the 
council. And that’s how the council came to consist of countries for three years 
and countries for two years. […] The other factor that influenced the design is 
the importance within Africa on equity that every region has the same number 
of seats, and that the other, the non-permanent seats rotates or that countries 
be elected in an equitable manner. That the regions are equitably represented 
(#29). 
Of course, there is no reason for permanent membership. […] It was one of the 
options but some of the member states objected strongly and by trying to come 
around the issue, there is the idea with some members for three years and 
others for two years (#27).  
 
However the UNSC not only triggered learning processes among decision-makers 
and consultants but also, according to interviewees, limited the possibilities the 
AU had for the establishment of its own council (interview section 67). AU 
decision-makers undertook intense debates about in what ways they should 
adopt certain useful features from the UNSC, while at the same time attempting 
to avoid taking on board those ones that had turned out to be problematic. 
Interview section 67 illustrates how certain of the choices made were so due to 
the negative impression of the UNSC among a number of AU decision-makers. 
The interviews divulge that some of these individuals would have preferred a new 
institution to be created that did not rely on the institutional design of one that 
they perceived to be ineffective (#10 and #24). According to interview #11, the 
UNSC acting as a primary role model prevented the relevant stakeholders from 
considering other institutions and their potential to offer guidance and 
inspiration to the AU instead—as the UNSC’s arrangements are as well-known as 
they are prominent.  
Interview Section 67: Limitations to Innovative Thinking 
 
We are already reproaching the UNSC to be something which is not acceptable 
to us, then we go on create something [similar] ourselves now? (#24). 
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The big picture is, the AU was modelled after the UN. Unfortunately, for the 





























9.1. Summary of Results 
 
 
People often have no choice but to consult experts. […]  
No one could acquire all of the specialized knowledge 
 a person would need in order never to be reliant  
on someone else’s expertise 
(Code 1999, 182). 
 
This thesis has asked why organizations resemble each other, how these 
similarities evolve, and what role stakeholders play in the decision-making 
process vis-à-vis institutional design. It has thereby situated itself within IR 
debates concerned with questions such as why organizations are created and why 
they look the way that they do. On the micro-level, this thesis has hence 
investigated why the security institutions of AU and ECOWAS not only resemble 
each other but also share similarities with the UNSC too. It has examined the 
pathways leading to these specific institutional design choices and has inquired 
after the role of stakeholders in the related diffusion processes. This qualitative 
study of (social) learning within diffusion processes has yielded the following core 
findings:  
 
1) History Matters. The study has revealed in a very clear way that the past 
influences the present. The end of the Cold War marked a major turning 
point for the world in general but for the African continent in particular. 
Severe and violent conflicts have not only seen millions of people 
murdered on the African continent since the early 1990s but have also led 
to extreme poverty and famine as well as internal displacement. Whereas 
ECOWAS, among others, had to deal with so-called new wars in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, the OAU was severely challenged, 
meanwhile, by the genocide in Rwanda. Neither of these ROs ultimately 
managed to solve their respective problems in the immediate post–Cold 
War era. The UN, as the organization having the mandate to enforce peace 
and security across the whole continent, actually—along with an 
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increasingly disinterested international community—left Africa to its 
problems in the 1990s. The own sense of powerlessness and the neglect of 
the international community deeply influenced the subsequent discourse 
on peace and security on the African continent, and intensified the wish of 
African ROs to pursue greater self-determination. These crises and their 
consequences served, then, as triggers for both organizations to start 
thinking about creating policies and institutions that would be able to solve 
such stark challenges in future. 
 
2) Lessons are There to be Learned. Both organizations, ECOWAS and the 
OAU/AU, learned enormously from their past experiences in conflict 
management. Whereas the OAU was almost paralyzed by its own 
powerlessness and unwillingness to take action in Rwanda, ECOWAS 
developed a greater self-confidence due to its own interventions in the late 
1990s. Based on (supposed) success stories, ones in which they would not 
rely on international support, ECOWAS could claim itself to be a strong 
RO with leading ambitions on the continent. By revising its security 
institutions, ECOWAS aimed to gain greater status and legitimacy not only 
on the African continent but also in the eyes of the UN—wherein it was 
seeking to become a strong and credible partner when it comes to peace 
and security issues. By institutionalizing its own modified security 
structures, the OAU/AU meanwhile now wanted to signal to the 
international community that it was a strong organization able to find 
“African solutions to African problems.” 
 
3) Learning is not Learning is not Learning. ECOWAS learned differently 
than the AU did. As the first RO on the African continent with an 
institutionalized security mechanism, ECOWAS particularly learned from 
its very own interventions in, among others, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea-Bissau. By taking the UNSC as a role model, it aimed at 
institutionalizing its frontrunner position in peace and conflict manners, 
as initiated specifically by the aspiring hegemon Nigeria. The AU, on the 
other hand, has learned enormously from ECOWAS. Being faced with the 
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horror in Rwanda and the complete failure to address this situation by 
both itself and the UN, the AU wanted to demonstrate that it would 
henceforth be able to cope with any own security problems on the African 
continent. Exemplary social-learning processes can be observed herein, 
based on the very close connections between these two organizations as 
well as the intense exchange of knowledge between them. By using the 
experiences of ECOWAS, and partly those of the UN too, the AU has thus 
strongly relied on diffusion processes.  
 
4) Knowledge Travels. The study has shown how expert networks influence 
decision-making in organizations. As the latter rely on expertise that is not 
already internally available, they hence liaise with think tanks and 
consultants from whom they expect to acquire the necessary expertise for 
undertaking more fruitful decision-making processes. The thesis has 
illustrated that, in order to be successful, experts need to be well connected 
to the respective decision-makers, as they were in the cases of AU and 
ECOWAS. Due to the natural proximity between these two organizations, 
significant movement of expertise has taken place between AU and 
ECOWAS over the years. As part of this, not only have decision-makers 
moved between AU, ECOWAS, and the UN but so too have consultants 
very often worked for more than one of these organizations. Thereby 
networks developed, knowledge could diffuse, and learning processes have 
thus been facilitated. 
 
9.2. Contributions of This Study 
This thesis regards itself as a key contribution to IR research in general and 
diffusion debates in particular. By having conducted a qualitative study on why 
organizations share institutional similarities and how those similarities have 
evolved, this thesis contributes to the current corpus of research in both 
theoretical and empirical ways. As a study on learning mechanisms, it enriches 
the current state of the art in a number of vital directions. 
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First, this thesis has not only shown how influential IOs are for ROs but also how 
the latter significantly influence each other too. By underlining the importance of 
networks, this thesis has illustrated how stakeholders connect to each other 
across borders. It has shown how knowledge that has been used in one RO travels 
to another on the basis of identical expertise being used in analogous 
organizations. This thesis has thus taken a first step toward exemplifying the 
relationship between ROs existing on the same continent, and how they, on the 
one hand, work closely together and share staff and expertise while, on the other, 
also compete for legitimacy and influence on their home continent. 
Second, this thesis has furthered diffusion research with the empirical 
foundations that it has laid. As the majority of the literature on diffusion 
mechanisms is conducted quantitatively, microperspectives on the actual 
processes involved are still heavily outnumbered. This thesis has taken an in-
depth look, then, at what actual happened where, and when—and who exactly was 
involved. By tracing the actual learning processes occurring and by having 
conducted numerous interviews with the involved stakeholders on all sides—
meaning the decision-makers in AU and ECOWAS as well as the experts hired as 
consultants to both ROs—this study offers profound insight into pivotal learning 
mechanisms—something that is very scarce at present in diffusion research. 
Third, there is currently a vast amount of literature on diffusion mechanisms but 
hardly any at all on related stakeholders. By extending the perspectives, then, on 
the actual core of diffusion processes—who shares knowledge with whom, and 
under which specific conditions—this thesis has taken a first step toward 
combining diffusion research with the literature on key stakeholders in decision-
making processes. It underlines not only how important knowledge is in a world 
more complex than ever, but also illustrates how powerful well-connected experts 
can be in determining international politics. 
Fourth, the literature on diffusion is mainly concentrated on the EU as well as on 
such processes running from the Global North to the Global South. By conducting 
research on diffusion processes between ROs on the African continent, therefore, 
a hitherto heavily neglected research field has now been moved to the center of 
our interest.  
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Fifth, this study has shown on a micro-level how organizations are established. 
In contrast to the dominant rational-choice approaches that argue states design 
organizations according to their own preferences, this study has shown how 
decision-makers in ROs learn and how consultants and think tanks facilitate this 
in processes of establishing regional and international organizations.  
 
9.3. Agenda for Future Research 
Although this thesis strived to begin filling in key research gaps previously 
identified, not all of these shortfalls in the literature could be overcome here. On 
the contrary, in fact; by researching in-depth the raised scholarly questions, more 
research fields have been identified that need to be urgently addressed in future 
academic endeavors. 
This thesis has revolved around the AU and ECOWAS—who are not only the two 
most prominent ROs on the African continent but also the most powerful African 
ones too. It would be helpful to now extend research not only to other African 
ROs but also to ones operating in Asia and the Americas too. Thereby, one could 
answer questions about to what extent diffusion mechanisms and stakeholders 
differ across world regions. As some of these other ROs already have been 
included in quantitative studies, more qualitative and in-depth research on them 
would be particularly helpful to better understand the driving forces behind their 
respective diffusion mechanisms and why they have opted for given institutional 
design choices.  
As outlined, the present thesis could not find answers for all pillars of the APSA— 
as there is insufficient available data for the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund. 
As both are crucial components of the APSA, it would be very interesting to find 
additional sources that may enable us to trace the processes leading to their 
eventual institutional designs. 
Theoretically, this thesis has been a classic diffusion study. As diffusion theory 
operates with concepts such as agency and cultural entanglement, further 
research should integrate the debates much more closely into cultural studies and 
anthropological research going forward. For the questions of why organizations 
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look similar and how that has come about, agency is a crucial component—
particularly against the backdrop of the diffusion processes from IOs to ROs that 
have partly been the focus of the present research. The same holds true for 
cultural studies, which ask similar questions—but would answer them differently. 
Methodologically, (historical) process tracing has turned out to be a useful tool 
with which to reproduce the relevant processes. However, as networks turned out 
to be a crucial component of the present research field, in-depth network analysis 
was not only able to tell us more about the involved stakeholders but also about 
the ties between them—and furthermore how the relations between one another 
have induced flows of vital expertise. Consequently stakeholders in decision-
making processes should assume center stage in future research, as they are the 
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